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The Rule of Law in the
Nicaraguan Revolution
ALEJANDRO SERRANO CALDERAt
PREFACE
BY ROBERT W. BENSON*
The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, one of the momentous
social events of our time from any political viewpoint, entered a new
phase with the birth of the Nicaraguan Constitution in 1987.
Whatever understanding, or misunderstanding, anyone had of the em-
bryonic phase of the Revolution, which began in 1979 with the vic-
tory of the Sandinista Front and the exit of the Somoza dictatorship,
must now be revised in light of the new Constitution. The Constitu-
tion is the charter not only for the elections of 1990, but also for the
entire structure of public life in Nicaragua for the foreseeable future.
A constitution, like any other legal text, acquires its meaning
from both context and application. Words alone mean nothing; con-
stitutions are mere black marks on paper, signifying nothing but a
haze of language over reality. In fact, however, the words are charged
with powerful meaning because they are never alone. They are always
embedded in a context and as applied are used as potent instruments
of government. The better conclusion, then, is that we should pay
close attention to a constitution's words-in context and as applied.
The historical context in which the 1987 Nicaraguan Constitu-
tion was drafted and adopted is extraordinary. Nicaragua was a small
society engaged in revolutionary reorganization while, at the same
time, defending itself against aggression which was financed and di-
rected by one of the world's superpowers. More fundamentally, the
context from which any constitution arises is what the Spanish philos-
opher Ortega y Gasset, in defining a nation, called a people's "life
t Dr. Serrano served as President of the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua be-
tween 1985 and 1988 and is currently serving as the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United
Nations. Dr. Serrano was also a professor of legal philosophy at the National Autonomous
University of Nicaragua between 1965 and 1974. He served as Nicaragua's Ambassador to
France beginning in 1979, as well as Ambassador to UNESCO and other organizations of the
United Nations. In addition, Dr. Serrano was a specialist in labor law at the University of
Rome and is currently a doctoral candidate at the University of Paris.
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
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project in common."' A constitution is the project's guiding plan.
How have the Nicaraguans planned their common life project? Why,
what, and whose ideas competed? What compromises were made?
Most importantly, how does all this charge the words of their Consti-
tution with certain meaning at the moment of its birth? With regard
to application, further questions arise: what meaning does the text
gather when applied in specific instances over the course of time? Is it
possible for the Constitution's text to be applied impartially in a revo-
lutionary society or in time of war? Can the liberal western democra-
cies' concept of the Rule of Law exist in Nicaragua today?
The pages that follow provide direct and indirect evidence of
some answers to these questions from an important source. The work
is a collection of essays, lectures, and speeches by the man who was
President of Nicaragua's Supreme Court of Justice between 1985 and
1988 and who presently serves as Nicaraguan Ambassador to the
United Nations, Dr. Alejandro Serrano Caldera.
Dr. Serrano, together with his judicial colleagues and others, dis-
cussed, debated and drafted ideas which significantly influenced the
final constitutional text, particularly with regard to the role of the
judicial branch. Then, after the Constitution was promulgated in Jan-
uary 1987, he and his colleagues began the work of transforming the
judiciary and proposing significant modifications of existing law to
conform to the new charter. As head of the Judicial Branch during
this formative period immediately before and after Nicaragua adopted
the Constitution, Dr. Serrano analyzed, negotiated, articulated, and
administered these changes. The works collected here reflect his la-
bors during that period.
Published in Spanish as two books, 2 they are combined here for
publication in the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Compara-
tive Law Journal under a title that states their unifying theme: The
Rule of Law in the Nicaraguan Revolution. Scholars and lawyers in
the United States customarily look to the writings of James Madison,
Chief Justice John Marshall, and others for evidence of their own
Constitution's formative context. Dr. Serrano's works will hopefully
serve the same important function in understanding the Nicaraguan
Constitution. Moreover, the works will be indispensable for any seri-
1. J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, ESPARA INVERTEBRADA 40 (1964).
2. Derecho en la Revoluci6n (Ediciones Juridicas, Managua 1986) covering 1985-1986,
and La Transformati6n Judicial en Nicaragua (Ediciones Juridicas, Managua 1988) covering
1986-1988.
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ous study of one aspect of the Nicaraguan Revolution that, to date,
has been virtually overlooked. That aspect is the emergence of the
Judicial Branch as a center of power.
Readers should keep in mind that Dr. Serrano's chapters are
prime source documents: speeches and essays delivered to audiences
involved in developing the Consititution. They are not after-the-fact
academic analyses. Therefore, their style is discursive, wide-ranging,
and designed for particular audiences. While this sometimes makes
for difficult reading, it increases the value of the chapters as mirrors of
historical reality at a key moment in Nicaraguan politics. To see what
is reflected in those mirrors, one must not only look to the ideas ex-
pressed, but also to the composition of the audiences, to Dr. Serrano's
position as President of the Supreme Court, and to the wider political
and international struggles that were taking place at the same time.
It was good fortune that, during this period, the Supreme Court
President was a scholar in legal philosophy rarely found in public ser-
vants, even those in the judiciary. Dr. Serrano was professor of legal
philosophy at the Autonomous National University of Nicaragua be-
tween 1965 and 1974 and General Secretary of the University from
1968 to 1974. Beginning in 1979, he served as Nicaragua's Ambassa-
dor to France, Ambassador to Italy, as well as Ambassador to
UNESCO and several other specialized United Nations organizations.
He has been a specialist in labor law at the University of Rome and is
currently a doctoral candidate at the University of Paris. Dr. Serrano
is the author of several other books, including Subdesarrollo,
Dependencia y Universidad (1971), Derecho del Trabajo (1972), In-
troducci6n al Pensamiento Dialrctico (1976), Dialrcta y Enajenaci6n
(1979), Existe Una Crisis del Racionalismo? (1982), La Permanencia
de Carlos Marx (1983), Filosofia y Crisis (1984), and Entre la Naci6n
y el Imperio (1988).
To understand how Dr. Serrano's commentaries influenced both
the Constitution and the rise of the new legal system, the reader
should have a sketch of the pre-existing legal framework and of the
lengthy discussion and drafting process the Nicaraguans followed to
arrive at the 1987 Constitution.
On July 19, 1979, as the revolution triumphed, the Governing
Junta of National Reconstruction issued a basic Governing Program.
The Governing Program separated the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial powers. Legislative power was vested in a Council of State com-
posed of representatives of the various forces that had toppled the
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Somoza regime. The Program guaranteed political pluralism, a
mixed economy, non-alignment in foreign policy, and protection of
human rights recognized in a number of international treaties.
Within days, these principles were formally reiterated and reinforced
by the Fundamental Statute for the Republic and The Statute of
Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans. Together they filled the role
of a constitution. During the iext several years, the Junta and the
Council of State issued thousands of laws which resulted in profound
changes in the economic, social, and political life of Nicaragua. In
March 1982, while facing counterrevolutionary guerrillas and other
interventions financed by the United States government, the Junta is-
sued a state of emergency decree suspending the press' right to be free
from censorship and other important rights.
The Fundamental Statute had promised general elections for a
National Assembly in accordance with an electoral law to be promul-
gated as soon as conditions permitted. A Political Parties Law was
approved in 1983 and the Electoral Law in 1984. The Electoral Law,
which went through several drafts during negotiations between
Sandinista ("FSLN") and opposition parties, placed control of elec-
tions in a fourth, autonomous government branch-the Supreme
Electoral Council. Elections were scheduled for November 1984.
Close to ninety-four percent of eligible voters, age sixteen and older,
registered. The turnout on election day was seventy-five percent.
Although the election was boycotted at the last minute by the candi-
dates supported by the United States, it was viewed as fundamentally
fair and legitimate by most non-partisan international observers. In
this election, the FSLN received sixty-seven percent of the vote while
six opposition parties divided the remaining thirty-three percent. A
FSLN President and Vice-President were elected. Under the system
of proportional representation, which assures minority party repre-
sentation, opposition parties took thirty-five seats (including six seats
guaranteed to their losing presidential candidates) in the ninety-six-
seat National Assembly.
In April 1985, the Assembly President appointed a Special Con-
stitutional Commission ("Commission") to draft the new constitu-
tion. The Commission was made up of twenty-two Assembly
members, twelve from the FSLN and ten from the six opposition par-
ties. The Commission was divided into three subcommittees: foreign
consultation, national consultation, and drafting. The Subcommittee
on Foreign Consultation sought information from approximately six
Latin American countries, the Soviet bloc, Western Europe and the
[Vol. 12:341
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United States. The Subcommittee on National Consultation heard
proposals from nine political parties and numerous interest groups in
every sector.
In February 1986, the Commission presented a first draft of the
Constitution to the National Assembly and broadly circulated it
through the media for discussion. Over a two-month period, the draft
was discussed at seventy-three town-hall style forums in communities
across Nicaragua. The forums drew 100,000 people, as well as 2,500
oral, and 1,800 written comments. The National Assembly then de-
bated and modified the draft over another two-month period. Finally,
the Constitution was adopted in December 1986, to take effect in Jan-
uary 1987. Dr. Serrano's essays cover this entire period as well as the
initial implementation period through March 1988. The essay does
not cover, however, the 1989 peace process initiated by the five Cen-
tral American presidents which resulted in a political accord between
the Sandinistas and opposing political parties. They also do not cover
the promised dismantling of counter-revolutionaries financed by the
United States who were operating from Honduran soil, or the agree-
ment for internationally-supervised elections to take place in Febru-
ary of 1990.
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Justice, after seminars and con-
sultations of its own with Nicaraguan jurists, domestic and foreign
legal scholars, Executive Branch officials, and others, sent the Na-
tional Assembly a proposal for the constitutional text on the Judicial
Branch. The proposal, which significantly influenced the adopted
Constitution, is included here along with the Constitution itself.
There are several crucial issues which the Judicial Branch con-
fronted and which thread themselves throughout these pages. They
include:
(1) The power of the Supreme Court to review laws for unconsti-
tutionality, and whether judicial review should be confined to over-
turning only the application of the law in individual instances, or
overturn the entire law itself;
(2) The elimination of Anti-Somoza People's Courts and other
specialized tribunals created outside of the existing judiciary;
(3) The commitment to popular or lay participation in the jus-
tice system;
(4) Judicial independence;
(5) The appropriateness of separation of powers doctrine in a
revolutionary state;
1990]
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(6) The reserve of law doctrine (non-delegation of legislative
power to the executive branch);
(7) Reorganization of the Judicial Branch; and
(8) Rewriting the Code of Criminal Procedure and other pre-
revolutionary codified law in order to conform to the new order.
Transcending all of these issues is the question of what the Rule
of Law3 means in revolutionary Nicaragua. This is a leitmotif run-
ning through Dr. Serrano's work. Without doing a disservice to the
modulations he gives the theme, it is fair to say that, for Dr. Serrano,
the Rule of Law is neither the mechanical application of abstract, uni-
versal norms of law to social facts (the dominant version of Rule of
Law in western liberal democracies) 4, nor is it merely a legitimating
mask for the exercise of political power (the version advanced by the
liberal Anglo-American and European legal scholarship). 5 To be
sure, Dr. Serrano breaks sharply with the classic liberal version:
[The] Rule of Law, is not a logical-rational construction, outside of
time and space, but rather a body of rules rationally articulated to
respond to reality. The law, thus understood, is social engineering.
Each country has full power to grant unto itself a system of stan-
dards which best responds to its concrete necessity .... 6
At the same time, Dr. Serrano preserves a concept of law as not
merely superstructure but also a reality that, although it does not
deny the influence of the infrastructure, has its own specificity and
exercises at the same time its reciprocal influence upon the forms of
production and social phenomena in general. 7 The law is a formal
fabric, with a logical structure and methodology.8 The danger of in-
terpretive laxity and arbitrary application of law in the name of social
3. Some scholars have defined the Rule of Law as:
... a rare and protean principle of our political tradition. Unlike other ideals, it has
withstood the ravages of constitutional time and remains a contemporary clarion-call
to political justice. Apparently transcending partisan concerns, it is embraced and
venerated by virtually all shades of political opinion. The Rule of Law's central core
comprises the enduring values of regularity and restraint, embodied in the slogan of
"a goverment of laws, not of men."
A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, Introduction, in THE RULE OF LAW ix (A. Hutchinson & P.
Monahan eds. 1987), (citation omitted). See also A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, Democracy
and the Rule ofLaw, in THE RULE OF LAW 97 (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds. 1987).
4. Infra pp. 358-61.
5. Infra p. 360.
6. Id.
7. See infra Part I.
8. Id.
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reality9 must be avoided. "We are obliged to comply with the laws:
they must be applied and applied correctly."' 0
From a North American legal scholar's point of view, I think
two factors are striking about this work, beyond its fundamental im-
portance for understanding specific issues of Nicaraguan law. First,
the way the evidence presented in this work conflicts with the picture
the administration in Washington, D.C. has painted of Nicaragua's
government since the Revolution. Rather than the monolithic, au-
thoritarian, Marxist dictatorship, portrayed by Washington and un-
critically accepted by the mainstream North American media, we see
here a polycentric, politically pluralistic society which openly debates
a wide range of ideas in order to build a constitution and transform a
legal system. Remarkably, this is taking place in the midst of United
States aggression against Nicaragua."
Second, there is nothing in the concept of the Rule of Law, as it
is presented here, that should make North American or European
lawyers uncomfortable, regardless of their political persuasions. The
classic liberal version of the Rule of Law as a mechanical application
of universal neutral rules has been discredited since at least the turn of
the century. For example, in the United States, Holmes, Pound, and
the Legal Realists, Geny in France, and other scholars involved in
modernist, pragmatic, sociological study of law, long ago arrived at a
conception very close to Dr. Serrano's. Holmes declared that law is
"not a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"' 2 and that legal principles
emerging from litigation were "traceable to views of public policy in
the last analysis."' 13 He added:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.' 4
The translation consists of two parts. Part I was primarily trans-
lated by Fernando E. Perez Pefia, a North American lawyer working
at the Supreme Court in Managua. The translation of Part II is mine.
9. See infra Part I, Section 4.2.
10. Id.
11. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the merits, June 27, 1986).
12. Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
13. Id.
14. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1(1881).
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The Constitution in the appendix is the official English version issued
by the Nicaraguan government.
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PART I - LAW IN THE REVOLUTION (1985-86)
Introduction
These collected works are the fruit of some personal reflections
from several of my presentations and lectures delivered both in Nica-
ragua and abroad between September 1985 and June 1986.
The fundamental nucleus of these works consists of themes deal-
ing with the Rule of Law, justice, and the judicial branch. They are
all within the context of the Sandinista People's Revolution and the
National Assembly's process of drafting our Constitution. Other
themes involve the search for a theory and practice of the Rule of
Law within the Revolution. The search includes the need to develop,
if only partially, the categories of the Rule of Law which would be
valid for the historic moment in which we live.
I am not suggesting that these works offer an answer to such a
challenge. Rather, I am merely emphasizing the necessity of consid-
ering this specific problem because the unique characteristics of the
Revolution demand that different systems be studied and adapted as
closely as possible to legal and judicial reality. I am referring particu-
larly to the nature, concept, and structure of the judicial branch. The
objective is to produce a coherent synthesis for our own historical
reality.
These works, born of reflection as well as legal and judicial prac-
tice within the Revolution, sketch the theme. Moreover, although
they are written in order to fulfill immediate needs within my assigned
role, in a deeper sense they are motivated by the inescapable impera-
tive of reforming our judicial institutions. This imperative arises from
both our historical experience and our socio-political reality. In some
measure, these works point out the temporary nature of the classical
liberal concept of the Rule of Law. They are a critique of the univer-
sality and eternity of that concept, which is derived from other reali-
ties, and which, while valid for a specific system at a specific time,
should not be imposed as an absolute model. One should not make
the formal institutional legitimacy of a state depend upon its total
compliance with the classic liberal model.
It is important to keep the popular roots of the Revolution in
mind since this is the source of power from which all powers of the
state emanate. There is a need for deeper reflection on the specific
content which the separation of powers assumes in light of those pop-
ular roots. In order to comprehend this issue, one must study how
separation of powers in our draft Constitution acquires its own con-
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tent and meaning and differs from the classical concept given to us by
Montesquieu. Montesquieu's notion of separation of powers will be
discussed in greater detail in Part II of this work.
A proposed draft for the new Constitution regarding the judicial
branch is included at the end. It was presented by the Supreme Court
of Justice to the National Assembly. In it, the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice presented not only the broad principles on which the judicial
branch should rest within the Revolution, but also draft language and
an explanation of the Court's reasoning. Once the Constitution is ap-
proved and the bases of the fundamental principles have been estab-
lished, the next step is to reform the Court Enabling Law and modify
codified law to conform to constitutional standards.
1. Rule of Law, Justice and the Judicial Branch'
The themes of the Rule of Law, justice and the role of the judi-
cial branch will be an important part of the various commissions' de-
bates and of the National Assembly's own plenary sessions regarding
our future Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Justice is in the process of organizing a
seminar to take place in October 1985. The topic will be justice and
the role of the judicial branch in preparation for the new Nicaraguan
Constitution. The object of the seminar is to define the proper struc-
tures for the judicial branch regarding both jurisdiction and the role
of the judicial branch in its relationship to other institutions. To that
end, the high court plans to consider all contributions from justices
and judges of the Republic, as well as contributions from the Ministry
of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, lawyers' associations, univer-
sity law school faculties, and mass organizations. At that time, a spe-
cially appointed commission will extract the major themes from the
results of the seminar. The special commission will then proceed to
draft the Supreme Court of Justice's proposal for the National Assem-
bly by the end of 1985.
This process will insure that the National Assembly will have
our contribution to the national and historic effort to give Nicaragua,
and the Revolution, a new Constitution. The Constitution will take
us to the highest phase of institutionalization, express the country's
political and social reality, and form the basis for its future legal and
institutional development. Let the ideas discussed here form a work-
1. La Salle Colbert of the National Assembly of France, September 16, 1985.
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ing paper for the exchange of opinions and points of view and serve as
a stimulus for reflection and discussion.
1.1 The Relation Between Society and Law in the Revolution
Every revolution represents a break between political, social, and
economic reality, on the one hand, and law and institutional order, on
the other. It creates the necessity of deciding how the relationship
between political reality and legal order is to be established and con-
ducted. A revolution must consider the structural change as well as
the difficulty of reconciling two universes which have been separated
and are potentially antagonistic to one another. What is to be done in
the face of this inevitable reality? There are three possible alterna-
tives. First, to force dynamic, changing reality into a legal system
that expresses a different reality. Second, to completely replace the
old law with new law contained in emergency decrees. Third, in some
mixed fashion, to reconcile old codified law with the law emanating
from executive decrees and special jurisdictions.
The first alternative would introduce a contradiction whose fore-
seeable consequence would be the breakdown of the legal system by
the expansive force of revolutionary changes. In addition, this alter-
native would delay the process of change and revolution, or possibly
create a socio-legal syncretism and a perverted legal order.
The second alternative, discarding all old law, might create a
hole into which the great guiding forces of the revolution would fall.
In reality, old law can not be substituted overnight by the new. There
is an inevitable coexistence between the legal order which survives the
system overthrown by the revolution and the society which is reborn
in the rubble of the old regime. The double orphaning, law without
the society which produced it and society without law to regulate it,
gives rise to a difficult double adoption, which is also a double adapta-
tion: old law to a new society and new law to an old society. Thus,
both the first and second alternatives are unacceptable.
I believe that in six years of revolution, practice itself has re-
sponded to the fundamental problem by moving toward what is
presented as the third alternative. This solution is to make code law
coexist with the law emanating from executive decrees and make spe-
cial separate revolutionary jurisdictions coexist with the jurisdiction
of the judicial branch.
I do not mean that all problems have been solved, nor that this
type of response has not generated new problems and new conflicts. I
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merely want to indicate which alternative has been chosen. I do so
because I believe the situation we are addressing gains a special im-
portance at this time since we are coming face to face with the devel-
opment of our Constitution. It is particularly so for the judicial
branch, because we are entering into a new dialogue on law and
justice.
The goal of the judiciary is to articulate what most concerns us:
the legal universe and the universe of socio-political reality. Reality is
where the task of the judicial branch becomes a difficult issue, since
we deal with applying the law in a concrete reality, but also struggle
to keep the context of socio-political circumstances in mind. Further-
more, the job of integrating, interpreting and applying the law be-
comes even more difficult since, in addition to codified law, law is also
produced by the executive branch and by special jurisdictions created
to avoid judicial congestion in those areas particularly sensitive for
the Revolution. Thus, judges, with their mastery of code law and
legal skill, must also possess adequate knowledge to foster integration
of old standards with a new society through their judicial
interpretation.
This transitory situation exists until a new code law slowly
emerges. The new code will be reorganized on the basis of decrees
issued in accordance with the new reality, which eventually, will
faithfully express the socio-political reality and its values. Finally, the
law will become what it should be-the form for social forms.
The task, then, consists of defining and consolidating the Rule of
Law in the Revolution within a determinate period, in accordance
with circumstances. It is a historical necessity for the Revolution,
born of a heroic deed of liberty, justice and power, to be consolidated
into law and into the institutions which express it.
1.2 Justice and the Judiciary
Justice is an essential condition of life in society. It is an implicit
consensus in the historical development of communities and a rule of
coexistence which arises from social context. Justice is the substance
that binds and unites a community because it creates a foundation of
stability, security and solidity. Without justice, the social edifice can-
not be erected or will collapse if it already exists.
The concept of justice might be left alone in a fundamental field
of social and moral values in a revolutionary process such as ours,
which is harassed by other urgencies. But, justice is, nonetheless, a
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condition for stability and consolidation. The concept of justice
therefore must be brought together with the practice of legal justice.
Justice's invisibility as an immediate necessity is much like a founda-
tion which supports a building, or the roots from which the tree
grows. Like air for one's existence, justice is essential for society. In
human life, individually or collectively, and in social relations, what
stands out is not justice but injustice, just as what causes an impact is
not the normal but the abnormal. People react to abuses. For these
reasons, justice is necessary, as a solid, unquestionable presence so
that life can go on in a dignified and serene manner.
Justice is, above all, a value. It is the value of law, intrinsic and
essential for individual and collective life. From the earliest precepts
in Roman Law, through Ulpian, who defined justice as giving each his
due, not harming others and living honestly, and even before Roman
Law defined it, justice has been the condition of life in society.
In all societies, but above all in a revolutionary one like ours, it is
necessary to make law and justice identical, for there are laws that are
unjust and just acts which are illegal. Equilibrium is reached when
law is just and justice is legal; when prescribed standards correspond
to what society considers necessary for itself and for each of its com-
ponents, and when social aspirations are thoroughly expressed in its
legal order.
The Judicial Branch, as the organ charged with preserving jus-
tice, and for which the Supreme Court is the vortex, is a structure and
a system. The Judicial Branch is a structure in that judges and tribu-
nals, are tiered hierarchically as to authority, form, and matter. It is a
system as far as its decisions and resolutions form a dynamic stability
which contributes, in an important way, to the creation of law in a
historical and geographical determinate medium.
Law is the result of the interaction of principles which nourish it
(legal fundamentalism), the universal values to whose realization it
aspires (legal axiology), the empirical reality which penetrates it and
from which it forms a part (legal sociology), and the legal standard
which it prescribes and sanctions (Hans Kelsen's normativism or The-
ory of Pure Law). 2 Law is shaped by the rulings of judges and tribu-
nals which interpret and apply positive law.
Without pretending, as the sociological school of Carlos Cassio
seemed to establish, that law begins and ends in a judicial decision, I
feel that case law is an important formal source of laws, both socially
2. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 LAW Q. REV. 474 (1934).
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and historically. While the Supreme Court of Justice has the last
word, that last word is usually said within the context of decisions
made by judges and tribunals of lesser rank. The Supreme Court of
Justice also exercises a jurisdictional role when it overturns errors of
law by appellate courts and other judges.
The jurisdictional role, always important in a reality such as
ours, is especiaiiy important since this function needs to be creative.
There are good and bad creations and, in reality, the jurisdictional
role is a difficult task. It is besieged by dangers whose extremes might
be an automated judiciary or a lax interpreter. On the one hand,
mechanistic application of the law, would transform the judge into an
automaton, alien to the spirit of the law and social reality. On the
other hand, an interpretative laxitude and arbitrary application of the
law in the name of that reality could also be the resulting danger.
Neither one nor the other is required. The objective is to interpret
law in light of the process we are undergoing.
Society is obligated to comply with laws and the judiciary must
properly apply these laws. This presupposes a collective effort on the
part of the entire judiciary. It also requires rejecting the false alterna-
tive of choosing between the factual situation or the law. The options
are not merely to violate the law by recognizing consummate facts nor
to maintain law as a sacred object in order to perpetuate obsolete val-
ues. The judicial mission does not put social reality into a systematic
confrontation with the law. I believe that the juncture requires the
abolition of the false contradiction between "factism" and legalism,
which suggests that law can only be respected by halting the
Revolution.
Our legal system must be the expression of the socio-political re-
ality we are building, which in turn should take on substance and be
carried out in law. The transformation of legislation is a challenge
which must be faced in order to avoid the contradiction between real-
ity and law. This transformation will give our process a unitary, ho-
mogeneous coherence, in which the legal order incorporates and
legitimizes in historical reality, the great principles upon which our
Revolution is nourished. In short, the legal order must contribute in
order to make the balanced realization of both justice and liberty
possible.
1.3 The Rule of Law and Revolution
Ultimately, as a state, we are trying to consolidate the Rule of
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Law in the Revolution. The Rule of Law governs the exercise of
political power and civil society. It is also born in the modern state
and is founded, above all, upon the definition of institutional functions
regulated by public law. It is founded upon the establishment of a
body and a procedure for administrative law to protect the Constitu-
tion by declaring any laws opposing the Constitution illegitimate.
In private law, the fundamental principles characterizing the
Rule of Law are composed of contracts and their essential elements
such as purpose, subject, intent, concepts of individual interest, sub-
jective rights, and legal relationships.
The extreme expression of the Rule of Law is stated in Kelsen's
Theory of Pure Law.3 He posits a natural relationship between the
state and the law, so that every act of the state is legal and all legal
acts occur only within the state. Further, Kelsen explains that law is
a system founded upon a basic norm, which is the Constitution. The
purity of Kelsen's theory depends on the concept of the cloistered
system of the law's existence. That system uses a self-feeding function
of the standards which comprise it, and brushes aside whatever is not
a norm. The consequence of Kelsenian normativism is the divorce of
law's theory and nature from all social and political reality, including
historical elements that influence law. Excesses that violate the state
are assumed to be lawful and are now justified not only in the name of
the state but also in the name of the law.
We are not proposing Kelsen's interpretation of Rule of Law.
Nor are we proposing a more generalized version of legal theory that
developed into the classical liberal concept of the Rule of Law. At-
tempts have been made to propose the definitional Rule of Law,
outside of which no other subordination of the state to law is ac-
knowledged. There we face the phenomenon of the idealization of the
concept, which presumes to freeze a specific model with general char-
acteristics and universal values in time and space in a mechanical and
demonstrable form. The definitional Rule of Law does not take into
account possible variations due to historically and geopolitically de-
termined circumstances. The Rule of Law should not be an immuta-
ble archetype, which is fixed in time and space and outside of history.
Law is not an abstract metaphysical value, but rather the particular
specific event of bringing together a historical, social, and political
reality within a determinate legal order. At the same time, it must
regulate the behavior of the state and society and be the formal ex-
3. See supra note 2.
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pression, derived from, and a product of, the underlying reality which
it governs.
Here we have taken a position on a fundamental philosophical
question: what constitutes the Rule of Law? The Rule of Law is not
a logical-rational construction, outside of time and space, but rather a
body of rules rationally articulated to respond to reality. The law,
thus understood, is social engineering. Each country has full power
to grant unto itself a system of standards which best responds to its
concrete necessity. Speculative, theoretical comparisons should not
have the force of logic, either legal or philosophical, and should not
deny legitimacy by referring to some absolute system or universal
model of law.
Private law and its fundamental principles, until recently consid-
ered immutable, have also begun to change in societies of liberal polit-
ical theory and market economics where they were produced and
developed. For example, changes have occurred in private law in the
traditional system of contracts based on Bentham's and Dicey's nine-
teenth century philosophical ideal. 4 The changes include the use and
enjoyment of property in industrial society, freedom of trade, power
of corporations, development of administration, discretionary admin-
istrative authority, economic law, and the rising influence of the con-
tract of adhesion in the general theory of contracts. Perhaps the most
significant of these changes is the appearance of collective labor law,
in which unions are recognized as legal entities with the capacity to
enter into labor contracts as parties. The participation of unions in
labor contracts gives rise to collective bargaining which alters the
classical rules of contract with respect to the parties, elements and
effects. Beyond the effects of a collective bargaining agreement on the
parties, there may be a general regulatory effect on working condi-
tions for an entire industry or an entire professional category. The
effect is to create standards for individual contracts even though the
labor contracts were entered into within the sphere governed by the
collective bargaining agreement. In this way, freedom of contract, an
essential element in the civil doctrine of contracts, is limited or dis-
carded in favor of fundamental provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement which are incorporated ipsojure into the principal clauses
of individual contracts.
4. J. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1923); A. DICEY, IN-
TRODUTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1968).
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The above discussion clearly indicates that the foundations of the
classical theory of the Rule of Law are evolving.
1.4 Legal Equality and Economic Inequality
I consider it important to clarify two concepts that are currently
confused in the traditional concept of the Rule of Law. First is the
belief that it is necessary to have a legal order and an institutional
system which regulate and standardize civil and political society. Sec-
ond, is that the Rule of Law is nourished by the principle of general
equality, and that it exists only when constituted on that model of
legal equality.
We acknowledge the first as a fundamental principle of the Rule
of Law. As to the second, mixed feelings arise. On the one hand, we
accept the principle and model for the type of society in which it was
created; that is, we accept it as a historical reply to specific needs
arising in a determinate time and space. On the other hand, we reject
it as a presumption of universality or a necessary archetype. The sec-
ond concept refers to a dichotomy between legal equality and eco-
nomic, social inequality. It must be pointed out that equality cannot
exist on the legal plane if it does not exist in the economic or social
planes.
The creation of the realm of equality in legal matters not only
ignores real inequality but accentuates it by placing subjects who are
on different planes on the same plane. In effect, when the law
prescribes equal treatment for beings who are unequal in their socio-
economic situation, it preserves the inequality at the outset, and main-
tains the distance, accepting as a given that very different economic
situation. Furthermore, the inequality is accentuated by its own dy-
namics within the framework of social production and by reiteration
of legal relationships which systematically confirm an unequal socio-
economic starting point. At least in slavery and in serfdom, inequal-
ity which existed in the socio-economic order was explicitly pro-
claimed by law. The law did not pretend to hide a concrete inequality
with an abstract equality.
With the coming of industrialized society, the existing law an-
nounced equality of human beings without paying attention to eco-
nomic and social inequalities. For the first time in history, a real
inequality was hidden by an ideal equality. Luigi Ferrajoli wrote that
in this relationship, one is a subject-object (subject who decides volun-
tarily to sell himself), labor person, and merchandise; whereas the
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other is person-property, person and privatized means of production,
capital, modern privilege. In such a fashion, he said, the equivalence
of the exchange, or equal law is carried out as the appropriation of
work, exploitation and accumulation of capital, and abstract equality
materializes as an inequality. 5
The dichotomy between legal equality and economic inequality is
the consequence of the separation between political and civil society
produced by the coming of industrial society. Once the political
sphere is situated within the limits of the state and the economic
sphere is within the limits of private society, two situations arise.
First is the supposed depolitization of economics, whose structure
within capitalist society pretends to become objective, apolitical, uni-
versal, and permanent. The other is an abstract definition of the state,
separate from private society's contradictions, which, according to the
theory, are overcome in the state.
This concept underlies the institutions of capitalist societies. It is
the historical-political translation of Hegel's philosophy of the state
and the law. In defending the concept and action of the Prussian state
in the face of the decomposition of the European bourgeois states,
Hegel, created the abstraction of the state as a logical-rational product
which places it above civil society and economics. Hegel's separation
of society and politics makes production relationships in the new in-
dustrialized society purely economic, in contrast to feudal society in
which production relationships were also political. The effect of the
break between political society and civil society within capitalism's
production relationships, produces a dissociation between the eco-
nomic individual and the legal individual. By contrast, in feudalism
and in prior societies they were unified. The economic subject is situ-
ated in an economic sphere with all of its inequalities. The legal sub-
ject is in a legal and political sphere, a realm of equality. "This
separation between the legal subject and the real economic man repre-
sents," says Luigi Ferrajoli, "the most specific characteristic of mod-
em law and, at the same time, its most authentic indicator of class."'6
In a revolutionary process such as ours, this dichotomy serves no
purpose. The law should be unmasked and should be the direct ex-
pression of the reality which produces the law. The relationship be-
5. See L. Ferrajoli, Notas sobre el Estado, el Derecho y la Economia. (Notes on the
State, Law and Economy), (unpublished manuscript presented at The Conference on Visions of
Sociology, Managua (1982), available from the author).
6. Id.
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tween law and society gives us a legal order in which fundamental
principles permit legal mechanisms to compensate for structural ine-
qualities. These fundamental principles also contribute to the process
of social justice and equilibrium in Nicaraguan society.
In sum, law should aim towards equality, acting as a regulatory
mechanism and compensating for real inequalities that arise on an
economic plane. Law should not formulate some abstract equality
which, in the last analysis, favors and accentuates concrete inequality.
1.5 The Judicial Branch
On speaking of the Judicial Branch, a series of themes and
problems arise. The focus is on defense of the Constitution which
entails jurisdictional matters as well as the nature and efficacy of judi-
cial actions holding the supremacy of the Constitution above ordinary
laws. However, before proceeding with the discussion of constitu-
tional defense, it is necessary to consider some changes required
within the Judicial Branch. The following sections constitute our pre-
liminary suggestions.
a. Strengthening the Judicial Branch is a Condition Precedent
Strengthening the Judicial Branch must begin with material, fi-
nancial improvement and the strengthening of its function in society.
To this end, a fundamental requisite is to maintain and strengthen the
independence of the Judicial Branch. This does not imply that the
judicial branch should be made into an organism alien to the revolu-
tionary process or outside of history. Rather, it means inserting it
definitively within the flow of changes and clearly establishing the
powers, functions, fields of competence, and limits of the institutional
and legal definitions existing in our country.
Article 29 of the General Act of the National Assembly already
confers upon the Supreme Court of Justice the initiative of creating
law in matters within its authority. This includes the possibility of
proposing reforms to code law. Based upon article 29, work has al-
ready been initiated and a Commission composed of the Supreme
Court, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice has
been created. Their work on the Criminal Procedure Code, to substi-
tute for the old Criminal Instruction Code, is well under way. A pilot
plan which includes the technical training of judicial personnel who
will have to apply the new standards will be instituted shortly in Re-
gion IV. In addition, the Supreme Court of Justice has the enormous
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challenge of reviewing other areas of current codified law which it will
undertake without undue haste or delay.
The maintenance and strengthening of the independence of the
Judicial Branch is not in order to isolate it from the Revolution.
Rather, it is to acquire strength in order to permit the Judicial Branch
to bring a genuine and effective contribution to the Revolution.
b. Jurisdictional Unity
We recognize the necessity which caused the fragmentation of
the judiciary's jurisdiction when special jurisdictions were created. I
refer to the Popular Anti-Somoza Tribunals, the National Institute
for Social Security, the Regional Committees for Human Settlements
and the Agrarian Court. The fragmentation was a measure adopted
as a short range alternative to leave the judicial branch and a good
part of codified law in place while giving particularly sensitive aspects
of the Revolution's development to special jurisdictions. However,
this fragmentation of regular jurisdiction cannot be considered defini-
tive. An appropriate unification of the courts should be
contemplated.
c. Training Judicial Officers
Technical and ethical guarantees of the correct application of jus-
tice depend upon the training of judicial officers. The Supreme Court,
conscious of this need, has been developing courses to train local
judges with continuing long distance education. With the goal of
widening and bettering what already exists, an agreement with the
National Autonomous University of Nicaragua has been reached to
establish a specialized program in judicial matters for graduates of the
Law School. This program, whose fundamental ideas are still being
worked out, will perhaps begin with the training of district judges
currently on the bench and a move to encourage lawyers to consider
the judiciary as a career.
We think that independence, jurisdictional unity, systematic
training and development of skill among the judiciary will contribute
to the. structuring of a strong judicial branch. This in turn will guar-
antee equilibrium and institutionalized legal stability.
d. Labor Jurisdiction
It would be well to add one point which in our judgment is im-
portant. That is the establishment of a special labor jurisdiction. Its
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purpose would be to maintain the uniqueness of the labor law indus-
try and keep it from being assimilated within civil law. Moreover, as
long as there is appellate review, uniform case law can be developed
within it.
1.6 The Judicial Branch and Constitutional Defense
Within the great theses which define justice, the Judicial Branch,
and its powers, Constitutional defense is a fundamental issue.
Legislative decree, No. 417, approving reforms to amparo law"
by the Council of State in regular session number four, May 21, 1980,
in title I, chapter I, article I, states:
This law establishes the legal means of exercising the right of
amparo, in order to maintain the validity and effectiveness of the
Fundamental Act of the Republic, issued by the Governing Coun-
cil on the 10th of July, 1979 and the Nicaraguans' Rights and
Guarantees Act, issued on the 21st of August, 1979. Conse-
quently, this writ may be taken against any disposition, act or reso-
lution, and in general, against any act or omission of officer, entity
or agent who has violated, is violating or threatens to violate, those
rights.
The general declaration of decree No. 417, article I, clearly estab-
lishes a defense against unconstitutional statutes through protection
of individual guarantees. However, in all of the rest of amparo law
there is no provision for the specific case of a violation of the Consti-
tution, or for a law that conflicts with the Fundamental Act or the
Rights and Guarantees Act. Nor is there a provision which guaran-
tees the general erga-omnes effect of a judgment declaring a law un-
constitutional. All effects are limited to specific cases, and the
question of unconstitutionality has to be decided anew in each case
even if the matter presented refers to the same law that has already
been declared unconstitutional. In Latin America, what is called judi-
cial review of the question of constitutionality has been significantly
influenced by the constitutional legal system of the United States.
This system was broadly influenced by Alexis de Tocqueville's work,
Democracy in America.
In the American system, judicial review is exercised through an
extraordinary writ for unconstitutionality, and the final decision rests
with the federal Supreme Court. That system applies to some legisla-
tion in Latin America, generally in the systems having double federal-
7. See infra SECTION 6.3 for a more extended discussion of the right of amparo.
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local jurisdictions. The writ for inapplicability is used in unitary sys-
tems and the final issue is resolved by the high tribunal. However, the
effect of judicial decisions in the American system is limited to the
specific case before the court.
Central American and the majority of Latin American constitu-
tions are influenced by the American system, although not exclu-
sively. The principal characteristics of the American system are the
claim of unconstitutionality of the law by the affected party, and the
ruling's effect being limited to the specific case. In contrast, the Aus-
trian system is characterized by the existence of a specific tribunal
which determines unconstitutionality of legislative acts, and by the
general effect of its rulings as opposed to the effect being limited to the
specific case. The so-called "mixed system" incorporates elements of
both: the American system, with the possibility of appealing before
an ordinary judicial body, and the Austrian system, with general and
future effects being produced by the judicial ruling.
Latin American constitutional law is, for the most part, mixed in
this manner. A jurisdictional body, generally the Supreme Court of
Justice, at the insistence of one of the parties, decides the constitution-
ality of a law. The ruling then has an erga-omnes effect which pre-
serves its effect for other cases. Latin American constitutional law is
further mixed in that sometimes judicial decisions are limited to the
parties in some cases and have a general effect in others.
From my point of view, it is very important to establish judicial
review with erga-omnes effect because it guarantees constitutional de-
fense and democratic equilibrium. The general rationale declaring
laws unconstitutional has been given by jurists, Jorge Carpizo and
Hector Fix Zamudio. Essentially, they favor an erga-omnes effect for
these reasons:
(1) It reinforces the principle of equality of all before the law;
(2) It protects those who do not seek redress for unconstitution-
ality of the law by protecting them ipsojure from the application of an
unconstitutional law;
(3) It lessens court congestion by avoiding hearing cases on the
same matter; and
(4) It reinforces the legal and social cohesion sought by the
constitution.
In our Constitution, the power of the Supreme Court should be
broadened to include the authority to resolve questions of constitu-
tionality of a law, with general effect.
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1.7 The Right to Sue as a Public Right
Considering justice, the law, and the Judicial Branch, imposes
the challenge of rethinking some issues considered up to now as uni-
versal, immutable principles of civil and procedural law. Classical
private law has flourished on theories of subjective law, legal duty,
legal relationship, freedom to contract and individuality and subjec-
tivity in the right to act. We have already seen the changes that col-
lective labor law has introduced. For example, the union has become
a legal entity with the right to sue and the right to collectively bar-
gain. The labor contracts have a general effect comparable to regula-
tory acts which become formal sources of labor law.
These legal transformations lay the foundation for qualitative
change in law even if their field of activity is limited to labor, a limit
which is perfectly explainable by historical and political reasons. Col-
lective labor law has survived as an exceptional case in law. It is an
exception which proves the general rule, the inevitable concession of a
system to socio-political pressures from the labor movement.
One cannot lightly propose changes. Every change in the law
should respond to real situations. But in a country such as ours in
which a revolutionary change has been produced, the issue should be
raised in light of these changes, as ideas reflecting a new reality. As
we try to bring social reality and law together, we can only proceed
after a profound analysis and meditative, careful study. This does not
preclude, however, our raising some issues and laying them out as
concerns. Returning to the theme of private law, subjective law is the
law of one party confronted by another party where both are obli-
gated by a legal duty. The legal relationship is between subjective law
and legal duty, and the right to sue is an individual subjective right-
the consequence of a legal interest of the holder of that right. The
nature and mechanics of the law of action, conceived by private, indi-
vidual, and subjective law, sanctifies and universalizes its exercise in
an individual manner.
However, if we assume that the right to sue is different from the
substantive right it embraces, the latter is a right, not as to another
person, but as to the state which is obligated to grant jurisdiction,
independent of whether the underlying claim is legitimate. Action,
instead of being a subjective private right, becomes a public right.
This public right may or may not be individual. It can also be collec-
tive because it is not exercised by a private individual but by the state.
In addition, the right to redress can exist without the right to sue.
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For example, natural obligations in which a substantive right exists,
can occur without action to make the right effective. And, similarly,
the right to sue can exist unfettered by the right of redress, as in the
case of someone who appears before the state and obtains a negative
decision to a substantive claim. The right to sue is then, an autono-
mous abstract public right, which can be exercised individually or
collectively.
On the basis of these reflections about the right to sue, perhaps it
would be appropriate to ask if the following would be legitimate:
(1) To seek to establish normative judicial oversight over collec-
tive interests;
(2) To develop a theory of the collective subject;
(3) To nourish a theory of procedural legitimization of collective
subjects;
(4) To design new procedural models; and
(5) To identify collective interests, bearers of those interests and
means of oversight.
Perhaps it would be wise to genuinely consider some legal
changes which bring our law and our institutions closer to the social
and political reality our Revolution encompasses.
2. Justice in the New Constitution8
2.1 Institutionalizing the Constitutional Drafting Process
The seminar ending today has permitted an open discussion of
ideas on justice and the judicial branch. That fact is even more im-
portant if we place it within its historical context. Nicaragua contin-
ues its process of change, impelled by the Sandinista Popular
Revolution and by national political dialogue. Governing principles
that will have to support the new Constitution of the Republic, which
is the expression of the reality in which we live and the fruits of ma-
jority opinion and choice of our people, are emerging from the
process.
This notable effort to institutionalize takes on greater significance
if we consider the aggression coordinated and acknowledged by the
present United States government. Our country is continuing to de-
fine its institutions and legal order while defending its sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and right to self-determination.
8. Lecture for closing session of seminar at Ruben Dario Hall, Intercontinental Hotel,
Managua, October 1-4, 1985.
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In the Assembly, the Constitutional Commission has heard from
seven political parties. The Commission has published a work sched-
ule to include national consultation in order to enrich the criteria and
integrate opinions which cover a wide range of points of view. This
will make the Constitution a genuine synthesis of national will.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court of Justice calls upon the
national judiciary to reflect on its nature, structure, and role. The
Supreme Court organized this Seminar, with the participation of the
Ministries of the Interior and Justice, the Military Judge Advocate's
office, delegates from the parties represented in the Assembly, law
schools, lawyers' organizations, and mass organizations. The regional
appellate courts and judges from each region in the country also par-
ticipated. In addition, our esteemed friends, the distinguished jurists
from different countries who have contributed considerably in our de-
liberations and who have shared friendship and solidarity with us, de-
serve special mention.
With all the material collected here, including presentations, ref-
erence documents, and conclusions, the Supreme Court of Justice
will, at its next session, nominate a Commission to edit the document.
After the document has been approved by the Supreme Tribunal, it
will be put into the hands of the National Assembly near the end of
this year. This will be our contribution to the process of institutional-
izing and deepening the Rule of Law within the revolution; a Rule of
Law which, from our point of view, should be the formal expression
of the underlying reality which it governs, rather than an abstract
metaphysical value, outside of time and space.
2.2 Law as Social Engineering
Here we touch upon a sensitive vantage point, where it is appro-
priate to stop, even if only briefly. The law is not a logical, rational
construction, outside of time and space, but a group of rules articu-
lated to respond to a reality. The law, thus understood, is social engi-
neering, and each country and each revolution has the full power to
grant unto itself the system of standards which best respond to its
concrete necessity in a legitimate form.
This does not preclude the fundamental legal principles which
have an influence in regulating socio-political reality. We are not pro-
claiming the consecration of factual arbitrariness; rather we are warn-
ing of the danger of presuming law to be an ideal entity.
We consider the problem in a dialectical relationship. While the
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facts are permeated by fundamental legal and moral principles, there
is no human act which is not accompanied by specific values. Law
should necessarily represent the economic, social, political, cultural,
and historical reality from which it springs. Thus, law will be the
form for social forms. The Rule of Law then, will be the manner,
mode, or form in which that reality is embodied in its institutions.
Reality produces its own legal ordering. Law, as well as the society
which it governs, inevitably tends to take on a group of values which,
although universal, are not any less historical, immediate or direct.
2.3 Justice and Social Reality
The law strives toward its principal value-justice. Thus, law
should reflect justice's value in a revolutionary society. In addition,
the integration between law and justice should correspond to law and
reality. The National Assembly and the Supreme Court of Justice are
coming to grips with a double challenge; the Assembly must develop
and approve our Constitution and must propound its points of view
on the constitutional chapter corresponding to the judicial branch. In
turn, under article 29 of the General Act of the National Assembly,
the Supreme Court has the authority to initiate legislation on matters
within its jurisdiction.
2.4 Revising the Code Law
On the issue of initiating law, codified law lies within the author-
ity of the Judicial Branch. Code law should have content and form
appropriate to represent the society we are trying to build. Changes
should start from the present moment and include both accomplish-
ments and contradictions. Any changes should therefore be treated
flexibly as transitional provisions, but should also point firmly and
solidly towards the future. Security for institutions and legal order
are indispensable in order to build a stable character for future Nica-
raguan society.
Perhaps the best example of this idea is found in the Supreme
Court of Justice's work on the proposed Criminal Procedure Code.
Presently, the Code is being studied by a commission in which the
National Assembly, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of
Justice are participating. Our proposal replaces the present Criminal
Instruction Code of 1879 which was based on rigid procedures of
written law and modeled on the Latest Spanish Restatement of 1805,
with improvements introduced by Royal Decree in 1835. Prior to the
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Spanish Criminal Procedure Act of 1872, the Criminal Instruction
Code of 1879 was characterized by secret proceedings and the absence
of any defense at preliminary hearings. The same judge handled pre-
liminary hearings, the trial, drafted findings of guilt, and passed sen-
tence. In addition, confessions were in the same language as the
indictment, thus avoiding exculpatory presumptions. Presumptions
were elevated to the same level of proof as other properly-established
legal proofs.
In Latin America, the renovating current in penal procedural
law does not principally come from the Code Napoleon, the French
model. Rather, it comes from German or Italian procedural law
which was developed at the end of the nineteenth century through the
first third of the twentieth century, such as the German Procedural
Ordinance of 1924 and the Italian Penal Procedure Code of 1930, or
the Manzini Code.
Our proposed Criminal Procedure Code incorporates popular
participation in the administration of justice. It is based on principles
of oral proceedings, reduction of procedural steps, publicity, flexibil-
ity, speedy trial, officiality, and proofs based on sound judgment.
Moreover, it will affect the current structure of the Criminal Courts
by incorporating lawyers and laypersons in the same judicial body.
In this proposal, two elements are manifest. The proposal con-
siders present reality because it is being proposed as a pilot plan for
Region IV. At the same time, it is structured upon principles which
permeate its content with a permanent and stable character. Consti-
tutional legitimacy of the system is assured by a transitory article in
the Constitution. This transitory article obviates problems which
arise when it is placed into effect in only a single region. This situa-
tion will be considered through transitory provisions, because Nicara-
gua is not a federal state with local legal systems. Rather, it is a
unitary state for which a uniform national legal system is appropriate.
The proposed Criminal Procedure Code reflects an integration of flex-
ibility, an association with reality, and a projection towards the future
with stability, security, and permanence as goals.
2.5 Tasks of the Judicial Branch
The Judicial Branch's activity, particularly that of the Supreme
Court of Justice, revolves around three principal tasks. First is the
classical activity of case decisions. Deciding cases requires integrating
justice, law, and reality. It requires keeping political context and cir-
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cumstances in mind. Given our circumstances, this is a uniquely im-
portant and particularly difficult task. Integration, interpretation,
and application become even more difficult because law emerges from
both the executive branch and special jurisdictions, which were spe-
cially created to avoid congestion and delay in judicial activity in ar-
eas particularly sensitive to the development of the Revolution. In
such a situation, a judge, besides being familiar with code law, must
also have sufficient understanding to assist in the integration of old
standards to a new society through interpretation. However, not all
old law is outdated and not everything emerging in society is new.
Shadowy, empty, and overlapping zones are produced between soci-
ety and law and reflected in case decisions.
The second principle task is to define the nature, structure, and
role of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Branch in the new Consti-
tution. The third task is to transform codified law in order to bring
the legal order together with reality.
Along with these three basic tasks, the following measures will be
placed into effect:
(1) Judicial Branch Commissions. One Judicial Branch Com-
mission for each region of the country will be established and each
will be coordinated by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice.
It will be composed of one Justice of the Supreme Court, the Presid-
ing Justice of the corresponding Regional Court of Appeals, and a
judge from the region. Each Commission is responsible for all the
internal problems of the Judicial Branch in its region. The Commis-
sions investigate inter-institutional relationships related to the admin-
istration of justice. They also deal with materials within the facilities,
such as transportation, equipment, and other necessities.
(2) Commission on Judicial Statistics. This body will create
technical statistical mechanisms. Its simplest task will be to make a
central file in the Supreme Court of Justice, where each entry corre-
sponds to a prisoner's case. The purpose is to determine the status of
cases, thus avoiding injustices sometimes committed when elementary
mechanisms used to determine the judicial status of prisoners are not
available.
In short, we are seeking, permanent, instrumental forms within
the revolutionary process. The following can be considered the basic
thrusts: strengthening the Judicial Branch, institutionally as well as
materially; strengthening its autonomy and independence; making
code law conform to the socio-political reality; unifying jurisdiction
[Vol. 12:341
Rule of Law in the Nicaraguan Revolution
and case in labor law; defining mechanisms for constitutional defense;
studying the right to act by collective subject; reorganizing judicial
organisms; and reestablishing jurisdictional unity when the circum-
stances which gave rise to its dismemberment have disappeared.
2.6 Judicial Review for Unconstitutionality: German
and French Practices
Along with studying our own legal and social reality, we are
studying comparative constitutional law on the question of constitu-
tional defense. The purpose of the study is to structure a solid and
realistic proposal to present to the National Assembly.
In a recent trip to the Federal Republic of Germany and France,
with Justices Dr. Rodolfo Robelo Herrera and Dr. Santiago Rivas
Haslam, we studied their judicial and constitutional systems. In both
countries, the constitutional issue is assigned to a constitutional court
and the finding on the constitutional issue is a general declaration
with erga-omnes effect. The German and French systems, however,
differ as to who has standing to file the appeal and the time for its
filing.
In Germany, the appeal may be filed directly, by anyone who
feels a law has adversely affected a constitutionally protected right.
There is no need for legal advice or representation. Conversely, in
France, only the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the
President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, one
of sixty Deputies, or one of sixty Senators may do so. Further, the
appeal must be filed after the passing of a law but before its effective
date. Thus, in France, emphasis is placed directly on the violation of
the Constitution and indirectly on protection of individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. In Germany, on the other hand, ap-
pellate procedure handles the violation of individual interests immedi-
ately by granting appellate standing directly to the individual.
In Germany, ninety-eight percent of the appeals filed are denied
a hearing and never make it to the Constitutional Tribunal. The high
percentage of denials is generally due to formal error, or to the error
of the appellant in considering the appeal. An appeal for unconstitu-
tionality could be filed even against the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Justice if the law in question not only affects a private inter-
est but also violates the Constitution.
The purpose of mentioning the German and French Constitu-
tional systems is not to propose the uncritical mechanical adoption of
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either of them. Whatever suggestion on the question which the
Supreme Court of Justice makes to the National Assembly should
come from our own reality. Rather, the purpose of mentioning them
is to keep those systems in mind, among others, as points of signifi-
cant reference as far as the nature of appeal and the limits of its filing
are concerned.
2.7 Judicial Review for Unconstitutionality: Possible
Ideas for Nicaragua
Three positions have been considered on this theme. The first
would deny appeal for unconstitutionality because it may act as an
obstacle to legislative development. If used for political purposes, the
appeal would hamper the legislative function, and with it, the institu-
tionalization of the revolution. The second view would establish not
only the right of appeal for unconstitutionality, but also a specific con-
stitutional body to stand guard over constitutional defense and to
safeguard the fundamental principles to which every legal system
should adhere. Finally, there is the view of granting constitutional
review to the Supreme Court of Justice, where the Supreme Court of
Justice's decision would have a general declaration with erga-omnes
effect, but without retroactive effect. Such a mixed system exists in
the majority of countries in Latin America and Switzerland. In this
last possibility the same arguments can be adduced: risk of using the
appeal for political purposes, paralyzing legislative functioning, dull-
ing the revolutionary process in its institutional phase, and clogging
the Supreme Court's work.
All of these observations are valid in light of our own reality.
However, certain questions arise:
(1) Would it help to continue to think about the subject and to
go deeper into its study?
(2) Might it be interesting to think about forms and mechanisms
which would permit constitutional defense without abusive, chilling
use of the right?
(3) Could we consider two institutions to decide two types of
appeal?
(4) In questions of constitutional defense, should we limit filing
of appeals only to the President of the Republic, the President of the
Assembly and a determinate number of deputies (similar to the
French system which limits filings to the time after the passing of a
law and before its effective date), or should the direct violation of indi-
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vidual rights and fundamental guarantees of individuals protected by
the Constitution be better protected through an improved writ of
amparo?
(5) Would it be appropriate to enlarge the Supreme Court
of Justice to include four departments: civil, penal, labor and
constitutional?
These are questions to consider. Our suggestions to the National
Assembly should not be determined solely by technical or conceptual
purity in constitutional legal order, but rather be based on what our
history and the particular moment we are living through demands.
Indeed, we need to try to perfect our system and consolidate the Rule
of Law to the fullest. These and all propositions should be approved
by the full Supreme Court of Justice and presented formally to the
National Assembly, where the final decision rests.
2.8 Other Themes of the Seminar
I shall briefly try to address some important themes dealing with
questions of justice and the Judicial Branch.
The use of the term judicial branch and powers of the state com-
pel us to add Montesquieu to the list of influences in our meeting.
The spirit of this French sage, appearing from behind his The Spirit of
the Laws, has troubled us with its proposition on the separation of
powers. At the time Montesquieu wrote The Spirit of the Laws, be-
hind each branch stood real power, with effective interests maintain-
ing them as the spearhead of real forces in struggle. Perhaps with the
reunification of forces into a more unitary and homogeneous popular
power, the institutional expression of that sole power in three or four
branches of the state may be the more legitimate expression of that
unitary power. That the branches are functions of the state is logical
since all institutionally-regulated power becomes explicit through its
organs and functions. The theory that separation is utopian because it
does not correspond to actual practice, is not an absolute argument.
The fact that something has not been does not mean it should not be.
The important issue is the necessity for institutional equilibrium
through the functions and attributes of those powers or organs which
together form the state. It is the same historical root, people's power,
with the same etymological root, democracy (demos-people,
cratos-power). Of course democracy to the Greeks, who had slav-
ery, is not the same as Rousseau's, or classical liberalism's. It is quali-
tatively different in sense and practice, but in a revolutionary process,
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such as we are undergoing, is much less comparable. Institutional
equilibrium is a permanent aspiration of man through the centuries.
As to independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the exposi-
tions and debates have been rich. Both forms of independence, inter-
nal and external, take on their true meaning when they are integrated
in the historical situation which is their true dimension, rescued from
the abstract universe where some would want to place them.
Institutional independence, equal dignity of judges, direct rela-
tionship between judges and law, and independence in the exercise of
their judicial role at each level, are very important. Knowledge of the
role of case decisions is also crucial. In addition, impartiality is an
irrevocable principle regarding the parties. In a like manner, judges
should not make a mechanical application of the law, as if the judges
were automatons with no commitment to determinate values which
every human being possesses. Righteousness and indispensable ethics
in the administration of justice does not exclude humanity and the
ethical judge cannot devoid himself from his vital, existential reality
as a participant in a determinate society in history.
We have already talked about judicial role and the defense of
legal order, with respect to constitutional defense and legality in the
face of administrative acts. We spoke of the right of appeal for uncon-
stitutionality through amparo, which refers to administrative and gov-
ernmental acts affecting an individual's rights which are protected
under the Constitution.
Human rights are an essential question because their protection
is deeply woven into the formal fabric through which the entire legal,
constitutional system operates. Human rights protection is guaran-
teed by the Constitution through defense against illegal administrative
acts and by the guarantee of due process. More specifically, they are
protected by the concrete dispositions where the Constitution and
laws protect human rights directly. They are guaranteed procedurally
by nondiscriminatory treatment, by protecting fundamental rights, by
regulating preventive detention and by abolishing discriminatory
practices. In addition, they are protected by incorporating ratified
legal documents on human rights into national legislation at the con-
stitutional level. This includes the rights protected by the Agreements
on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations. Also guaranteed
are rights to education, to health, to organize, and to participate in
social life at different levels, consecrated by the United Nation's
Agreements on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The right to
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the free determination of peoples should also be mentioned which is
guaranteed by article I of the two agreements mentioned above.
The judicial role and the guarantee of due process are very im-
portant. The concept of due process is a conduit or medium for lib-
erty. The crucial principles of the democratic process are: legality,
independence, jurisdictionality, neutrality, speed, integration of the
judiciary into social life, adversary proceedings, and the incorporation
of critical analysis into the judicial role.
The problems of unity and exclusivity of the state's judiciary are
important elements in the creation of the Rule of Law. While the
dismemberment of jurisdiction that occurred in our revolutionary
process has responded to peremptory objective necessities, jurisdic-
tional unity should be a legitimate aspiration whose restoration
should occur once the cause which produced the creation of special
jurisdictions has disappeared.
Popular participation in the administration of justice is impor-
tant through the integration of laypersons into judicial organs; but its
starting point is respect for the principle of legality, unity, exclusivity
of state jurisdiction and easily understood procedures. I think the
proposed Criminal Procedure Code draft is a good example of what
popular participation in the administration of justice should be. It
deals with the integration of laypersons and lawyers into judicial bod-
ies and incorporates the following important principles: oral proceed-
ings, concentration, publicity, flexibility, speed, officiality,
inviolability of defense, economy, and the weighing of evidence by
sound judgment.
I wish to conclude these reflections by thanking the eminent ju-
rists from France, Italy, Spain, the Soviet Union, the United States,
and Cuba for their most worthy contributions that enlightened our
deliberations. I also thank the speakers from the judicial branch, the
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Association of
Jurists, and the universities. They have given us their focus, opinions,
and points of view. Although they do not obligate the Supreme Court
in the formulation of its own criteria, they constitute a gold mine
from which the Supreme Tribunal can draw upon in its work.
. I also wish to thank the President of the National Assembly, Co-
mandante de la Revoluci6n, Carlos Nufiez T6llez, for his presence at
this closing session. He has come to terms with all the legislators in
the historic, exemplary task of drafting a Constitution to carry the
Rule of Law in the revolution to the highest plane. I also wish to
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thank the presence of the President of the Supreme Electoral Council,
Dr. Mariano Fiallos Oyanguren, the Minister of Justice, Dr. Rodrigo
Reyes and the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, Brigade
Commander Omar Cabezas Lacayo.
As far as we, the Judicial Branch, and the Supreme Court of
Justice are concerned, we are conscious of the difficult task we yet
have to accomplish. We have stated some of the broad outlines in
these words. We hope to fulfill our responsibility and rise to the
challenge.
3. Message to the Second Graduating Class of Lawyers
in the Revolution 9
3.1 Revolution and Legal Change
From this very dear rostrum, which I have used so many times
as a student, as a teacher, and lately as a guest of the University, I
wish to express some thoughts to you on the occasion of the gradua-
tion of the second class of lawyers to emerge in these six years of
revolutionary life.
To start, it would be well to remember that every revolution is a
transformation of political, economic, social, and moral changes, fol-
lowed by a reaccommodation in the same areas. Inevitably, a read-
justment in institutions and in the legal order is required. At the time
you graduate, the Revolution is settling its values. This is a conse-
quence of its own action and of the specific gravity of history which
has its own laws of attraction and gravitation. The Revolution's
deeds and ideas leave themselves like a footprint having passed the
wake of history.
However, we are still living in an era of transition; although there
has been considerable change, the transition is difficult since the struc-
ture for the newly conquered land is unfinished. While we left the
darkness of the dictatorship behind us, the new institutional structure
is not complete. The base for the state and the whole nation will be
revolutionary Nicaragua's future Constitution. Its body will be the
legislation to follow it.
The Revolution, during its struggle for liberation, was made le-
gitimate by its deeds, by the moral content of its actions and by the
justice of its objectives. After coming to power, the Revolution be-
9. Lecture delivered at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua, December
10, 1985.
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comes the source of law inasmuch as it produces institutions and a
legal order. The institutions and legal order, in turn, collect and em-
body the values and ethical content of the Revolution itself.
As a political power, the Revolution enters into another phase of
its historical life. Now it is the real source of law, not because its acts
are formally legitimated a priori through the mere fact of being pro-
duced. Rather it is because the Revolution has created its own insti-
tutional, normative fabric within which it acts. This is not a sudden
act that happens from one day to the next. It is a slow, difficult pro-
cess. It is especially difficult in our circumstances when we take into
consideration the foreign aggression we suffer at the hands of the
United States which is reaching qualitatively newer levels and unprec-
edented gravity.
For these reasons, the effort to build the Rule of Law more elabo-
rately within the Revolution demands greater effort, conviction and
will. The Revolution's attitude in discussing and drafting the Consti-
tution while having to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity is
exemplary. In this regard, we must work for greater coherence be-
tween decrees and code law and then relate that coherence to the. fu-
ture Constitution. Two very important issues must be reconciled:
changing reality, and the necessary stability institutions and legal or-
der should have.
3.2 The Supreme Court's Proposals
The creation of the Constitutional Chapter on the Judicial
Branch is an immense challenge which should be approved in the next
few days by the Supreme Court of Justice en banc before being sent to
the National Assembly for consideration. This work is the preamble
to all the code revision work the Supreme Court of Justice will be
undertaking.
In our preliminary text, the structure of the judiciary is reaf-
firmed as a branch of the state along with three other traditional
branches, the executive, legislative, and the electoral branch. Inde-
pendence and impartiality in the judiciary is consecrated from the in-
ternal point of view since each judge or justice is autonomous as far as
his authority to judge and decide. Judicial hierarchy refers only to the
gradual tiering of hearings and appeals. It does not affect the freedom
of conscience and the personal autonomy of the trier in each case.
Independence of judicial bodies is likewise postulated from an
external point of view which consecrates independence and interde-
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pendence of branches into a workable and healthy institutional equi-
librium. The preliminary text does not reproduce the historical
framework in which Montesquieu proclaimed the separation of pow-
ers in The Spirit of the Laws, nor does it contradict the principle of
"people's power." People's power is the basis of democracy (demos-
people, cratos-power). It is expressed in a constitutional, legal
framework which defines, legitimizes and gives content to the
branches.
In labor matters we are recovering jurisdictional and decisional
unity within the judicial system. Labor matters today are dispersed
through fragmented areas of civil jurisdiction. However, civil law
does not correspond to the substance, nature, or values of labor mat-
ters. Nor can fragmentation be cured through appellate procedures.
Due to their number and their possible differences of opinion, appeals
courts could eventually produce contradictory judicial decisions on
the same issue. We think a possible alternative would be to create a
Labor Department in the Supreme Court of Justice, where appeals
would lie from trial judges' rulings, thereby eliminating the appeal to
regional appellate courts.
The foregoing takes us to another matter: the restructuring of
the Supreme Court of Justice. As the Court Enabling Act might later
provide, since it should also undergo corresponding reforms immedi-
ately after the approval of the Constitution, the Court would be or-
ganized into departments and work within a department or en banc.
The departments would then maintain specialization in particular dis-
ciplines. In principle they would include civil-administration, crimi-
nal, labor and constitutional law.
The mention of constitutional law brings us to the next stop
within the logical development of the system, as conceived by the
Supreme Court of Justice. Although there is a difference of opinion
on this, we think that constitutional review should be established
through appeal for unconstitutionality. The purpose is to assure the
supremacy of the Constitution over any law, decree, or regulation vio-
lative of a constitutional concept. I believe it should be the Supreme
Court of Justice that rules on appeals for unconstitutionality,
although there is still no official single opinion reached by the Court
on this issue. If a court holds that a law violates a constitutional con-
cept, the holding should have an erga-omnes effect, which is a general
declaration effectively derogating any law repugnant to the Constitu-
tion. One view is to create another branch of the state, such as a
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constitutional council or tribunal for this purpose. But some prefer a
body, emanating from the Assembly itself, to carry out constitutional
review.
The argument which favors the Supreme Court of Justice on
matters of constitutional review is as follows. Constitutional review
should be exercised by a body different from the one that wrote the
law. Therefore, it should be outside the Assembly itself. Granting
the function to the Supreme Court of Justice, experienced in constitu-
tional matters because of amparo appeals, would avoid increasing bu-
reaucracy. Creating a new body would weaken the judicial branch
while granting constitutional review would affirm the principal of ju-
risdictional unity and exclusivity of the Court.
3.3 End of the Specialized Courts
Here we touch upon the fundamental problem of the dismember-
ment the Judicial Branch caused by the creation of extraordinary ju-
risdictions. The dismemberment was motivated by the exceptional
situations which the Revolution has lived through. Nevertheless, we
believe, to the extent the exceptional causes which gave rise to special
jurisdictions begin to disappear, the special jurisdictions should be
progressively reintegrated into the Judicial Branch.
To illustrate, we have made a proposal for the reform of the
Rental Act. The proposal is to transmit rental matters to the judicial
branch to prescribe and regulate them. This matter is now in the
hands of the National Assembly. In effect, the Regional Human Set-
tlement Committees ("CRAH") would become part of the judicial
branch. The Supreme Court of Justice would appoint the President of
the Regional Committee and his alternate directly. According to the
proposed reform they would be lawyers. The Supreme Court of Jus-
tice would also appoint the non-lawyer members of the Regional
Committees from a list proposed by the Sandinista National Defense
Committee. Appeal from determinations of the CRAH would be
heard and resolved by the Regional Appellate Courts in the judicial
branch. It is expected that the full Assembly will reach a decision on
this matter in the next few weeks, so that, starting in January 1986,
administrative work can begin to define the actual transfer and its
date.
3.4 The Role of Lawyers
These great thrusts on judicial reform now being initiated will
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contribute to giving law professionals, whose graduation we are cele-
brating this evening, a fuller vision of our legal reality. Within these
reforms, the role of the lawyer in our society becomes a historic one.
If today's lawyers participate in our transforming society, they may
contribute, in various forms, to the forging of new institutions and to
the development of new law.
Perhaps one IIignIt say the iiieudiate probulemn lawyers fa c,
among others, is the derogatory manner in which they are treated and
the generalized feeling that they are useless in the revolutionary pro-
cess, or have become a devalued profession within the process. I
should answer thus: true, but we are looking for solutions to these
problems; we are trying to recover the dignity of the judicial process;
we want lawyers and judicial officers to be treated with respect; we
want compliance with judicial rulings. To that end, in these last few
months, a series of mechanisms have been designed. They include
regular contacts with the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Jus-
tice and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice. In addi-
tion, we proposed the establishment of Judiciary Commissions for
each region of the country. An example of our efforts is the National
Justice Commission. The Justice Commission is made up of the Pres-
idency of the Republic, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of
Justice, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the General Secre-
tary of the National Assembly, and the President of the Supreme
Court of Justice. Its purpose is to design adequate mechanisms to
coordinate what a judicial system should be.
What degree of responsibility does each of us have in the crisis
this profession is undergoing? What responsibility do justices,
judges, officers of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior
and the Sandinista Police have? We also have to ask, what responsi-
bility do the lawyers themselves have?
Because this is not a matter of allocating blame, but of resolving
problems, we have to find immediate answers. We must not, how-
ever, lose sight that the central issue demands a structured response,
and lawyers themselves must not remain alien to the responses. An
integral problem requires an integral solution, which presupposes eve-
ryone's participation. A fundamental prerequisite to elevating the
dignity and worth of the lawyer's profession is having everyone's par-
ticipation in discussing and bringing about legal changes in the coun-
try. Specifically, the University cannot remain on the sidelines
because it plays a predominant role in society and the Revolution.
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Of course I haven't come here to tell the University what to do; it
knows it better than anyone. Yet were I permitted but one observa-
tion on this matter, within the same constructive spirit that has been
underlying my previous considerations, I should only say the follow-
ing. The Law School should continue to deepen its ties to state insti-
tutions as it has already been doing with the Assembly and will soon
do with the Supreme Court of Justice. The curriculum should raise
the level of importance of constitutional, administrative, agrarian and
labor law to that of clerical, civil, and criminal laws and their respec-
tive procedures. Then, greater association with reality will be
achieved. The emphasis should be on academic rigor as well as inno-
vation. And, above all, let academic rigor in the innovations them-
selves be exemplary and let the importance of basic courses, such as
the History of Law, Roman Law, Theory of the State, Introduction to
Law and the Philosophy of Law never be forgotten.
The same theory applies to a rigorous study of the institutions of
code law. Theoretical instruction is what truly permits the law pro-
fessional to understand changes. Never forget that a genuine change
is not the annulment of the past but an overcoming of it, for historical
dialectics teaches us that the world progresses among contradictions.
If today we have the Revolution, it is because yesterday we suffered a
dictatorship. Please understand that what I want least is the nostalgic
remembrance of that brutal dictatorship. Yet, in a contradiction, the
revolutionary movement and a University emerged from the bleakest
hours of the dictatorship. Because of the lessons it contains and be-
cause it helps us to understand the present, one must have the fore-
sight to learn from the past.
Do not refrain from the study of Roman Law simply because
Rome was an empire. On the one hand, it subjugated peoples and
conquered nations, but on the other, it created institutions which have
survived through the centuries, notwithstanding the changes particu-
lar historical characteristics and the passage of time demanded.
The study of liberal bourgeois law must also be continued.
Although the development of capitalism has engendered the most in-
humane injustices in the name of an abstract legal equality which
hides and perpetuates economic inequality, this is only true in light of
phases of capitalistic development. It is not true in the light of the
philosophy of Enlightenment, the encyclopedists, the age of light, and
the French Revolution: they all sought to abolish the privileges of a
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feudal corporate society in which servitude, enfeoffment, and other
privileges were consecrated by the legal order.
If we don't understand each change in its time, and all of them in
their totality, we will not understand this moment in our history. We
cannot see the future if we do not know the past. Therefore, do not
forget that this Revolution is continuing. Today we are engaged in
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ity in the Revolution. Lawyers should undoubtedly know laws, codes,
terms and procedures in order to practice the profession competently.
They should also know, however, the sources of their science, its roots
and its past in order to project themselves creatively towards the fu-
ture. Those who know the theoretical foundations of their science
will better understand changes than those who focus only on the tech-
nical command of legislation. A revolutionary teaching of law places
humans at the roots of knowledge and fosters an understanding of the
Rule of Law within the revolutionary process with all the changes and
permanence it contains.
My congratulations on behalf of the Supreme Court of Justice to
you graduates of the Second Graduating Law Class. May your inte-
gration into the revolutionary process be fruitful. May you contem-
plate the rigors of the impending journey with optimism and
determination. Lastly, may your efforts benefit our Revolution and
the fundamental values that should always inspire it: peace, justice,
and liberty.
4. Law in the Revolution: A Constitution for the New Nicaragua '0
4.1 The Law - Habitat of the Revolution
I am grateful for the invitation which the Association of Demo-
cratic Jurists of Masaya has granted me to speak before lawyers and
judicial officers of Region IV, about law in the Revolution. The
theme is very broad and goes beyond strict legal matters. It also in-
cludes the philosophical plane and the sociology of law.
The revolution is, as Proudhon said, the supreme act of sover-
eignty. But upon becoming a state and a government, the revolution
inevitably also becomes the formal source of the law. In this way, the
revolution crystallizes its values into reality.
10. Lecture delivered before the lawyers and judicial officers of Region IV, at the
invitation of The Association of Democratic Jurists of Masaya, January 1986. The same
lecture was also delivered at La Salle Colbert of the National Assembly of France, July 2,
1986.
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In terms of the historical philosophy, the revolutionary process is
the dialectic that runs between civil society and political society. Civil
society revolts against the political society subjugating it. With the
revolution, a civil society turns into a revolutionary state and makes
its requests permanent in new laws and institutions. In this manner,
the law, normally resistant to change, is changed into one of the many
points of arrival of the revolution. From such a point of view, law
becomes a reference. But law is much more than that. It is the fabric
the revolution tears apart in order to place itself within it.
An immense effort is necessary in order for the revolutionary
process to take place. The historical reality created by the revolution
and the legal, institutional order must be made to accommodate one
another. Correct knowledge of this relationship is essential for the
proper understanding of the social nature of law, whose values are
eminently historical (with the exception of human rights and princi-
ples, which, once won, are acknowledged as having universal valid-
ity). The new law is the rational, legal architecture by which a
determinate society is articulated at a given moment in history. When
the collective will for tomorrow decreases, the nation built on deter-
mination of the collective will goes into a phase of disintegration, if
the effort developed was not yet sufficient to sustain it. A nation falls
when it exhausts the force which impels it forward without a renewal
in the determination of the collective will.
Latin America's dilemma, besides being the imperialist project of
the United States, is that it has lacked the necessary vigor to give body
to the Latin Americanist ideal of Bolivar and Sandino. The result is a
project with insufficient strength to form a Latin American Nation.
The project should constitute a synthesis of the individual nationali-
ties. If Latin America today has no unitary past, it is because it has
not had the necessary vigor for the future.
History is a paradox. Not only does it show us that there can be
no future without a past, but that there can be no past without a fu-
ture. Designing a tomorrow from today on the basis of a communion
of wills, sets the stage for what will be a common past in which to
recognize ourselves, as our face before a mirror. Tomorrow, proposed
as a future, will become fact and will be the present of our future
generations. Renan tells us: "the existence of a nation is a daily plebi-
scite" I I and Ortega y Gasset reminds us that "on defending the nation
11. Quoted in J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, supra p. 346 note 1, at 64.
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we are defending our tomorrow, not our yesterday."' 12 I think we are
defending both.
In Nicaragua, because every authentic revolution is always a pro-
posal to build a future, there is always a program to be carried out.
Law plays an integral role in this process. The law should be the
architecture slowly expressing the new conquered reality. Legal stan-
dards should be the objective expression of the revoluiion's values.
The new Constitution is called upon to embody the essential features
and values of what is Nicaraguan and to serve as a proposal for a
future society. The Revolution is, above all, a project for the future, a
program for identity, and the reality of the Nicaraguan being.
Within this undertaking, law is charged with being the objective
expression of the project for a nation. There lies its greatness and its
difficulty.
4.2 Bringing Law and Reality Together
There are many problems associated with the administration of
justice and the practice of the legal profession. The major question is,
what is the principal cause of the difficulties the administration of jus-
tice faces in a revolutionary process? Facing this question, we have
been leaving facile, general answers aside and have slowly tried to get
to the heart of the problem. We have tried to look at this difficult
reality face-to-face. We have encountered, and we say so honestly,
the understanding and willingness to help on the part of other institu-
tions. They have made the solution of numerous problems possible,
and relations with judicial branch officers have improved.
Clearly these inter-institutional relationships, however valuable
and useful, can only contribute to solving joint problems. The prob-
lem of law in the revolution is, above all, a structural problem. It
consists of reconciling the different nature of the revolution's socio-
political dynamics with the static character of law. The degree of this
problem sharpens if the comparison is made, not only between reality
and law, but between Nicaraguan revolutionary reality and the pre-
revolutionary legal order.
Again Ortega y Gasset gives us a magnificent thought on the
matter:
The law, in effect, is static. Humans have not yet succeeded in
creating a form of justice which is not circumscribed by the clause
rebus sic stanibus.
12. Id. at 41.
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But the fact is that human affairs are not res stantes. On the
contrary, historical things are only movement, perpetual motion.
Traditional law is only the regulation of paralyzed reality. And
since historical reality changes radically periodically, it clashes in-
evitably with the stability of law, which becomes a straight-
jacket. 13
Starting from these observations, the nature and depth of the
problem is better explained. We do not want to erase certain individ-
ual attitudes or ignore non-observance of the law, its procedures, and
judicial rulings. But neither do we want to attribute the origin and
breadth of the problem only to such conduct which may have its ori-
gin in the law-reality contradiction.
The solution then, regardless of how enormous it seems, is clear
and simple: make law conform to reality. But the logical trans-
parency of the matter does not exclude the many difficulties implied
in putting these ideas into practice. Besides, the law and reality are
not homogeneous. We are dealing with reconciling entities, het-
erogeneous in their own right, and having their own internal
contradictions.
Supposing that the difficulties involved in revising code law and
the body of laws and decrees produced through the revolutionary pro-
cess can be overcome, despite the serious limitations of human, mate-
rial, and financial resources, it would not suffice to create a formal
body of new law, although it would certainly be a gigantic step. This
step would require training for technical personnel capable of apply-
ing it. We would require weaving a network of commonly shared
legal values to which legal changes would be referred since the
changes reflect the collective intent of the Nicaraguan nation.
For example, consider the new Criminal Procedure Code which
the Supreme Court is about to finish and put into effect in Region IV
as part of the judicial transformation. To apply the Code, the judicial
personnel must be trained, and financial and technical resources must
be acquired. Then the concrete results of the Code's implementation
and its value to society must be evaluated. In addition, the possibility
of its gradual extension to other regions in the country must be ana-
lyzed, assuming there are no other practical, educational, or cultural
difficulties. And this is only the beginning. Projecting this concept to
other areas of the law, we have a rough overview of the seriousness of
the task, a task which must be completed over a period of many years.
13. J. ORETGAY GASSET, LA REBELION DE LAS MASAS 215 (1986).
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In any case, the proposed legal changes respond to a shared ne-
cessity which represents the Revolution's fundamental values. These
values are common to Nicaraguan society and are not a unilateral
formulation by the Supreme Court of Justice with which the majority
of the population would not feel any identity or participation. This is
reflected in the fact that we are now discussing the proposed Criminal
z~Ur U JU II uiia 11 d~a lawyes ' VYT shiall also be-
gin seminars throughout the entire country on a bill which the court
has sent to the National Assembly regarding the judicial branch in the
new Constitution.
To conclude, I want to underscore two ideas: a problem and a
program. The problem is the reality-law contradiction. The program
is the proposal to overcome the contradiction. The reality-law contra-
diction is expressed daily with no reference to persons or specific
cases. A problem having basic characteristics of a historical nature
appears before our very eyes, with a structural foundation. Proper
treatment of the matter demands a historical and a structural frame of
mind.
4.3 Judicial Transformation: Participation of the Legal Profession
There can be different perceptions of a single fact. Thus, the role
of the administration of justice within the Revolution can have differ-
ent views, depending on the observer, his immediate expectations, and
his priorities within the revolutionary process.
Perspective is a property of reality, be it physical, natural, or his-
torical. Before a landscape, we appreciate the part which our visual
angle permits us to see. Another person, situated at another vantage
point, will see another part of the landscape and if his gaze rests on
the same piece of nature, he will see things arranged differently and
therefore, with a different expression. Obviously, the opinion of both
observers of the same thing will also be different.
A similar phenomenon occurs with historical facts. The evalua-
tion of capitalism currently held is quite different from what was held
in the mid 18th century during the Industrial Revolution, which lev-
eled the feudal system, the corporative regime, and privileges con-
secrated in law. Besides the historical perspective of a fact,
perspective also varies with the subject. For example, the ideology of
the analyst or the location (time and place included) from which ob-
servations are made can also create a different opinion. In a similar
way, facts in daily life are influenced by our personal position and the
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context of events influencing our daily existence. Thus, concerning
the administration of justice, one can have a different perception, de-
pending on who the observer is.
Therefore, there can be no other alternative but to seek the struc-
tural solutions jointly, with all the institutions involved in justice, un-
til a result is reached which takes all points of view into account.
I invite you to meditate on the role lawyers can play within the
Revolution. I am not referring to the personal position that each one
of you assumes in the Revolution, which of course is extremely impor-
tant. Rather I refer to the possibility of translating individual polit-
ical attitude into a contribution to the common cause. A collective
proposal for the Rule of Law within the Revolution is an idea needing
everyone's contribution in order to be consolidated and deepened. I
invite you to become decidedly involved in the seminars on the draft
of the Criminal Procedure Code that the Supreme Court of Justice is
conducting. Give us your ideas, suggestions, and criticisms on the
draft's content. The draft is a first effort to conform to reality. I also
invite you to participate in the seminars that the Supreme Court of
Justice plans to conduct in all regions of the country concerning the
draft of the constitutional chapter on the Judicial Branch.
I think all justices, judges, and lawyers in the Republic should be
associated with the effort to make Nicaragua a national school for
legal pedagogy in this year of 1986.
4.4 The Constitution - Supreme Act of Legal
and Political Creation
What is a constitution? From the formal, organic point of view,
since the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, a constitution is
the guarantee of fundamental rights and the determination to separate
the powers of the state.
In effect, article 16 of the Declaration points out that in all socie-
ties in which the guarantee of rights is not secure nor the powers sepa-
rate, there is no constitution. Such a definition is certainly excessive
since it has been surpassed in history. One cannot deny constitutional
character simply because Montesquieu's separation of powers does
not exist.
Regarding separation of powers, I see no contradiction between
the existence of people's power in the Revolution and the constitu-
tional recognition of the organization of the state into branches which
are independent and interdependent among one another. The consti-
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tution is the form for expressing the power rooted in the people, or-
ganically and institutionally.
Allesandro Pizzorusso in his Lessons on Constitutional Law said
that in this sense-with the term that was used all through the 19th
century-the constitution did not just mean a text with certain legal
formal characteristics but also, above all, a document whose disposi-
tions collected in some measure, at least, what at that time was the
liberal movement's political program.' 4 Of course that ideological
need has no justification at this time. In Pizzorusso, we always find
the reference to Mcllovain saying, "[tihe constitution of the state
should be understood as that complex of identifying principles of the
form of State and Government, such as will be applied in a specific
state society, no manner what it may be."' 5
Let us now analyze our own legal and historical conception of
the constitution. In the first place, one might say there is a bundle of
fundamental standards which act as the basis of the legal system.
These standards validate or invalidate the legal system, depending on
whether they meet or contradict constitutional provisions.
Without going to the extent of Hans Kelsen's theory of pure law,
for we have always maintained that law has a historical foundation,
law is a system which has its own rules and an intrinsic rationale tied
to constitutional concepts. From the point of view of legal technique,
then, a constitution is not only the basis and foundation of legal order
but also the spinal column binding together and making sense of the
system of standards within a determinate legal universe. Above all, a
constitution is a consensus of wills fixed in time.
For the state, the constitution is the foundation and the program,
the organization of the state, the consensus of a society, and the defi-
nition of power. It is a foundation and a program, in that it estab-
lishes legal order and proposes future development. It is, and should
be, both reality and possibility. It is organization of the state, to the
degree that it establishes and legalizes structure and function. It is the
consensus of a society because, in order to be historically representa-
tive, the constitution should express national reality. As a result, a
constitution should be a common ground, a point of convergence, and
center of force and equilibrium for the society it deals with. In short,
it should express historical reality.
Do not think, however, that consensus is the reason for society,
14. See A. PIZZORusso, LESSONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1983).
15. Id.
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as Rousseau thought the "social contract" was. On the contrary, con-
sensus is the consequence or the effect of a historical, socio-political,
pre-existing reality. Law is generally a rational formulation and a for-
mal legitimization of the facts, not the other way around.
Finally, the constitution is the definition of power. It is not only
the articulation of legal principles which contain an express popular
will, it is also a political text, as the very name suggests. To define
power is to express it legally, which does not mean to create it.
Whatever power is created is always created as a historical fact before
it became a legal act. The legitimization of power in law, however, is
not only a legal necessity but a political one. The dialectics of the
facts demand formal expression and standardized translation as an
intrinsic necessity. Only then does the legitimization of power in law
acquire breadth and maturity.
The law, with the constitution as its maximum expression, is the
conduit and program of power. From that, laws, the constitution,
and legality, are not merely artificial formalisms but the natural
destiny of historical processes.
4.5 The Proposal for the Constitutional Chapter
on the Judicial Branch
The National Assembly is dedicated to the historic task of giving
revolutionary Nicaragua a constitution. If every process of constitu-
tional drafting has a great importance and is, in a sense, a founding
act, the significance is even greater when it occurs within a revolution.
The Constitution acts as a self-encounter for the Revolution, realizing
the fundamental steps to what might be an inventory of realities and
possibilities.
The political parties comprising the National Assembly have ex-
pressed their support and agreement, in differing degrees, on some
fundamental points. That is to say, even if no one is in agreement on
all points, nevertheless there has been support from some of the polit-
ical parties within the Assembly on the first basic points to be taken
into consideration.
The basic points in question are the following: political plural-
ism; mixed economy; non-alignment; organizing the state under the
rule of democratic, unitary, representative law constituted in execu-
tive, legislative, judicial and electoral branches; social assistance; anti-
imperialism; self-determination; and democratic exercise of national
sovereignty. These are among the most important.
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National consultation and the open town meetings will then take
place according to a calendar previously drawn up by the Assembly.
Opinions on the constitutional proposal from different sectors of the
Nicaraguan people will be collected. The Supreme Court of Justice,
for its part, has tried to present its contribution to the National As-
sembly by sending the latter a text which contains the draft of consti-
tutional eaptes and crespondig arguliins 101 Lfcrhe. in thL
document, the Supreme Court of Justice suggests a series of basic
points that should be the foundation of the judicial apparatus in the
Nicaraguan state.
The nature, structure and role of the Judicial Branch is defined
with increasing support for the Rule of Law in the Revolution. By
virtue of that imperative, the Supreme Court of Justice's proposal
draws the basic lines of the judiciary in the following ways.
a. Popular Participation by Integrating the People into Tribunals
Through an Appropriate Mixture of Laypersons
and Lawyers
We hope the combination of people's wisdom and the technical
handling of the rules of law will enrich the administration of justice in
general, through reciprocal and self-nourishing action. The proposed
new Criminal Procedure Code is a first step in that direction. The
principle of continuing reforms of law in the future will be established
in the Constitution.
b. Unity and Exclusivity of Jurisdiction
The Constitution should grant unity in structure and exclusivity
of jurisdiction. Concerning special jurisdictions, created to respond to
specific imperative situations demanding particular treatment, the
Supreme Court of Justice deems that they should be fully reincorpo-
rated into the orbit of the Judicial Branch when the causes that gave
rise to them cease to exist.
c. Independence
Independence is expressed in a double sense; externally, with re-
spect to other State powers and internally, with respect to the func-
tion of tribunals and judges in their respective areas and levels.
Therefore, the hierarchical organization of the Judicial Branch does
not affect the principle of independence, since, in this instance, hierar-
chy deals only with lawsuits and appeals.
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d. Reserve of Law
A law reserve constitutionally guarantees that certain matters
considered particularly important will be regulated by legislative pro-
cedures within the Assembly. This avoids the possibility that regula-
tion will occur through administrative rulings. In judicial matters,
modern constitutions usually contain a law reserve regarding the crea-
tion of courts, their authority, judicial proceedings and invisibility and
non-removal of judges.
e. Constitutional Control
Constitutional review is one of the themes of greatest interest,
not only for the Supreme Court of Justice, but also for the different
political parties making up the National Assembly. Constitutional re-
view is the mechanism which permits preserving the supremacy of the
Constitution through appeal for unconstitutionality of a law. A rul-
ing on an appeal leaves an unconstitutional law ineffective if the ruling
has a general effect.
This appeal is different from amparo, at least in two principal
aspects. First, an appeal of amparo protects an individual interest di-
rectly. It covers acts emanating from a governmental or administra-
tive authority, acting according to a law, decree or rule, or simply a de
facto measure without reference to any legal provision. Appeal for
unconstitutionality of a law, on the other hand, is addressed directly
against the law, violative of a constitutional provision, the individual
interest thus being protected by the Constitution rather than directly.
The second aspect refers to the effects of the ruling. In an appeal
on arnparo, the holding does not transcend the specific case, and
therefore the law is not derogated by the judicial holding. Further,
amparo is directed against the act of an officer who prejudices a con-
stitutionally protected interest rather than the legal standard which
authorizes the administrative or governmental conduct. Appeal for
unconstitutionality of the law, on the other hand, is a general declara-
tion and derogates any law repugnant to the Constitution.
This was one of the two points on which there was no unanimity
of opinion in the Supreme Court of Justice. The rest of the document
was approved unanimously in all details. Even though the decision of
the Supreme Tribunal was to approve constitutional review and to
grant this function to the Supreme Court of Justice, there were dissi-
dent opinions. These were also forwarded to the National Assembly
in order to provide them with various points of view. For brevity's
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sake, in this exposition we will not include every argument submitted
during the course of the many sessions of the commission entrusted
with preparing the text submitted to the Court. We shall, however,
briefly state those we adopted.
There were three arguments recommending the Court as the
body to hear appeals for unconstitutionality: (1) the necessity of
strengthening the Supreme Tribunal and the Judicial Branch, debilli-
tated by the separation of special jurisdictions; (2) the Court's experi-
ence in matters of appeal and amparo; and (3) the cumbersomeness of
creating a new body, considering material and financial limitations.
f Reorganizing the Supreme Court of Justice into
Specialized Departments
In the opinion of the Supreme Tribunal, this responds to a pro-
gressive division and subdivision of law into new legal disciplines.
Civil, administrative, criminal, labor, and constitutional departments
were considered. In the latter, it should be mentioned that those who
did not agree with the establishment of constitutional review in the
Court also disagreed here.
Perhaps it is advisable, only as a brief reference, to mention the
recommendation of establishing a labor department. This responds to
the necessity of creating labor case law so that appeals in this area,
today fragmented in different regional courts of appeal, will be unified
with the Supreme Court of Justice as the final arbiter.
4.6 Creative Participation in the Construction of the Country and
Our Own Identity
The relationship between the Revolution and the Judicial Branch
is expressed as a reciprocal act, consisting of integrating the reality of
the Revolution in the judicial branch's structure. The Judicial Branch
is then at the very heart of revolutionary changes.
There is a challenge in creating a Constitution in a revolutionary
process and in the midst of a war of aggression. Let us rise to the
status of what the times demand. Each one of us is a protagonist,
either positively or negatively, in his own circumstances. Each one,
through action or omission, is an indispensable and untransferable
subject in his own historic moment.
As members of a profession being modified in the midst of a
country also being changed, we are subject to the exigencies and im-
peratives of the times, which are common to us all. Let us participate
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creatively, responsibly and in full awareness of our duties and rights
in building our country. By doing so, we are constructing our history,
our future and our own identity.
5. Inaugural Address to the Seminar on Mixed Economy
in Nicaragua 16
Before all else, I wish to thank the organizers of this event, the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation and CINASE, for their invitation to ad-
dress you with these personal reflections which make the gentility and
benevolence of the organizers even more evident.
5.1 The Economy and the War of Aggression
Mixed economy has been considered a characteristic element of
the Popular Sandinista Revolution, along with political pluralism and
non-alignment. These three elements help to define our revolutionary
process, particularly if one considers that all of them are related and
express a specific conception of political and economic democracy.
They respond to specific needs of Nicaraguan society and historical
national and international requirements. Furthermore, and to a lesser
degree, they respond to a theoretical definition or to the adherence to
a previously established model. Their relationship, in agreement of
theory and practice, is not whimsical. It permits one to perceive that,
in a moment determined by the Revolution, society produces political
economic forms through daily, difficult, and contradictory practice.
The moment creates a conceptual legal formulation which should
reach its maximum expression in the Constitutional text going into
effect by January, 1987.
The common dominant characteristic of these three elements,
which are an expression of society, is the participation of all sectors in
the preservation and reconstruction of the nation. This occurs within
the historical current and the frame of reference the Revolution has
been developing. This multiplicity of the three elements manifests it-
self in the plurality of parties, in the variety of economic forms, and in
the diversification of international relations.
From my point of view, the specificity that these elements bestow
upon the Revolution is related to their development and consolidation
at the nucleus of revolutionary change. The reaffirmation of the Nica-
raguan nation is related to recouping an identity dispersed and
16. Ruben Dario Hall, Hotel Intercontinental, Managua, June 19, 1986.
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adulterated by different forms of foreign domination, and conquering
and reaffirming the rights and dignity of the people as the protagonist
in the revolution and as the beneficiary of their own history.
In order to achieve a mixed economy, political pluralism and
non-alignment, the Revolution must face the principal contradiction
between itself and the empire. The following events are significant:
the National War in 1856, Zeledon's resistance in 1912, Sandino's
struggle from 1926 to 1933, the revolutionary struggle by the
Sandinista National Liberation Front against the dictatorship from
1961 to 1979, and the Nicaraguan people's resistance against the war
of aggression imposed by President Reagan's government via the
counter-revolution since 1981.
The consolidation of identity and nation, inevitably and pain-
fully, continues to confront the empire. I say inevitably because it is
difficult to avoid a war when one is attacked on the threshold of the
twentieth century in the name of concepts such as the Monroe Doc-
trine of 1823 and "America for Americans," restated throughout his-
tory as The Big Stick, Dollar Diplomacy, John Quincy Adams'
Manifest Destiny, John Foster Dulles' National Security, and Presi-
dent Reagan's Fourth Frontier Doctrine.
Nicaraguan history has been the Nation's struggle against the
Empire and the vindication of an identity in the face of those who
only consider our people as their strategic frontiers. Imperialism has
been part of Latin American and Caribbean history, shadowed by
many aggressions from the beginning of the century. Interventions in
Cuba, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, among others,
have marked the period in which two interventions occurred in Nica-
ragua; one in 1912 and one in 1926. The intervention in Grenada in
1983 reaffirms the vocation of hegemony by force.
Since 1823, the Monroe Doctrine has been applied in permanent
form. In order to justify interventions, the national security argument
has been maintained by the United States, through presidents William
Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and Her-
bert Hoover, with slight variation in tone. Today the cries from the
White House curse any effort at liberation as international communist
expansion, thereby identifying any effort by oppressed people as a
symptom of the East-West conflict.
At this time Nicaragua is being publicly attacked by the present
administration in the United States. Losses of millions of dollars be-
tween 1980 and 1985, a commercial embargo, a closing off of private
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and official financial resources, a blocking of international loans, a
sabotaging of prices for our products and a closing of traditional mar-
kets are expressions of a war of economic attrition. It is designed to
provoke social and political destabilization. The war produces serious
distortions in the economy, which is why it is used as a destabilizing
factor. In addition, the loss of human life which the war causes is
imponderable.
This reference is indispensable to understanding the moment we
are living through. Things are what they are due to the time and
circumstances in which they are being produced. National and inter-
national historical facts have become one in a moment in history
which represents the unity of multiple determinants. The conflicts
and contradictions of the present hour would not be understood if one
did not keep in mind that the nation-empire contradiction criss-
crosses our entire history, uniting and dividing political frontiers in
our country, while at the same time defining and circumscribing the
drama of a people's history of revolution and struggle.
5.2 Capitalism, Socialism, and Mixed Economy
In article 6 of the proposed Constitution, a mixed economy is
defined as an economic model where different types of property exist
and are combined. The property includes state, private, mixed and
cooperative, and has the people's welfare as the primary objective
without prejudicing the establishment of reasonable profits.
Two elements are essential in the proposed Constitution: (1) co-
existence of different forms of property and (2) the property's tie to a
specific common goal; the people's welfare. The proposed Constitu-
tion states an express historical reality which is the coexistence of dif-
ferent forms of property.
Generally, a mixed economy carries characteristics associated
with market economics as well as state economics. That double role
is evidenced in social production relationships, whereby the means of
production determines the character of the property. The state's role
in the whole system is economic regulation. Different degrees of state
participation may vary according to the greater or lesser preponder-
ance of either market or state economics.
It is also important to bear in mind that variations can function
in mixed economic forms with respect to the goals of the national
economy. Should the mixed economy consist of superimposed forms,
independent of one another, without a unifying logic to explain their
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differences? Or should a common denominator exist to govern the
types of consumption, the types of investment, specific policies of sup-
ply, social services, employment, pricing, and income? In other
words, should one look for a logic in the system of mixed economy in
the state or should economics be left alone to self-regulating mecha-
nisms such as price and production equilibrium and the law of supply
and demand, as in the free market system?
It is clear that mixed economy systems present different modali-
ties, not only because of state participation, but also because of mo-
nopoly relationships over mechanisms of free competition. We are
combining the capitalist and socialist economic systems, with respec-
tive components having greater or lesser degrees of participation.
From the capitalist system we adopt decentralization of economic de-
cisions: Adam Smith's invisible hand, the law of supply and demand,
private property, private enterprise, consumer sovereignty, free pric-
ing system, and free competition. From the socialist system we adopt
centralized economy: collective interest, state ownership of the means
of production, socialization of natural resources in the production
phase as in the distribution phase, central planning, distribution of
production, the application of the principle from each according to
his ability and to each according to his need, accommodation of capi-
tal understood to be destined to resources for the production of pro-
duction goods, price control, public interest, and integral vision of
economics and planned economy.
With regard to the capitalist system, the total set of principal
characteristics are fully valid at the initial stages of free competition.
Later, capitalism begins the process of economic concentration to-
wards monopoly, with only one firm dominating productive activity;
or towards oligopoly, where some firms dedicate themselves to the
same activity in order to dominate a sector of production (i.e. trusts,
cartels, and holding companies). The process of capitalism's eco-
nomic concentration has carried a double centralization and accumu-
lation of capital and production. The process leads to the monopoly-
imperialist phase of capitalism bursting into multinational capitalism.
The elementary logic of the process of concentration arises from the
necessity of overcoming competition, lowering costs, and accumulat-
ing profits. Inevitably, a monopoly projects itself beyond national
frontiers and inserts itself in the heart of underdeveloped societies.
The capitalist process accentuates dependence qualitatively and con-
sequently causes the modification of center-periphery relationships. It
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affects economies in dependent countries and alters the structure of
international trade.
These characteristics of world capitalism, particularly the pro-
cess of monopoly-imperialist concentration, clash with a revolution-
ary process' very foundation and reason for being. While the
Revolution seeks to forge an identity and structure a nation, capital-
ism's multinational expansionist process dissolves into exporting capi-
tal and surplus goods. This limits the characteristics of a people, of a
history, and an identity. This phase of capitalism submerges all the
distinctive traits- of the nation into the undifferentiated universe of
multinationals, into the world of data processing and cybernetics, and
creates a technological superstructure of which a supernation without
borders is founded.
The Sandinista Popular Revolution, consequently, can only de-
fine an economic system framed outside the direct logic of multina-
tional capitalism. This does not mean isolation from the relationships
determining international and geopolitical economic conditions.
Rather, it means trying to define a framework for respectful and just
economic relationships; a framework to unite efforts and expectations
with other countries of Latin America and the Third World. It means
struggling for the application of a new international economic order
and in particular, to seek policy treatment of foreign debt that favors
a just convergence between the creditor nations, international finance
organizations, and debtor countries.
The quest for real world peace involves acknowledging poor peo-
ples' right to justice, liberty and dignity. Peace is not merely the ab-
sence of war, but the reality of a dignified free life, respect for moral
values, and respect for self-determination and sovereignty. Peace is
the application and compliance with the new international economic
order and the absolution of usurious mechanisms in international re-
lationships making foreign debt an instrument of exploitation. By
means of that usury, not only is our wealth mortgaged, wealth that
was usurped for centuries by the dominators, but our future, our iden-
tity, and our historical possibility are also mortgaged and alienated.
Mixed economy, in some way, permits recognizing a reality
founded on different forms of property, including private as well as
state property. It permits the state's participation, to a greater or
lesser extent, in the regulation of economic activity. Mixed economy
responds to a determinate reality. Article 6 of the proposed Constitu-
tion consecrates that reality and tries to perfect the mechanisms for
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legal regulation through the Constitution and corresponding ordinary
laws.
Reflection on the economy, the war of aggression and our at-
tempts at response will bring us closer to the theory and practice of
mixed economy in our revolutionary process. It is advisable to look
next into the most effective mechanisms for state, private, mixed, and
cuperative property participation, whiie paying close attention to the
requirements of our national reality so as to achieve the greatest bene-
fit from our existing resources. These mechanisms are as follows:
(1) Considering state regulatory and control mechanisms over
economics; analyzing the feasibility of controls to be established for
the purpose of improving them and avoiding eventual distortions and
anomalies in a productive and distributive apparatus. This includes
lowered production, hoarding, speculation, artificial scarcities of
goods, and excessive prices.
(2) Evaluating the establishment of investment policies on a
short and middle term basis and the opportunity to create investment
law.
(3) Establishing a set of provisions to create the most appropri-
ate legal framework to strengthen and develop constitutional concepts
which consecrate the principles and draft the great general lines.
(4) The necessity of establishing and developing policies and
mechanisms oriented toward increased productivity of labor and im-
proved use of existing resources.
(5) The advisability of doing comparative studies of other histor-
ical realities and experiences.
These are strictly personal reflections. If they awaken some in-
terest and if they give rise to certain elements of discussion, I shall be
satisfied for having contributed to the efforts of the organizers and the
participants of this event. We hope and trust that this meeting will be
fruitful and that the highest spirit of cooperation, analysis, and
profound reflection will always prevail, consistent with the high level
of the institutions and their participants.
6. The Judicial Branch 17
6.1 The Role of the Judiciary in the Nicaraguan State
The Sandinista Popular Revolution, like any genuine revolution,
17. Draft proposal for the new Constitution presented by the Supreme Court of Justice to
the National Assembly, January 1986.
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has produced a rupture between socio-political reality and legal, insti-
tutional order. From that fact, it is imperative to reconcile law and
institutions with the historical reality that is the Revolution, in order
to permit law and the judiciary to express the full revolutionary
process.
The Supreme Court of Justice, under article 29 of General Act of
the National Assembly, has the right to initiate laws in matters within
its jurisdiction. Under this power, the Court prepared a draft of the
new Criminal Procedure Code to be substituted for the current Crimi-
nal Instruction Code. The Court expects to submit the draft in the
near future to the National Assembly for consideration. Today, the
Supreme Court of Justice wishes to present, at this historic moment,
this draft of the chapter on the Judicial Branch. Within the limits of
legal order and in response to the reality of the revolutionary period,
the Judicial Branch has attempted to express justice's true values, and
adhere to the laws and rights of the majority of our people, which
have been won and defended by the Sandinista Popular Revolution.
However, in order to make judicial practice consonant with this
historic moment, it is necessary to conform the Nicaraguan State's
judiciary to Nicaraguan reality and to redefine the concept to include
the principle of popular participation.
The Supreme Court of Justice has urged judicial reform along
with other State institutions since the Silvio Mayorga Legal Seminar.
Reform is imperative in light of the historical antecedents of the ad-
ministration of justice in our country. At first, the judicial system was
linked to justifying colonial exploitation. Later, during various forms
of domination installed in our country after our independence from
Spain, the legal judicial system was oriented toward justifying usurpa-
tion of indigenous communities and appropriating labor forcibly. Fi-
nally, during the Somocista dictatorship with its ties to imperialism,
the judiciary's power was at the service of Somocista interests. This
resulted in a grave deterioration of fundamental values and justice.
This deterioration extended to sectors affected by the arbitrary atti-
tude of those who had a duty to preserve values, and to the loss of
prestige of institutions, including the entire Judicial Branch.
In order to end the deterioration, the Revolution emerged as the
only historical possibility. As a result of deposing the exploiting class,
new standards were promulgated. The new standards included the
Fundamental Statute and the Statute of Nicaraguans' Rights and
Guarantees. Laws of an economic-social nature, international agree-
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ments, and the appointment of new people to take charge of govern-
ment functions brought about a new, just, and better functioning
judicial system in spite of the economic crisis and aggression the
country is suffering. The judiciary should act in accordance with, and
reflect the popular, democratic, anti-imperialist character of the revo-
lutionary process. The administration of justice must merge with in-
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and with the protection and oversight of human rights, through the
creative application of law in the matters under its jurisdiction.
6.2 Unity and Exclusivity
The principle of unity can be defined as the judicial function ex-
ercised by a unitary System of bodies which together comprises the
judicial organization which the Constitution generically grants. It is a
structural concept since it is carried out through the ordering of its
elements into levels leading up to a common vertex. This implies, as a
corollary, the incorporation of the special courts, now part of the Ex-
ecutive Branch, into the judicial system, once the causes that gave rise
to them disappear.
The principle of exclusivity refers to the role and not the struc-
ture of the judiciary. It can be explained through the following prop-
osition: only judicial bodies can exercise judicial functions.
There obviously exists a close tie between the principle of unity
and exclusivity, but they should not be confused. Exclusivity could be
granted (all jurisdiction in the hands of judges) without unity (absence
of a single vertex) as has already occurred in Nicaragua with labor
jurisdiction.
6.3 Constitutional Review
In any state, the process of drafting and developing law has three
fundamental steps: its creation by the legislative branch; its applica-
tion by the Judicial Branch; and the implementation of acts pre-
scribed by law or by judicial decisions by the Executive Branch. The
Executive Branch has the responsibility of seeing that all citizens do
what they are obligated to do by law and that judges' and appellate
courts' decisions are obeyed. The mechanism of reciprocal action
around the law generates a mutual, correlative autonomy in the role
of the branches of state.
The Judicial Branch is entrusted with hearing and resolving all
controversies which come within its courts' jurisdiction, including
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those which are the object of amparo appeals. Amparo applies when a
law, decree, regulation, mandate, or governmental or administrative
decision violates an individual's constitutionally-protected interests.
The Supreme Court of Justice exercises, through amparo appeals, in-
direct control of constitutional order every time it restores individual
rights. Amparo appeals can be sought in criminal matters, when deal-
ing with freedom and personal safety, or in civil matters when dealing
with damages or threats to property. Within the revolutionary pe-
riod, the right to amparo is preserved in the Amparo Act for Freedom
and Personal Safety and the Amparo Act itself. The constitutional
text needs only to confirm the validity of these Acts, because the pro-
cedures contained in them are sufficiently swift and effective to guard
the rights provided. One should point out that the reach of judicial
rulings in amparo appeals only applies to the specific case.
These standards are the foundation of revolutionary legality, of
which the principal objective is to maintain the supremacy of consti-
tutionally ranked statutes now, and the supremacy of the new Consti-
tution later. In order to faithfully comply with that revolutionary
aim, it is appropriate to establish a fully defined amparo appeal in the
future Constitution. Amparo's principal objective is the protection of
human rights. Human rights are fully recognized by the Sandinista
Popular Revolution in the Fundamental Statute and the Statute of
Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans, as well as in the signing and
ratification of all international treaties devoted to the protection of
human rights.
This represents a permanent attitude on the part of the Revolu-
tion. It changes substantially the mere public relations fanfare about
human rights, which took place during the dictatorship, to an authen-
tic revolutionary commitment to respect and observe the rights of
human beings. All of this occurs within the atmosphere generated by
the Revolution, in which all manner of foreign exploitation and de-
pendency have been eliminated and in which a new social, political,
economic and cultural order is produced.
In addition to the constitutional protection through amparo ap-
peals, the Supreme Court of Justice will establish a mechanism of con-
stitutional rank for direct protection against unconstitutionality.
Consider the following: the Fundamental Law of the Republic is the
Constitution, since it was drafted by a body created for that very pur-
pose. The drafting of our future Constitution to structure the Nicara-
guan state has been turned over to the National Assembly. The
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Assembly then has a double mission: drafting the constitutional text,
and legislating in the ordinary sense. The Assembly, then, fulfills the
functions belonging to every Legislative Branch. Once it is drafted
and promulgated, the Constitution becomes the supreme standard,
which no law, decree, regulation, act, mandate, order, act or omission
of any officer or authority, may contradict. Its precepts must be duly
adiered to in order to achieve a constitutional state which makes
human rights paramount.
In order to accomplish the above, it is necessary to exercise con-
stitutional control from different angles and dimensions, so that
supremacy of the Constitution is guaranteed. At the same time, inter-
dependence of the branches of the state is made a reality. Interdepen-
dence, without prejudice to the principle of independence, should
favor close coordination and collaboration between the branches, for
the purpose of attaining harmonious compliance with the ultimate
purpose for which they were created. For this reason, in addition to
self-constraint which each branch should exercise to avoid running
afoul of the Constitution, it is necessary to have appropriate controls
available to permit the maintenance of constitutionality. Those con-
trols can be the amparo appeals, to which we have already referred,
and appeals for unconstitutionality of a law, discussed below.
In our national system, we aspire to exercise constitutional con-
trol because we consider it healthy and beneficial to safeguard the
Constitution, and to adjust it to our national reality and our own Nic-
araguan characteristics. In that sense, constitutional review should be
exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice, an institution which has
been, by definition, the one entrusted with hearing claims of conflict
with the national Constitution's precepts. For this reason, we reaffirm
our opinion that the judiciary should be the branch entrusted with the
authority to hear and resolve all controversies arising from damage to
individual civil or political rights or from conflicts with the
supremacy of the Constitution. Review for unconstitutionality is es-
sentially the province of the Supreme Court of Justice for it is part of
the intrinsic, characteristic role it plays, independent of the nature or
rank of the body which commits an infraction.
Therefore, it should be the Judicial Branch that exercises consti-
tutional review. We do not think it advisable for control to be in the
Assembly itself, since it is more appropriate and effective for the
Supreme Court of Justice to hear the appeal due to the intrinsic rea-
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sons alluded to previously and due to the advisability of review to rest
in a different body than the one in violation of the Constitution.
6.4 The Necessity of Dividing the Supreme Court
into Specialized Departments
Due to growth of knowledge and the necessities of social devel-
opment, the various branches of the law have become progressively
more subdivided. The subdivision has led to specialization, due to the
necessary division of labor, especially when work is done by a colle-
gial group. For example, in criminal law, specialized study is re-
quired in order to produce judicial experts capable of reaching
accurate conclusions in the conflicts presented by society. The same
is true in constitutional law, administrative law, civil law, labor law
and other fields. This has obligated legislators in almost all countries
to divide their supreme courts into different divisions, sections or
departments.
It is equally important to point out that national case decisions
need to be uniform, and higher converging vertices need to be created
for that purpose. Uniformity is accomplished when hearings on dif-
ferent cases reach the ultimate authority through proper channels.
These channels are extraordinary appeal for unconstitutionality,
amparo appeal, ordinary appeal, and in labor cases, final appeal to the
Supreme Court of Justice.
All of the above illustrate the necessity of constitutionally estab-
lishing specialized work on the part of the Supreme Court of Justice,
in order to achieve swifter, more uniform and better administration of
justice.
6.5 Reserve of Law: Non-Delegation of Legislative Power
The principle of "reserve of law," developed initially in German
doctrine at the end of the nineteenth century, means that certain par-
ticularly important matters can only be regulated through a statute
enacted by the National Assembly.
Reserve of law is normally established in the Constitution, so
that only by amending the Constitution can the reserve be eliminated.
The practical effect is to block reserved matters from administrative
control. In judicial matters, modern constitutions usually contain a
reserve of law concerning the creation and organization of the courts
(Court Enabling Act), governing areas such as judicial authority, judi-
cial procedures, and non-removal or revocation of judgeships.
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6.6 Popular Participation
Popular participation in the administration of justice has been a
constant preoccupation and aspiration of the Nicaraguan people. The
above affirmations are corroborated by the "civil jury" practice, even
though rules were never established for it. They are corroborated by
the appointment and existence of lay judges to hear cases involving
lesser amounts in civil matters and for misdemeanors in criminal mat-
ters. The presence of a "jury" in criminal matters is also evidence of
these affirmations. The jury was incorporated into our legal system
beginning with the Criminal Instruction Code of 1879, which is still
in effect.
Although it is 'not possible to determine precisely the sources
which inspired legislators of that period, the insertion of the "jury" in
the Code, which has a strong inquisitorial tendency, is a fact accepted
by national scholars. It reveals, directly or indirectly, a liberal ten-
dency inspired by the Criminal Instruction Code of France of 1806, or
by the Constitution of Cadiz (Spain) in 1812. The jury is a demo-
cratic aspiration and expression. If the people participate in the legis-
lative branch, it is incoherent to deny them participation in the
exercise of the judicial branch. Besides, the conscience of the judge or
trier should be founded on collective conscience. However, in spite of
these solid theoretical foundations, the jury did not fulfill its promise
in the earlier system, which was a system rotten from within and
which, of course, the jury did not escape.
With the triumph of the Revolution, the institution of the jury
underwent substantial changes. In some departments, mass organiza-
tions were called upon to propose candidates for the elections of ju-
rors. Jurors have acquired a greater consciousness of their
responsibility in the administration of justice, so much so that "juror
absenteeism," a frequent vice in the past, has disappeared. However,
the field of jury application under the Criminal Procedure Reform has
been limited to five types of felonies: aggravated murder, endanger-
ment, patricide, infanticide and rape when the victim is over fourteen
years of age. Although we are aware of the imperfection in human
institutions, after six years of Revolution, we have had positive exper-
iences in the creation and workings of the courts with effective popu-
lar participation.
In any event, the participation of the people in the administration
of justice, by actively integrating popular elements in the courts, as
well as by passively permitting public attendance at trial, assures
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"revolutionary legality." Additionally, it has been a key factor in the
democratization of the judiciary. Consequently, in order to guarantee
the permanent application of popular participation in the administra-
tion of justice, we deem it advisable to state it in the Constitution.
6.7 Proposed Text: The Judicial Branch
Organization of the Administration of Justice
Article 1
The Administration of Justice guarantees revolutionary legality
and the protection and oversight of human rights, through the crea-
tive application of the law in matters and cases within its authority.
Article 2
The Administration of Justice shall be organized and shall func-
tion with popular participation. Appropriate laws shall determine
that participation.
The Judicial Branch is composed of the Supreme Court of Justice
and other tribunals as established by law.
Article 3
With the exception of the Supreme Court of Justice, which shall
be composed entirely of lawyers, justice tribunals, in the actions
within their jurisdiction, shall be collegial and shall be made up of
lawyers and non-lawyers representing popular sectors. The Court En-
abling Act shall determine the qualifications of their members.
Article 4
The term of office of the justices of the Supreme Court of Justice
and of the lawyer members of regional tribunals shall be the same as
that of the members of the National Assembly. The term of office of
the members of other tribunals shall be determined by law.
Article 5
The members of the Supreme Court of Justice and the tribunals,
may be removed from their office during their tenure only for just
cause, duly proven.
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Appointment of Justices and Judges
Article 6
The National Assembly is charged with election of the members
who comprise the Supreme Court of Justice and with the determina-
tion of its internal organization.
The National Assembly is also charged with election of the law-
yer members of the Regional Tribunals and with their internal
organization.
The lawyer members comprising the zone and municipal tribu-
nals shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 7
Non-lawyer judges representing popular sectors shall be ap-
pointed at Popular Assemblies by the corresponding mass organiza-
tions within their respective areas. The form of the election shall be
governed by law.
Judicial Democracy and the Principle of Impartiality
Article 8
The members of the justice tribunals, be they lawyers or not,
have equal rights in the exercise of their judicial duties.
Article 9
Rulings and decisions of the justice tribunals shall be adopted by
simple majority of votes.
Article 10
Trials shall be public. However, certain trials or proceedings
may be in closed session if required by morality, security and public
order.
Article 11
Justice is free.
Article 12
Justice emanates from the people and shall be administered with
the people's participation, and in the name of the people through the
judicial bodies provided by law.
[Vol. 12:341
Rule of Law in the Nicaraguan Revolution
Article 13
The equality of persons, consecrated by law, must be guaranteed
in the judicial process in real form by the judicial body.
Law Reserve
Article 14
What is not stipulated in this Constitution regarding the compo-
sition, functions and powers of tribunals and judicial proceedings may
be regulated only by duly enacted statute.
The Principle of Independence and Legality
Article 15
The Judicial Branch is independent of any other branch of the
State. Within the judicial structure tribunals are also independent in
the exercise of their duties. The hierarchy established by law exists
only with respect to suits, appeals, and discipline.
Article 16
Tribunals and judges comprising the Judicial Branch shall be
subject in their duties only to the Constitution and the law. The En-
abling Act shall prescribe their organization.
Unity and Exclusivity
Article 17
Justice tribunals comprise a unitary system, whose highest body
is the Supreme Court of Justice. They alone are charged with the
exercise of jurisdiction.
Military tribunals are regulated by special act.
The Supreme Court of Justice shall hear, in a manner prescribed
by law, appeals from decisions they issue in second instance.
Departments
Article 18
The Supreme Court of Justice, the number of whose justices may
not be less than at the present time, is the highest Tribunal of the
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Republic and shall be divided into departments. Matters to be heard
by the departments or the Full Court shall be prescribed by law.
Supremacy of the Constitution
Article 19
The present Constitution of the Republic is the Fundamental
Law; no other law, decree or regulation may contradict it.
Constitutional Review
Article 20
Appeal is established for unconstitutionality of a law, decree or
regulation that opposes what is prescribed by the Constitution.
Article 21
The Full Supreme Court of Justice is the authorized body to hear
appeals for unconstitutionality. Procedures shall be prescribed by
law.
Article 22
Amparo appeal is also established, against any disposition, act or
resolution and, in general, against any action or omission of any of-
ficer, authority or agent of those who violate or attempts to violate
rights and guarantees consecrated in the Constitution. Procedures
shall be prescribed by law.
External Relations
Article 23
All other authorities of the Republic shall lend such collabora-
tion to the judges and tribunals as they may need for the better fulfill-
ment of their duties.
Article 24
State authorities, organizations, legal institutions and individuals
must comply with the verdicts and resolution of the judges and
tribunals.
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Transitory Articles
Article 25
Judicial transformation may be set into motion, by means of spe-
cial projects, in accordance with what the law establishes.
While the judicial transformation contemplated in this Constitu-
tion is being carried out, tribunals' structures and duties shall con-
tinue to be governed according to existing law.
Article 26
Special jurisdiction tribunals shall continue to function as long as
the causes which gave rise to them continue.
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PART II - THE JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATION IN
NICARAGUA (1986-88)
Introduction
This section incorporates a number of written works, lectures,
and speeches given in Nicaragua and abroad between December 1986
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development of the principal ideas of justice, the judicial branch, and
the Rule of Law in the Nicaraguan revolutionary process.
These essays are oriented both towards designing and imple-
menting legal institutions and provisions for transforming the judicial
system, and towards resolving structural and related problems in the
daily exercise of the Supreme Court of Justice. The ideas and the
concrete decisions are the fruit of the collective work of the Supreme
Court of Justice and other judicial officials. These essays reveal the
severe time constraints placed on the Judicial Branch due to the vol-
ume and demands of official obligations. At the same time, they allow
a glimpse of the process that requires the President of the Supreme
Court to explain the dominant ideas in various forums. What has
prevented a more coherent linking of the different essays to improve
the general architecture of this article has, on the other hand, permit-
ted some glimpse of the movement that flows behind the more visible
ideas and actions. The search for a concept and practice of the Rule
of Law in the Revolution is, in the final analysis, the fundamental
objective of all the essays.
In Part I, the search was for preliminary and fundamental con-
cepts of the Rule of Law, with a view towards elaborating the political
Constitution through the lens of the Judicial Branch. For that reason,
the principal themes of Part I revolved around the proposed bill for a
new political Constitution presented to the National Assembly by the
Supreme Court of Justice in January 1986.
The basic points of the bill were: jurisdictional unity, constitu-
tional control, independence of the judicial branch, and popular par-
ticipation in the administration of justice. The Assembly adopted the
Court's entire bill. This was the basis for chapter V of title VIII of
our political Constitution promulgated in January 1987.
In this second part, the theme of the Rule of Law is again present
throughout the various essays and lectures. It appears in the essays
on the concept of state, law and justice, and amparo-particularly
with respect to appeals for unconstitutionality. It is also present in
the reflections on separation of powers and on reform of criminal pro-
[Vol. 12:341
Rule of Law in the Nicaraguan Revolution
cedure. Finally, the Rule of Law is an essential part of our study on
the judicial transformation. The Rule of Law is, in short, the com-
mon proposition underlying all the essays, without detracting from
the purposes and specific propositions of each one. While Part I ex-
pressed the principal ideas of the Judicial Branch pertaining to the
political Constitution, Part II focuses primarily on the legal reforms
which will bring ordinary legislation into conformity with the Consti-
tution, and develop constitutionally-based regulatory laws.
We must point out that we are discussing Parts I and II in this
introduction because they unite a theory and an experience tied to the
process of judicial transformation in Nicaragua. Both sum up the ju-
dicial transformation expressed in the Constitution and the subse-
quent judicial reform process, thereby articulating a completed stage.
The transformation represents a theoretical formulation and a polit-
ical implementation. This stage is expressed fully with respect to its
theoretical formulation, and partially with respect to its practical
implementation.
The Judicial Branch's theoretical foundations are now part of the
constitutional text in force. The following are constitutionally estab-
lished: jurisdictional unity, constitutional control, the appeal for un-
constitutionality, independence of the Judicial Branch, the Supreme
Court of Justice's authority to organize and direct the Judicial Branch
according to article 164, subsection 1 of the Constitution, decrees 299
and 303 (which give the Court the power to create, eliminate, and
merge courts of the first instance), organization of Appellate Courts,
and establishment of jurisdiction by subject matter and amount on the
basis of agreements with the Supreme Court of Justice itself without
National Assembly approval.
The Court, incorporating the views of the former Ministry of
Justice, completed the bill for a new Constitutional Act of Amparo.
This Act includes a chapter which establishes and regulates proce-
dures for the exercise of appeals for unconstitutionality, pending ap-
proval by the National Assembly.
The Assembly has already approved the first part of the criminal
procedure reforms, on the basis of a joint bill prepared by the General
Prosecutor of Justice, the Supreme Court of Justice and the Ministry
of the Interior. The most important part of the reform is the abolition
of the General Prosecutor's monopoly on criminal prosecution. How-
ever, the General Prosecutor retains the exclusive right to prosecute
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for crimes against national security, economic crimes and heinous
murder.
The Judicial Branch has been expanded by the Constitution and
by statutes, providing the foundation for judicial transformation. In
this process, the abolition of the Popular Anti-Somoza Tribunals was
the first and perhaps most important step in the concrete implementa-
tion of article i59 of the Constitution (recognizing jurisdictional
unity). The transfer of the jurisdiction of the Regional Committees
on Housing Affairs ("CRAH") to the Judicial Branch is also about to
take place. This means that an appeal in this area will have to be
taken, after approval of the relevant statute, to the appropriate Re-
gional Court of Appeal.
Additional jurisdictional matters are still pending. The reunifica-
tion of the jurisdiction of Custody and Protection of Minors, now in
the hands of the Nicaraguan Institute of Security and Social Welfare
("INSSBI"), and the jurisdiction of the Agrarian Tribunal, must be
brought within the Judicial Branch in order to complete the process
of implementing article 159 of the Constitution. The continuation of
the reform of criminal procedure, and putting into practice judicial
policies adopted to reduce the delay of justice, are among the greatest
problems still facing us.
These are all important, central themes of Part II. We have also
deepened and developed Montesquieu's theme of the separation of
powers, as was promised in Part I.
This Part completes the full vision of transformations which have
taken place between 1985 and 1988. We trust that this text presents,
with sufficient clarity, the fundamental ideas and the conceptual
framework in which the ideas have developed.
1. Closing Address at the International Seminar on Law and
Justice in the Nicaraguan Constitution '
1.1 Fundamental Principles of the New Constitution
In 1987, the National Assembly gave revolutionary Nicaragua its
first Constitution. This Constitution attempts to express, on an insti-
tutional level, the social, economic, and political realities of our coun-
try. In addition, the Constitution attempts to insure that the current
of history that crosses our land flows through an increasingly coher-
ent legal system.
1. Managua, December 17, 1986.
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Every true constitution is established by the dialectic that en-
twines the ebb and flow of history. A constitution is therefore, both a
point of arrival and a point of departure, since at the moment that it
gathers the experience of these difficult and luminous years into a syn-
thesis, it immediately opens the tasks of the future, and lays before us
the future as a task. In this way, the Constitution synthesizes the
institutional labor that began on the first days of the triumph, appear-
ing in the Fundamental Statute and the Statute of Rights and Guaran-
tees of Nicaraguans. The labor continued throughout the numerous
decrees issued by the Junta of the Government of National Recon-
struction, carrying out profound transformations of our society. This
labor was then translated into statutory law in the Council of State,
into popular will, the presidential and legislative elections of 1984,
and finally into text and context of our revolutionary reality in the
Political Constitution of the Republic.
The Constitution also opens the furrows of new work. Ordinary
codes and statutes must be changed to conform to the newly changed
Constitution. Thus, the Constitution requires a legal effort to impose
the content and essence of the constitutional norm upon the ordinary
laws.
Without falling into either the logical-rational abstractions of
Kelsen's theory of law, 2 or the overvaluation of the norm of legal pos-
itivism, we think that law is not merely superstructure without iden-
tity, unilaterally determined by the infrastructure. Law is a reality
that, although it does not deny the influence of the infrastructure, has
its own specificity and exercises, at the same time, its reciprocal influ-
ence upon the forms of production and social phenomena in general.
There is, thus, a two-way movement of feedback and dialectic be-
tween the economic sphere and the legal sphere.
The Constitution is simultaneously the base and the pinnacle of
the legal system. It provides the foundation for ordinary laws and, at
the same time, allows these laws to carry out the Constitution's val-
ues, principles, and formal content. This "base-pinnacle phenome-
non" has become a necessary condition of legality under the principle
that the Constitution is the supreme law. The law is not only based
on constitutional principles, but carries out those principles. Thus,
the law in its logical structure and methodology, emanates from the
Constitution and returns to it.
In this sense, Kelsen's theory has some value because it contrib-
2. See supra Part I note 2.
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utes to an explanation of the logical structure of the system and of
each individual norm as a piece of the whole. When Kelsen's theory
establishes the hierarchy and interaction of norms, it also establishes a
valid methodological principle. But this is true only when it does not
pretend to exhaust the real content of law, which is always a historical
content.
When we say historical, we mean to affirm that the law must
express its reality and, at the same time, be an instrument of that
reality. Bourgeois law has achieved this proposition quite fully, re-
producing real inequality in the name of the declaration of formal
equality. Someone has said that true equality is equal treatment to
equals and unequal treatment to unequals, since equal treatment to
unequals only serves to perpetuate inequality. Equality is the first fic-
tion that bourgeois law passes off as reality. The next is to deny its
historical character by attributing to law an exclusively rational na-
ture. The effect of this, as we have seen, is the reproduction of the
historical picture of capitalism founded upon inequality between indi-
viduals and classes.
The law is and always has been an instrument for the reproduc-
tion of the social system that produces it. It builds within the dialec-
tic of society a reciprocal movement of influence and double direction
that goes from the base to the peak and likewise from the peak to the
base.
A constitution, to the extent that it is the fundamental norm, is a
mediating mechanism between civil society and political society. To
be successful, a constitution must develop a system of capillaries and
communicating arteries between all the particulars that make up the
structure of society, giving them fluidity and coherence. In our case,
the Constitution and the legal and judicial transformation that has to
take place to fulfill what it prescribes, must be a channel for change
and cause of future transformations. It must also be the formal
framework and instrument to carry out the objectives of the Revolu-
tion. It must, in short, reproduce the reality which exists in the social
and economic base, in ideology and in revolutionary values.
This transformation requires an equilibrium between the text and
the context, between the framework and the reality it contains, and
between the norm and the sociopolitical reality. Every constitutional
framework, either by excess or defect, distances itself from its circum-
stances. Thus, a constitution either lives in the kingdom of utopia by
being a metaphysical abstraction that transcends the objective world,
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or else it lags behind social changes. It impedes those changes and
ends up coming apart as the final result of the contradiction between
the productive forces and the social relations of production.
Our recently approved Constitution incorporates the fundamen-
tal elements of the revolutionary transformation in Nicaraguan soci-
ety. Those elements are based on principles of political pluralism,
mixed economy, and non-alignment. Beginning with title I, chapter I,
the fundamental principles announced do not provide an empty and
rhetorical declaration, but rather the daily, historic, and epic reality of
the Nicaraguan people. Article 1 provides that
Independence, sovereignty and self-determination are inalienable
rights of the Nicaraguan people and the foundation of the Nicara-
guan nation .... It is the right of the people and the duty of all
citizens to preserve and defend, with arms if necessary, the inde-
pendence of the Nation, its sovereignty and national self-
determination.
3
Rarely have these words embodied such a dramatic and glorious real-
ity, making the legal norm a living and throbbing body, expressing the
will and the practice of liberty and dignity of the Nicaraguan people.
The Constitution recognizes basic and inalienable individual
rights such as the rights to life, dignity, liberty, the family, commu-
nity, country, humanity, equality under the law and due process. It
also enshrines political and social rights, labor rights, agrarian reform,
defense, the economy, education, culture, the rights of the Atlantic
Coast communities, and the organization of the State and the defense
of the Constitution.
These principles and constitutional provisions cover the most
permanent values of the historic life of the Nicaraguan nation, while
at the same time incorporating the great transformations of the
Revolution. For example, the agrarian reform has given land to
thousands of farmers, the educational reform has attacked illiteracy at
its roots and has made education a phenomenon for the masses, and
the cultural transformation has made poetry, painting, song and
dance flourish like the miracle of a rose that sprouts in the hands of
the people.
1.2 The Judicial Branch in the New Constitution
Title VIII, chapter V, of the political Constitution refers to the
Judicial Branch. This is the first step in the judicial transformation.
3. NICARAGUAN CONST. art. 1.
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A series of general principles outline the framework of this re-
form. The first principle is that the Constitution establishes that jus-
tice emanates from the people and shall be imparted through the
Judicial Branch. In so doing, the popular essence of justice is en-
shrined. Implicitly, the lines of axiological content are prescribed,
tied strictly to the historical values of the Revolution to which the
people are both the purpose and the protagonists.
The Judicial Branch is recognized as the delegate of the people in
whose name it will impart justice. This confers a different sociological
and political sense upon the organization of the state than that which
Montesquieu attributed to it in The Spirit of the Laws in 1748.
Originally, the separation of powers doctrine responded to the
upheaval in European society of the eighteenth century and to the
division of political and economic power between different social
classes. However, the necessary content which it acquires in our con-
stitutional text and in our own reality which that text formally ex-
presses, is a concept of popular cohesion as the dominant expression
of Nicaraguan society.
Montesquieu's separation of powers was designed to produce an
alliance between the bourgeoisie-the economically dominant class
which exercised the legislative and executive functions-and the
King. Historically, this alliance was confronted by the landholding
aristocracy. This manifested itself in the struggles of feudal society
for territorial and legal reunification of sovereignty in the nation-state.
But the application and meaning of separation of powers in our social
and legal reality is directed in every case to aiding the people. As
established in article 2 of the Constitution, the people are the locus of
national sovereignty, the source of all power, and the forgers of their
own destiny.
The Judicial Branch, in Montesquieu's division of powers, re-
mained a stronghold of the landholding aristocracy, displaced from
other functions by the bourgeoisie and the monarchy. The historical
reality of our country stands in contrast. Far from effecting a distri-
bution of the functions of state among different social classes, we have
a distribution of abilities, attributes, or powers which issue from one
solitary power-the people.
It is true that labels express determinate contents, but it is also
true that contents change in spite of their labels and that there is no
word, however precise, that can express all the richness of change and
action. For us, the separation of powers is a label, pulled from the
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West and integrated into the legal and political tradition of Latin
America. It responds to a new content, with different objectives, and
with different subjects. The separation of powers must reproduce, in
spite of its origins, the values of the Revolution. Separation of powers
will neither take revolutionary force from our process by its presence,
nor add transforming power by its absence.
Article 166 of the Constitution establishes popular participation
in the administration of justice by indicating that "[t]he administra-
tion of justice shall be organized and shall function with popular par-
ticipation as determined by the law."4 The Supreme Court of Justice
and the full Judicial Branch is presently studying the draft bill for a
Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the application of this constitu-
tional provision shall be considered. We have approved a calendar of
work. It contemplates analysis and discussion of the draft bill by all
the judges and magistrates of the Republic, and by the Ministry of
Justice and Ministry of Interior. In addition, it calls for consulting
with the law faculty at the National Autonomous University of Nica-
ragua and the Central American University, CONAPRO Heroes and
Martyrs, and the Association of Democratic Jurists.
The Supreme Court of Justice will issue its opinion on the draft
bill, incorporating the suggestions of all these groups. Modifications
will be made to improve it and make it more responsive to the necessi-
ties of Nicaraguan society. In addition, the principles of public trials,
oral proceedings, direct examination, sound discretion (sana crftica)
and other elements are incorporated. These elements will result in
modern instruments that benefit the principles and values of the ad-
ministration of Nicaraguan criminal justice.
Upon an agreement between the Ministry of Interior, the Minis-
try of Justice and the Supreme Court of Justice, the latter will present
the bill to the National Commission of Justice, so that the Commis-
sion may proceed with its study. Once approved, the Commission
will send it to the National Assembly. The Commission is presided
over by the Vice President of the Republic, and is composed of the
Minister of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Controller General of
the Republic, the Secretary General of the National Assembly, and
the President of the Supreme Court of Justice. According to the
schedule, the bill for the Code of Criminal Procedure will be
presented to the full Assembly in the second half of 1987.
With regard to constitutional review, article 164 mentions that
4. Id. art. 166.
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"[t]he functions of the Supreme Court of Justice are to . . . [r]eview
and decide on writs challenging the constitutionality of a law, filed in
conformity with the Constitution and the Law of Amparo. ' '5 In addi-
tion, title X, chapter II, also establishes constitutional review.
Article 187 states:
Any citizen has the right to seek judicial review of the consti-
tuiionality of any law, decree or regulation that is inconsistent with
the Political Constitution. 6
With the appropriate constitutional requirements established, the
chapter on the Law of Amparo remains to be drafted, in which corre-
sponding procedures shall be established and very important ques-
tions not treated in the Constitution will be resolved. Among other
things, it will be necessary for these specific propositions to clearly
define what the character of the Constitution is, not only as a superior
programmatic norm, but also as a norm that can be directly applied.
Likewise, it will have to be decided if all judges may declare laws
unconstitutional in specific cases before them, or whether considera-
tion of the case ought to be suspended immediately and sent to the
Supreme Court, to be continued once the problem of unconstitution-
ality has been resolved.
While the judge must apply the Constitution over any other law,
its application does not transcend the specific individual case. Only
the Supreme Court of Justice has the power to issue decisions on con-
stitutional subjects with effects that extend to everyone or that over-
turn the unconstitutional law. To get Supreme Court review the
person affected might have the immediate option of bringing the ques-
tion of unconstitutionality or may make a timely appeal. The periods
in which an appeal may be brought after the law has been promul-
gated will have to be established. However, a judge may at any time
bring up the problem of unconstitutionality of a law in a case before
the court. Clearly, there are a number of possibilities and options
which will have to be decided and specified very concretely in the
statute on the subject.
There are other questions that will have to be identified and re-
solved in the statute. For example, the suspending or retroactive ef-
fects of an appeal or of a decision may need to be resolved. It is our
unofficial opinion that the appeal should not have a suspending effect.
In France, for example, an appeal may be directed against a law that
5. Id. art. 164.
6. Id. art. 187.
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has been approved, but not yet promulgated. This has the effect of
preventing the law from entering into force. We think the appeal
should only be allowed against a law that has already been promul-
gated and is legally in force. This way, it is possible to avoid use of
the appeal for purposes of weakening the legislative function of the
National Assembly.
With regard to the retroactive effect on laws in force, we believe
laws should not be affected if they were promulgated prior to the pro-
mulgation of the unconstitutional statute. Such retroactivity ought to
be sacrificed in favor of legal certainty and institutional stability.
Additional concerns which have been expressed and discussed in
this seminar must be addressed. These concerns include resolving the
nature of the decision to identify contradictions of a logical-abstract
nature between the Constitution and the law. Other concerns include
the interpretation of a law when its unconstitutionality is predicated
upon one interpretation given to it by a court, and the expansive na-
ture of the decision with suggestions to the Legislative Branch about a
specific law.
The Supreme Court of Justice has a very delicate task in the
preparation of the bill, which shall be proposed to the National As-
sembly on this subject. The Constitution confers upon this Court the
duty to initiate laws on matters within its jurisdiction.
The Constitution also addresses the unity of jurisdiction and the
appointment of the magistrates and judges of the Republic within the
judicial branch. With regard to unity of jurisdiction, article 159
states: "The Courts of Justice form a single system, headed by the
Supreme Court of Justice. The exercise of judicial powers falls under
the authority of the Judicial Branch."' 7 Article 199, referring to spe-
cial jurisdictions, states: "The special courts shall continue to func-
tion until such time as they come under the jurisdiction of the Judicial
Branch."8 Under these articles, the Constitution encompasses the
principle of unity of jurisdiction and establishes the transitory charac-
ter of the special courts. In addition, military jurisdiction is regulated
by statute and is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.9
The nomination of magistrates and judges is provided for by arti-
cle 138, subpart 7, which authorizes the National Assembly to ap-
point the magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice. They are to be
7. Id. art. 159.
8. Id. art. 199.
9. Id. art. 159.
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selected from slates presented by the President of the Republic. The
President of the Supreme Court of Justice is appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic from among the magistrates appointed by the
National Assembly, as provided by article 163 of the Constitution.
The appointment of other judicial personnel is provided for by article
164. It states that one function of "the Supreme Court of Justice is
... to appoint the judges of the Appeals Courts and the Courts of the
Republic in accord with procedures established by law." 10
1.3 Protection of Rights and Supremacy of the Constitution
The principal provisions of the Constitution regarding the Judi-
cial Branch are the protection of rights and supremacy of the Consti-
tution. They embrace two fundamental questions. First, what
procedures can be established to facilitate judicial mechanisms capa-
ble of guaranteeing effective protection of the rights of the citizens?
The Constitution grants every citizen the right to invoke an appeal for
unconstitutionality, an appeal for amparo, and a writ of habeas
corpus. These three mechanisms form a solid defense of the
supremacy of the Constitution as well as guaranteeing individual
rights. But the importance of the other ordinary and extraordinary
appeals should not be minimized, since they can be brought before the
courts and the Supreme Court of Justice in each case.
Second, and closely related to the protection of individual rights
and the safeguard of the supremacy of the Constitution as guarantee
of the Rule of Law, is the position of the Judicial Branch within the
constitutional scheme that regulates the social and political life of the
nation. These powers are conferred upon the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice, which is a vital body for the equilibrium between civil and polit-
ical society. It acts as an organism capable of contributing effectively
to the permanent regeneration of the social fabric and is indispensable
in every politically and legally organized human community.
The Court's powers include constitutional control together with
all the other ordinary and extraordinary writs, the reaffirmation of the
independence and obligatory nature of judgments and decisions of the
Court, and the power to initiate laws on matters within its jurisdic-
tion. This comes at a time when the process of judicial transforma-
tion is being encouraged. Thus, the Court is called upon to be a
prominent organism within the institutional body of the Republic.
However, these considerations cannot and should not remain solely
10. Id. art. 164.
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on a theoretical level. Constitutional development reflects the exist-
ence of a political reality determined by the Revolution. In the
Revolution, these Constitutional provisions acquire their true mean-
ing and content. There, revolutionary legality and the Rule of Law
receive specific meaning, not as abstract labels responding to an ar-
chetype of principles and norms immutable in time and space, but as
concrete historic experiences reflecting a specific political will. This
makes it possible to endow the people with a Constitution and carry
forth legal reform and judicial transformation in the midst of an un-
just and immoral war imposed upon our people by the current admin-
istration in the United States. This process of organization and
institutional development initiated on July 19, 1979, reached a high
point with the approval of our Political Constitution.
1.4 Future Reforms
The approval of the political Constitution, particularly the chap-
ter on the Judicial Branch, concluded an important stage of the
Court's work. This work consisted of discussion, preparation, and
approval of the document before finally going to the National Assem-
bly. Its fundamental content is today part of our political Constitu-
tion. From this point onward, the Judicial Branch faces an intense
but fertile labor of drafting the bills to assure legal and judicial con-
formity with the norms and provisions contained in the Constitution.
The Court will soon begin work on three fundamental objectives:
discussion, refinement, and approval of a bill for a Code of Criminal
Procedure; the editing of the chapter on the Act of Amparo; and the
reform of the Court Enabling Act. The Court continues work on ad-
ministrative reform of the Judicial Branch and the development of a
methodology to manage studies on the structure, function, and possi-
ble modification of the Judicial Branch.
The Court must also investigate delinquency in the country.
Such an investigation should be designed to determine its causes,
quantitative burden on the judiciary, possible alternatives, and inter-
institutional cooperation in dealing with the problem. The Court
plans also to finish the Ministry of Justice's study on developing a
document which contains the design of a harmonious, more coherent
judicial system, and the development of proposals for national policies
on judicial matters. When completed, the study will be jointly sub-
mitted to the National Commission on Justice.
Beyond this, the Court will continue to deal with, and resolve if
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possible, the serious economic, infrastructural, and transportation
problems which plague the Judicial Branch throughout the country.
This three day International Seminar on Law and Justice in the
Constitution succeeded in gathering all of the magistrates and judges
of the Republic, delegates of the Ministries of Interior and Justice,
representatives from the National Autonomous University of Nicara-
gua and the Central American University, the CONAPRO Heroes
and Martyrs, and the Association of Democratic Jurists of Nicaragua.
Eminent jurists from the United States, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Ecuador, Mexico and Costa Rica
participated. They came from different parts of the world, different
jurisprudential schools, and even different political systems. We
thank them for their presence, their solidarity, and their contribu-
tions. We are secure with the knowledge that they are true friends of
the Nicaraguan people and the Sandinista People's Revolution, and
that we can count on them for advancing the cause of justice, self-
determination, dignity, and Rule of Law. We give our friendship and
our fraternal embrace, and acknowledge their contributions with the
hope of seeing them again in revolutionary Nicaragua on a future oc-
casion of a new conference for consolidation and deepening of our
efforts for justice, peace, and Rule of Law.
We especially wish to thank the Friedrich Ebert Foundation,
represented in Nicaragua by Clement Rhodes, for its constant cooper-
ation with the Judicial Branch and particularly with this seminar. A
few weeks ago we presented to them part of our work program for
which we are requesting economic support. This program contains
three particularly noteworthy activities: initiating the Judicial School,
holding regional seminars and holding the new International Seminar
on the Bill for a New Code of Criminal Procedure.
We also wish to thank the personnel of the Judicial Branch who
have worked tirelessly to prepare this event. To all who have partici-
pated in this seminar, coordinators, reporters, general reporter, trans-
lators, and collaborators in general, our thanks.
We wish to acknowledge before the authorities of the nation
what we said in the inauguration of this event: the self-sacrifice of the
Supreme Court of Justice and all the magistrates and judges of the
Republic in fulfilling their duty in the midst of extremely difficult eco-
nomic and material situations provided an inspiration to all of us.
We are especially grateful for having with us our friend the Vice
President of the Republic, Doctor Sergio Ramirez Mercado, whose
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presence is an encouragement to us all. His understanding and good
faith towards our difficulties and his help in the solution of our mate-
rial problems has been invaluable to us.
In concluding this seminar, we have evaluated the ideas and con-
cepts debated in the October 1985 seminar which are today Constitu-
tional law. These seminars are not isolated events, but are an organic
part of a work plan in which ideas are debated, discussed and ana-
lyzed. Similarities and differences with our own and fellow magis-
trates are set out and incorporated dialectically in the development of
our work and internal discussions. As we proceeded with the seminar
of 1985 and with the process of development of our draft on the Judi-
cial Branch, so we shall proceed now with a view to the immediate
future.
We are left with a new experience and a series of ideas and sug-
gestions that we shall bear in mind when we initiate our work to con-
form the laws and judicial structures to the lines laid down by the
Constitution.
In conclusion, we invite all the members of the Judicial Branch
to join enthusiastically in the tasks ahead; to carry them out with con-
viction, with unity and a fraternal spirit of solidarity, with unshakable
faith and hope in the future of our country and our Revolution.
2. Remarks at UNESCO on the Occasion of the Fortieth
Anniversary of the International Association
of Democratic Jurists. "1
2.1 The Foundations of World Peace
In making use of the honored forum of UNESCO at this inaugu-
ral ceremony commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the found-
ing of the International Association of Democratic Jurists, I want to
express my country's and my personal gratitude to all those who fight
for the cause of peace and law in a world surrounded by the fire of
war. This world event takes place under the eaves of UNESCO and
is, above all, a significant message and a symbol of hope and faith.
Both the organization which celebrates this event and the place at
which it is held give life to this message of hope. The International
Association of Democratic Jurists is an example of perseverance and
devotion in the search for peace and persistent action from different
parts of the world. This group stands for the supremacy of funda-
11. Paris, December 12, 1986.
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mental values of individuals and peoples and for the supremacy of law
and justice.
UNESCO serves as the world's stage for solidarity among peo-
ples, and continues to be the meeting point toward which the roads of
the world converge. Last year, in October, the United Nations cele-
brated the fortieth anniversary of its founding. We all recall four de-
cades ago, some because they were contemporaries of the tragedy,
others because they are the inevitable heirs of the memories of terror,
the Holocaust. Today, forty-one years after putting out the last bon-
fires of the Second World War, peace continues to be an aspiration
and a point of reference for a better future. We continue to hear the
blasts of cannon fire and witness the devastation of war.
The future is uncertain. New hallucinations of power place the
human species once again at the edge of the abyss. While people in
many parts of the earth have neither food nor shelter, while many
people fight for their liberation and others for the defense of liberty
already won, while sickness and hunger erase the smiles from the lips
of children, and trees and flowers die of pollution from industries, we
are threatened not only by having the earth usurped, but also by a sky
in which stars will no longer be points of light in the blue cover of the
heavens, but points of fire and death.
There has been no new world war, to be sure, and this is the best
justification for the United Nations. If humanity turns its eyes to the
past, it contemplates the history of the last forty-one years. Flowers
are reborn in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in spite of the threats and
dark possibilities, a new sun nurtures life from among the lethal hor-
rors of the atomic bomb. However, the world lives on the edge of a
conflagration whose destructive effects, it is feared, this time will be
final.
Peace is not the absence of war, but the reality of a free and
dignified life with respect for the moral values of being human, as well
as respect for the self-determination and sovereignty of peoples. It is
the application and fulfillment of the new international economic or-
der, and the abolition of usurious mechanisms in international rela-
tions that make external debt an instrument of exploitation which not
only mortgages our secular riches but also transfers to others our
destiny, our identity, and our historic possibilities as people.
Peace is recognizing that despite fundamental differences, the
people of the north and south share a common destiny, that the recog-
nition of our countries, the reformulation of international relations
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and external cooperation, are neither charitable acts nor gracious con-
cessions. They are unavoidable historical necessities. Without our
development, the industrialized countries will succumb, and our col-
lapse will be the collapse of a total system. Hence, there exists the
necessity, today more evident than ever, of treating humanity as a
whole.
Rich countries, therefore, must significantly invest their re-
sources to further develop the poor countries. Such contributions
would be a grand gesture of world solidarity, and would serve as com-
pensation for the constant usurpation that has victimized the Nicara-
guan people throughout history.
According to a 1983 report to the Secretary General of the
United.Nations, $800 million are invested annually in arms. While
two thirds of humanity suffers hunger, misery, sickness, and malnutri-
tion, the world is preparing for war, not peace. This spectre of war
remains ever present as colonial and neo-colonial countries refuse to
recognize the oppressed peoples' legitimate right to independence.
Peace can be accomplished by founding a society based upon the
Rule of Law. The Rule of Law recognizes the intrinsic dignity and
equal and inalienable rights of the human family, the hope of a world
free from fear and misery, and the universal and full respect for the
fundamental rights and liberties of humans. All people possess the
right to self-determination, and the right to freely establish their polit-
ical conditions and likewise provide for their own economic, social
and cultural development. These rights are proclaimed in article 1 of
the International Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and in article 1 of the International Agreement on Civil and
Political Rights.
2.2 U.S. Aggression and the Decision of the World Court
There exists the right to live free of external aggression, without
mined ports, economic blockades, or threats of invasion. Currently,
the United States organizes and finances such aggressions against our
country and the Popular Sandinista Revolution. The moral and his-
torical obligation to respect the international judicial process and in-
ternational judiciaries, such as the International Court of Justice at
the Hague, involves reestablishing the dialogue of Manzanillo and ef-
fectively supporting the efforts of Contadora. Furthermore, there is a
moral obligation to halt aggression against people who desire and
should be given the opportunity to live in peace. Such opportunity
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should be offered without more deaths, without more tears, without
more destroyed homes, and without more mothers' sorrows.
War burns in Central America. The United States directs and
finances an immoral war which violates the norms of International
Law and its own domestic law. Additionally, the United States vio-
lates the principles of ethics, and the basic rules that govern the civi-
iized co-existence of peoples. The entire world has seen that arms are
supplied to the Contras by means of airplanes that violate the air
space of our country. The North American aircraft downed while
transporting arms to the Contras is irrefutable proof of the United
States' support for the Contras. The Nicaraguan government has de-
nounced these actions by the United States.
Furthermore, procedures openly violating the United States' own
laws have been used to finance the war in Central America. "The re-
cent diversion of funds to Contra bank accounts, as a result of the sale
of arms to Iran, serves as an example of these violations.
The December seventh bombing of Nicaraguan citizens in Wiwili
and Murra, twenty-five kilometers from the border, demonstrates a
disrespect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. It constitutes an
intolerable aggression carried out to justify a direct invasion of North
American troops in our country. Furthermore, military exercises are
carried out by North American troops in Honduran territory which
lies just fifteen kilometers from the Nicaraguan border. Given these
facts as well as the direct evidence of the Contra raids from Honduran
territory, the most important aspects of the Reagan Administration's
plan of aggression against Nicaragua and its Sandinista Revolution
become clear.
The people of Nicaragua want peace. They want to dedicate
their energies to the fruits of their work in this land that they love so
much. This is the land of our ancestors, and of our children; our own
land charged with history, sacrifices, struggles, and desires. We also
wish to reaffirm our willingness to defend our land at all costs and
with the most permanent values of liberty and dignity.
The decision of the International Court of Justice at the Hague
recognizes that the United States has violated customary law through
a series of acts which we characterize as state terrorism. The use of
force is proscribed by the United Nations Charter and by customary
law. Respect for the principles of self-determination, national sover-
eignty, non-aggression, and the right of people to maintain their own
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identity and development together constitute the axis of the philoso-
phy of both the United Nations and international law.
The Constitution of the United States provides that treaties rati-
fied by that country become part of the fundamental charter itself.' 2
We think that the intention of such a provision is to recognize that the
international law contained in international treaties is not limited to
being characterized as a universal declaration of principles or an ordi-
nary statute within the North American legal system. The provision
has the character of an obligatory constitutional norm and elevates
international law into the domestic law of the country at its highest
level. The United States' reservations to the provisions proscribing
the use of force and protecting the self-determination of people, and
its failure to sign the Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the Agreement on Civil and Political Rights of the United
Nations, ten years after these Agreements entered into force, expose
its intention to evade the obligations imposed by international law as
an essential condition for peaceful co-existence of peoples.
The United States' disregard of the decision of the International
Court of Justice reveals, in the clearest possible fashion, a lamentable
attitude. It rejected the Court's 1984 decision on precautionary meas-
ures requested by Nicaragua and authorized by the Court and it uni-
laterally rejected the jurisdiction of the Court.
The United States' violation of both international law and its
own domestic law has potentially grave consequences since the coun-
try is one of the most powerful on earth, with an enormous influence
in the development of world affairs. This should cause everyone con-
cern. Of course, Nicaraguans suffer from an incalculable aggression
and an unjust war imposed upon us by the imperial will of the current
United States government. We are daily obliged to engage in armed
defense of our nation, of our sovereignty and our revolution.
Respect for international law and the United Nations system is a
requirement for peace. The United Nations system expresses Rous-
seau's idea of the social contract. But unlike Rousseau's time, we live
in a more vast, complex society, with diverse complicated judicial sys-
tems, and with ideologically distinct political, economic, and social
conceptions. The delegation of natural liberty to a civil liberty born
12. Translator's note: Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "all Treaties made
.. under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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of consensus becomes necessary for the co-existence of nations in the
contemporary world. The social contract that Rousseau conceived, a
rational supposition giving origin to the basis of co-existence among
humans, society, and the state, becomes a historical imperative among
nations in today's world of high technology.
Whoever uses force, disregarding the law and the fabric of inter-
national relations upon which rests the precarious balance of our
times, attacks humanity itself and takes us back to the pre-Rousseau
state of communal war. Whoever arrogantly offers us powerful brute
force, submerges humans into the night of time. Although he con-
quers space, he loses his own world. Whoever abuses physical, nu-
merical, and military superiority, acts like a primitive being, erasing
the human value of science and technology and increasing the contra-
diction between the progress of objects and the retrogress of the
human condition. Whoever transforms abuses into actions and nour-
ishes the myth that might makes right, leaves as an alternative only
radioactive caverns. If he does not lose his life totally, he will have
lost his sense of life.
The law is not a superfluous artifact. It is the cohesive substance
of national and international society. Law is the maker and product
of history. In a dialectical relation, the synthesis becomes a new the-
sis, a pathway and horizon of future actions. International law is nec-
essary to maintain peace between nations. But it also must be the
cause and channel of peace, reflecting the highest values of the inter-
national community.
2.3 Nicaragua's Adherence to International Law
and Human Rights
We have come here to proclaim our unshakable faith in law. The
war that we are obliged to wage in order to defend the principal right
of all people, the right of free self-determination, should not detract
from that goal. From the first day, the Popular Sandinista Revolution
has maintained an unwavering institutional commitment. Thus, dedi-
cation has remained constant in the midst of a war without bounda-
ries. There are several manifestations of this commitment. Among
these are: the Fundamental Statute, the Statute of Laws and Guaran-
tees of Nicaraguans, the Council of State, the presidential and legisla-
tive elections of 1984, and the recent approval of the first political
Constitution of Nicaragua.
Nicaragua adheres to the tenets of international law and to the
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United Nations system for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The
decisions of the International Court of Justice have shown approval
for Nicaragua's actions. However, Nicaragua does not limit its faith
in law to the international sphere. If a serious effort to consolidate
and develop the Rule of Law, respect for laws, and the strengthening
of judicial institutions and the legal order did not exist internally, then
Nicaragua's external adherence to international law would lose all
value.
The recently approved political Constitution has incorporated
fundamentally all of the propositions that the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice submitted for consideration. Thus, Nicaragua has enshrined at
the constitutional level several principles. First, the judiciary is in-
dependent from other branches of government. Second, all state au-
thorities, individually and collectively, must comply with all judicial
orders and decisions. Third, jurisdiction is unified, thus special courts
are only temporary and will be dismantled when the needs which gave
rise to them disappear. Fourth, the Supreme Court of Justice has
constitutional control through the appeal for unconstitutionality of
law. In addition, appeals can be initiated by any citizen, through the
amparo appeal and the writ of habeas corpus. Finally, full procedural
guarantees were adopted.
Due to the adoption of the Constitution, in the coming months, a
complete process of judicial transformation will take place. The Nica-
raguan people will carry out that transformation at the same time that
they are defending their sovereignty, liberty, dignity, and Revolution.
We wish to conclude this statement by thanking the Interna-
tional Association of Democratic Jurists for the opportunity to ad-
dress the jurists of the world in the inaugural session of this
commemorative meeting. From this forum, we issue a fraternal call
to judges, justices, lawyers, law professors, and students of the United
States. We ask that they contribute toward persuading the United
States government to respect international law as well as its own do-
mestic law by ceasing its aggression against the Nicaraguan people.
We issue the same call to all people of good will in that nation who
feel the lofty ideals of the founders of the North American nation, and
who share the values of law, justice, and liberty that those pioneers
sought during their struggle for independence.
We ask from this forum that the International Association of
Democratic Jurists continue supporting the cause of justice in the
world and the right of small nations to construct their history and
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defend their identity. We wish your voices would multiply and carry
to the world the message of the Nicaraguan people who wish to live in
peace and to consolidate and develop the Rule of Law. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice decision defends not only the rights of a small
country under attack, but also the principles of international law,
which is the foundation of civilized co-existence among states and
Peples Of tLe wuflud.
3. On the Separation of Powers in Montesquieu 13
3.1 The Controversy Over Montesquieu
The political Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua specifies
the distribution of power among four branches: legislative, executive,
judicial, and electoral. This distribution is based on Montesquieu's
principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, this new structure
has attracted attention as it deals with the organization of the revolu-
tionary state. The Constitution's theme was not arbitrarily decided.
The theme was discussed throughout the period when the Constitu-
tion was formed. Nicaraguan and foreign jurists exchanged opinions
during the development of the document on the Judicial Branch.
During the seminars on the roles of law, justice, and the Judicial
Branch in the Constitution, held in October 1985 and December 1986
by the Supreme Court, Montesquieu and his theories were debated.
The core discussions focused principally on the following themes:
a) Montesquieu was a bourgeois thinker who defended the inter-
ests of the bourgeoisie of his time;
b) The separation of powers produces a fragmentation of a single
power recognized by the Sandinista Popular Revolution as rooted in
the people;
c) The separation of powers produces a fragmentation of real
power, but also reproduces a pre-existing separation in reality;
d) The European society in which Montesquieu wrote The Spirit
of the Laws, was different from the reality of the structure of revolu-
tionary Nicaraguan society.
3.2 Conditions Necessary for a Critique
We must be cognizant of the revolutionary reality in which Nica-
raguan society is living, the organizational levels of the people (both
quantitative and qualitative), and the levels of popular participation in
13. Managua, May 1987.
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civil and political society. This is fundamental and constitutes the
essence of the political Constitution which gathers and reproduces
that particular social reality. We do not overlook, of course, the legal
and institutional forms in which reality is framed and which the Con-
stitution itself establishes. In analyzing power, it is important to focus
on the political-social, rather than on the legal-institutional.
Given the foregoing, a theory of separation of powers in the Con-
stitution must analyze the foreseeable function of separation of pow-
ers within revolutionary Nicaraguan society. It cannot be developed
in the abstract. Words by themselves do not provide sufficient force
to transform society by simply conjuring up its conceptual contents.
Obviously, the theoretical position, starting from a consideration of
intrinsic goodness or evil, ought not to defend or attack Montes-
quieu's theory of separation of powers. First, the problem must be
posited correctly. The problem must be situated historically, referring
to specific conditions of a certain society, and not be rejected a priori
on the basis of prejudices or of ideological sanitizing or sanctifying.
3.3 Montesquieu: Nobleman, Bourgeois, or Revolutionary?
Having established the general condition necessary for a theoreti-
cal critique, it will be helpful to refer to the specific points of the dis-
cussion mentioned before. Some have said that Montesquieu was a
bourgeois thinker or, more precisely, a bourgeois who thought. It has
been affirmed that Montesquieu defended the interests of the bour-
geoisie of his time. I do not know up to what point I could agree with
the propriety of the foregoing. That Montesquieu was a bourgeois in
origin is easily refuted since his social class was in fact of the aristoc-
racy. Montesquieu was a nobleman. He was born one year after the
triumph of the English Revolution and one year before Locke was to
publish his essay on civil government.
The idea that Montesquieu was a bourgeois thinker, defending
the interests of the bourgeoisie as a social class with a certain eco-
nomic and political destiny, deserves closer examination. We begin
by affirming the most visible fact: the theory of separation of powers
favored the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie of his time used and de-
fended this theory and carried it to the category of universal principle.
Everything said until now confirms the thesis that a nobleman by ori-
gin thinks like a bourgeois and thinks for the benefit of the bourgeoisie
of his time and of Europe. If this had been the case, it could be con-
cluded that Montesquieu fought in his time for the revolutionary
1990]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ideas of Europe. Bear in mind that, though The Spirit of the Laws was
published in 1748, Montesquieu began work on it in 1728.14 It was
written between the two revolutions, the English of 1688 and the
French of 1789, a period in which the mentality of the bourgeoisie
was changing, stimulated by the triumph of the English Revolution.
But to assume by syllogism that Montesquieu was a revolutionary and
t a cL.pL his LiUy IUI tIhatL IV4so UII WUUJIU UC LU pWI.. UUIbCIVCS PIe-
cisely in the position of a critical, ideological beatification. In other
words, although Montesquieu may have acted as a revolutionary in
his time, this would be insufficient reason to accept his theory in our
times.
Possibly, then, Montesquieu was not a revolutionary at all, at
least with respect to flying the banners of the bourgeoisie. Does this
disqualify his teachings from the time and circumstances in which we
live? Should revolutionary Nicaraguans who are now organizing
their state and elaborating their constitution disregard Montesquieu's
The Spirit of the Laws and his theme of separation of powers? To
reject his theory because he may not have been part of the revolution-
ary tendencies of his time is to hold the very same a critical attitude of
accepting his theory on the assumption that he was a revolutionary on
the side of the revolutionary bourgeoisie of his time. It would assume
the same abstract and metaphysical attitude which we criticized
earlier.
Moreover, according to one of the most penetrating studies on
Montesquieu, by Louis Althusser, his position was based on com-
pletely different reasons from those of the bourgeoisie-not the bour-
geoisie of his time between 1728 and 1748, but the later bourgeoisie
which made the French Revolution. The different reasons, suggests
Althusser in La Politique et L'Histoire, are not only different but actu-
ally opposed. The bourgeoisie fought against the monarchy in order
to gain power for itself. Montesquieu, on the other hand, opposed
absolute monarchy for the purpose of restoring a share of power to
the feudal aristocracy which was being lost to an absolute monarchy
in what then seemed to be a process of irreversible decadence. The
principal clash, however, was not between the absolute monarchy and
the feudal nobles, nor between nobles and a bourgeoisie which flocked
en masse to overcome the regime of feudal exploitation. The principal
clash was actually between the feudal regime and the great popular
14. C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (A. Cohler, B. Miller & H. Stone
trans. 1989).
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masses subjected to its exploitation. Althusser indicates that Montes-
quieu could not identify with the revolutionary bourgeoisie. First, he
maintained feudal ideals. Secondly, at the time of The Spirit of the
Laws, no revolutionary bourgeoisie existed. Instead, there was a
bourgeoisie interested in accommodating itself ever more to the bene-
fits derived from the system of feudal exploitation. However, this did
not prevent later bourgeoisie, who supported the revolution, from im-
posing limitations on absolute monarchy through the theory of sepa-
ration of powers.
Montesquieu had the Constitution of England in mind when he
developed the theory of separation of powers. Chapter VI of book XI
deals with laws that form political liberty with regard to the Constitu-
tion. It carries a subtitle, "On the English Constitution" and is based
upon the "Essay on Civil Government" by John Locke. The English
Constitution conferred important powers upon the feudal nobility.
For example, it gave judicial powers to nobility's peers, thus removing
this aspect of the judicial function from the King. This prevented the
King from acting through judicial powers against the feudal nobility
and, consequently, protecting them against the monarch.
Althusser's realistic analysis, permits us to escape the appear-
ances of history and in particular the illusion that Montesquieu was
the herald, although disguised, of the bourgeois cause that was to tri-
umph in the revolution .... For a single return to history, that which
looked to the past seemed to open the doors of the future.., and it is
because he fought for the cause of a decrepit order that he became the
adversary of the existing order that others had to overcome ... others
before him had left for the east . . . and discovered for us the West
Indies. 15
3.4 Does Separation of Powers Fragment the
Power of the People?
The statement that the Separation of Powers would fragment a
single power, which for the Sandinista Revolution is rooted in the
people, seems to imply that the base of power is anchored in its own
formal structure. Generally, a foundation of this nature would invert
the pyramid, making the peak the base and the base the peak. This
would be unstable both for solid bodies and political bodies and is an
unsupportable theory. Real power in any society is rooted in a combi-
15. See L. ALTHUSSER, MONTESQUIEU, LA POLITIQUE ET L'HISTOIRE (1981). Transla-
tion from French by Alejandro Serrano Caldera.
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nation of structural and conjoining factors. Some of those include
economic, social, political, and cultural factors which are expressed in
the forms and control of production, distribution systems, trade, the
banking system, finance, organization, the levels of participation of
the various sectors of society, and access and control of the mecha-
nisms of the state. These factors are mentioned to the extent they
represent differeneACl.;UoiwU 1111u lSciali I1 IIaus.
The state is the peak of actual power when it is supported by a
solid base. The concurrence of various powers exercised in civil and
political society, which come together at a point of crystallization and
consolidation, forms the base of state power. The state is clearly the
consequence of a specific power. However, it is a source that gener-
ates power from its own functioning. It has a dynamic that works to
strengthen the original source of power within the very structure of
society.
Laws, judicial decisions, and institutions with their own charac-
teristics, tend to form a part of a homogeneous system of an organic
whole with a specific logic and rationality between the parts and the
whole. When this does not occur, maladjustments, conflict, and con-
tradictions appear inside the system. Therefore, every power should
seek coherence among all of its parts on the basis of clear policies to
establish priorities, objectives, goals, structures and tactics. I do not
refer to arbitrary or despotic procedures to guarantee the interests of
the power itself but rather coherence between objectives and the in-
struments to carry them out and between causes and the channels
through which power is exercised. For this reason, law, institutions,
and judicial decisions are not artificial or deceptive, nor are they mere
superstructures belonging to an exclusively formal world, discon-
nected from reality. They are living entities which are indispensable
for the survival of the social and political body and in which are the
flesh of the economic, social, and political life of a nation. Society
must obey the laws and the laws must respond to the needs of society.
There must exist unity between the nature of government and its prin-
ciples, as Montesquieu proposes in The Spirit of the Laws.1 6
It is clear that the state is not a reflection of the economy, nor a
subproduct of the productive forces. It is a reality in itself, with its
own character.
But all this supposes the integration of different social and polit-
ical forms and levels into a coherent system. This means that the
16. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14.
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unity formed by the gathering of social differences actually works and
harmonizes. Thus, as the system does not presuppose homogeneity,
nor a single nature for all of its parts produced and determined by one
exclusive cause, neither should the heterogeneity and particularity of
each part signify conflict and contradiction. Coherence and function-
ality of different parts of a whole that interrelate and feed back on
themselves are the necessary conditions of a system of power.
Everything said until now includes a relationship of precedence
and foundation. The economic, social, and political structures are the
foundations of the state and not the reverse. The separation of powers
at the state level causes the fragmentation of power in society. In
contrast, the type of power that exists in society is reproduced at the
level of the state, from which it feeds back, recomposes and consoli-
dates itself. For example, the structure of French society of the eight-
eenth century was composed of the feudal aristocracy, the
bourgeoisie, and the people. In the midst of these, the monarchy
played out its destiny; first against the feudal aristocracy, which it
conquered in order to impose absolute monarchy, then against the
bourgeoisie, to which it fell in the French Revolution.
The theory of separation of powers is not the cause of this group-
ing of classes, but rather its consequence. This consequence, however,
is not the product of a historical law which declares that, given a
specific composition of classes, a specific form of government will
arise. Rather, this consequence is a legal refinement which seeks to
save part of the lost power of the aristocracy by limiting the function
of the monarch.
In the case of our revolutionary society, the situation is different.
Obviously, comparisons of class composition between French society
of the eighteenth century and ours of the twentieth century is unnec-
essary. However, comparing the two societies is important to the ex-
tent that the legal categories of the eighteenth century are operating
among us, whose true meaning, past and present, can be understood
as a matter of class structure and not as a matter of exclusive legal
analysis.
In our society, the composition of classes has been different. A
quick characterization demonstrates that an authentic class structure
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as a result of quantitative
and qualitative growth in the industrial means of production, has not
appeared in our society.
Our first social relationship between the classes consisted of the
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agricultural production relationship between the owners of land and
livestock, and their salaried workers. Later, social and economic po-
sitions brought about by commercial activity and development of the
liberal professions marked membership in a certain social status. An
incipient industrialization occurred but never materialized into an ac-
tual industrial workers' movement with a specific class formation. Fi-
nally, in the last two decades of the dictatorship, there was an
incipient financial capitalism fed by the capital of liberals and con-
servatives, the two dominant political ideologies before the triumph of
the Revolution.
Parallel to these socioeconomic characterizations, there was arti-
san activity running through the length and breadth of the social
structure. In this picture, a true aristocracy never appeared. For that
matter, neither did a true bourgeoisie or a true industrial workers'
movement. Because industrialization did not emerge, a class struc-
ture based upon the means of production of companies, or a contra-
diction, or class struggle determined by social relationships of
production never appeared.
In this social structure the division between rich and poor was
brutal and dramatic. Although it was not determined exclusively by
the means of industrial production, it nevertheless defined economic,
social, cultural, and political position. The leaders of the liberal and
conservative parties were drawn from those dominant sectors. The
dominated sectors, above the broad masses of peasants, were victims
of interminable rebellions that filled the roads of our history with
blood and fire at the service of the lords of the manor.
With the triumph of the Revolution, the people took power
through their vanguard, the Sandinista National Liberation Front.
Although the economic claim in favor of those marginalized by the
dictatorship is one of the basic points of the Revolution, the principal
contradiction is political, and the essential claims revolve around it.
The popular claims constitute one of the important objectives of the
Revolution. The efforts of many Nicaraguans of different economic
and social backgrounds move toward that objective. This is exempli-
fied in the struggle for liberation, which includes the reconstruction of
the country from the bottom to the top. Political power has a popu-
list content because its objective is directed particularly towards
workers and peasants. Thus, it also has a class content. Its class con-
tent is determined by the objective of economic and social claims di-
rected and implemented by the state and by the appropriation of the
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means of production to a specific social class. There have nevertheless
been changes in social relationships having to do with production.
This was brought about, for example, by the establishment of state
property, a cooperative sector, and an area of people's property.
People exercise power through their numerous structures of or-
ganization and participation. At the state level, while it is true that
power is not exercised by groups of people by virtue of their origin
and membership in a specific social class, it is nevertheless exercised
by virtue of populist, united, and common objectives. Consequently,
the separation of powers established by the Constitution, need not
produce a fragmentation of the power base. It does not affect, in any
way, its principal articulations, nor does it affect its essential struc-
ture. On the contrary, it represents a particular form of organization
and technical division of labor that does not carry any implication of
a social division of power.
3.5 Does the Separation of Powers Reproduce a Pre-existing
Social Separation?
Some believe that the separation of powers does not produce a
fragmentation of social power so much as it reproduces a pre-existing
separation in social organization. This does not describe our reality.
What does not exist at the base, cannot exist at the peak.
Institutional and legal organization is a mechanism that has a
double function. First, it acts as a reproducer of the socioeconomic
organization. Second, it influences the general system of society. The
Constitution, for example, by establishing a mixed economy, repro-
duces the modality of the Nicaraguan economy. The creation of laws
influences the system and establishes the specific modalities of the
practice. These specific regulations include medium and short range
policies for investment law, policies and mechanisms designed to in-
crease productivity of labor, better utilization of resources, and the
linking together of each part of the economy (private, state, coopera-
tive, people's) with the objectives of the economy in general. In this
way, legal mechanisms, set forth in the Constitution and regulatory
laws, embrace the form of practical economic functioning, and
strengthen the implementation and development of the economy and
set forth the rules of its functioning. Thus, every law must achieve
this double function: to both express reality and to reproduce it. The
institution or law that does not reproduce its reality, conflicts with its
reality. If the conflict is profound, it is possible that the institution or
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law-and not the social or economic reality-will fall into a crisis. If
the contradiction is not profound, mutual and partial accommoda-
tions, joint solutions and specific alternative policies may permit each
problem to be resolved for the moment, even though the problems
may return from the persistent cause in which they originate. Most
important, the separation of powers contributes to the reproduction of
the society and its values.
3.6 Other Objections to Separation of Powers
Beyond the three questions analyzed above, three other questions
remain. First, does the separation of powers block the development of
society? I think not, since the societal, economic and political trans-
formations can be expressed within the institutions organized into
separated powers. But these institutions must be capable of respond-
ing to reality by conforming themselves to it conceptually, organically
and functionally.
Second, does the separation of powers block the exercise of
power at the state level? It depends upon what type of power. If one
is referring to sole, hegemonic, and centralized power, conceived ver-
tically from the peak to the base, it is possible that the answer is yes.
However, the contrary is true if power is conceived and structured as
a rational and workable state apparatus. This does not mean a frag-
mentation of popular power, but rather a balanced distribution of
popular power. This implies that power is conceived as a means and
not as an end in itself.
At the base, through the separation of powers, the branches act
inter-dependently. For example, the executive branch has legislative
functions (executive decrees), the legislative branch has judicial func-
tions (in some countries, the trial of the president of the republic, rep-
resentatives and judges) and the judicial and the electoral branches
have legislative functions (the power to initiate bills on matters within
their jurisdiction). The tacit but concrete objective is to limit the
powers of the monarchy in favor of the feudal aristocracy. Beyond
that immediate and historically specific political end, the separation of
powers creates an end in itself since it can be valid in any political
organization in which it is applied. This end is the creation of a sys-
tem of countervailing powers to avoid the excessive growth of one
power alone. Specifically, this refers to the controls exercised by the
legislative and judicial branches over the executive branch, which by
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its own nature of command and implementation, tends to develop
hegemonic attitudes.
From 1748 to the present, Montesquieu's theory of separation of
powers has been used for various political purposes. First, Montes-
quieu subtly wrapped concrete political objectives into a refined legal
abstraction: the legal, institutional balance of the state. Later, the
bourgeoisie used the theory during the struggle that led to the French
Revolution, to the extreme of incorporating Article 16 in the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man of 1789 which provides that "every society
which lacks the Separation of Powers has no constitution."' 7
Currently, the value of separation of powers is not the absolute
one given by article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. To-
day, no one can pretend that there is no constitution, and therefore no
Rule of Law, without the separation of powers. Today it is univer-
sally accepted that the Rule of Law consists essentially in the subordi-
nation of power to law, regardless of whether the bodies and functions
of the state are organized in separated powers.
3.7 The Spirit of the Laws as a Revolutionary Work
Aside from the theory on the separation of powers, Montes-
quieu's The Spirit of the Laws was a revolutionary work despite its
tacit defense of the feudal nobility's political interests. To overcome
this apparent contradiction, we must distinguish two dimensions: the
political interests of class, which by design are conservative; and the
scientific project of The Spirit of the Laws, including its object and
method, which is profoundly revolutionary.
Following La Politique et L 'Histoire, Montesquieu's intention of
studying all the customs and laws of all the people of the world distin-
guishes him from all authors before him who wanted to make a sci-
ence out of politics,' 8 because he sought the science in all concrete
societies. Montesquieu's project of building a science of politics and
history, assumes that science and history can be the object of a sci-
ence, that is, that they contain a necessity that science should
discover. 19
This necessity possessed no theological or moral aspirations, and
obeyed historical laws exclusively. In the preface of his work, The
Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu says:
17. L. ALTHUSSER, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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In order to understand the first four books of this work, one must
note that what I call virtue in a republic is love of the homeland,
that is, love of equality. It is not moral virtue or Christian virtue;
it is political virtue, and this is the spring that makes republican
government move, as honor is the spring that makes monarchy
move .... Finally, the good man discussed in book 3, Chapter 5,
ic nnt the Christian oond man hut the p-litical g--d ___ 1Wh
possesses the political virtue I have just mentioned. He is the man
who loves the laws of his country and who acts from love of the
laws of his courntry .... 20
Here we have the first identification of the new political science, the
establishment of its political rather than moral objective. This does
not mean, however, that Montesquieu is proposing amorality in polit-
ical science. He is merely establishing its object with precision. He
says in the preface:
It should be observed that there is a very great difference between
saying that a certain quality, modification of the soul, or virtue is
not the spring that makes a goverment act, and saying that it is not
present in that government. If I were to say that a certain wheel, a
certain gear is not the spring that makes this watch move, would
one conclude that it is not present in the watch? Far from exclud-
ing moral and Christian virtues, monarchy does not even exclude
political virtue. In a word, honor is in the republic though political
virtue is its spring; political virtue is in the monarchy though honor
is its spring.
2 1
It is also interesting to note Montesquieu's position with respect
to the contract theory. In chapter III, dealing with positive laws,
Montesquieu says: "As soon as men begin to live in society, they lose
their sense of weakness, but then equality among them ends and the
state of war begins."
'22
Villemain, in his Eulogy of Montesquieu, cited chapter III saying
that as an interpreter and admirer of the social instinct, Montesquieu
is not afraid to confess that the struggle, the state of war, begins for
man at the moment he constitutes society. But from this sad truth,
which Hobbes would abuse in order to celebrate the tranquility of
despotism, and Rousseau to praise the independence of life in nature,
the true philosopher deduces the healthy necessity of laws, which are
20. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at xli (emphasis in the original).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7.
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which are a truce between states and a peace treaty between citizens. 23
Unlike the social contract theorists, Montesquieu believed that
society is the true state of nature and the true object of investigation
which ought not to be the reason why men associate, but why at one
time they lived isolated; outside of society. It is obvious to Montes-
quieu that the social instinct is the natural tendency of man. Further-
more, he believed that every contract assumes the existence of society;
society is the cause and the contract is the effect, not the other way
around.
Althusser indicated that what unites natural law philosophers is
the problem of figuring out the origin of society, and the resolution of
the problem by the state of nature and the social contract. For exam-
ple, to Hobbes and Spinoza, the state of nature is war, the triumph of
the strong over the weak. For Locke, it is a state of peace, and for
Rousseau, it is isolation and absolute society. Thus, the social con-
tract, for contractarians, is a step out of the state of nature, which
each characterizes differently, into the state of society.
We have already seen how Montesquieu rejected the social con-
tract and reaffirmed feudal tendencies. Althusser states:
Social contract theory, turns feudal convictions upside down: his
belief in the natural inequality of men, in the necessity of the social
orders and of the state. It begins with a contract among equals,
with a human work of art, for what feudal theoreticians would at-
tribute to nature and the natural society of man.... The doctrine
of natural sociability or social instinct is a theory of feudal inspira-
tion, and a doctrine of social contract is a theory of bourgeois in-
spiration, even when it is in the service of absolute monarchy (as in
Hobbes). 2
4
Here Montesquieu reaffirms the underlying conservative position
which contradicts his revolutionary method to which we referred
above.
Montesquieu's concept of law is noteworthy. "The laws," he
says, "are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of
things. '25 Use of the term "relation" to define laws implies, accord-
ing to Althusser, a theoretical revolution. "It assumes that it is possi-
ble to apply to the materials of politics and history a Newtonian
category of law." Aside from referring to the concept of law as one of
23. Quoted in C. MONTESQU1EU, DEL ESPIRITA DE LAS LEYES book 1, Ch. 3 (N. Es-
t6vanes trans. (1971).
24. L. ALTHUSSER, supra note 15.
25. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 3.
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relation, it is important to note the connection of a previous historical
value to this concept. This implicitly leads to the necessary conform-
ity of law to social fact.
Montesquieu defines the law as social relation, although the so-
cial relation has not yet acquired a formal and positive expression.
The legal norms or rules of law, are only law to the extent that they
formally contain the reality that is expressed as a relation. The social
relation has intrinsic value that law merely recognizes. The laws ex-
ist, although there is no written norm, since the spirit of the law is not
in positive law, rather in the social relation that precedes it. Montes-
quieu eloquently reveals that:
Particular intelligent beings can have laws that they have made,
but they also have some that they have not made .... Before laws
were made, there were possible relations of justice. To say that
there is nothing just or unjust but what positive laws ordain or
prohibit is to say that before a circle is drawn, all its radii were not
equal.
Therefore, one must admit that there are relations of fairness
prior to the law that establishes them.
26
This "relation" is then the "spirit of the laws." Montesquieu in
dealing with "positive laws," states:
As I am not going to deal with the laws but with the spirit of
the laws that consists in the relations that various things may take,
I must follow not the natural order of laws but the order of their
relations and of those things.27
In the chapter on the dialectic of history, Althusser underscores
the innovating and revolutionary positions of Montesquieu with re-
gard to the dialectical chain of the laws. Each individual law is linked
to the next, depending upon some more general law. Likewise, Al-
thusser emphasizes the relation that Montesquieu establishes between
nature and the principle of each government. Nature is what makes
nature be what it is; principle is what makes it act. The nature of
republican government is sovereignty exercised over the people. The
nature of monarchy is government by one person alone conforming to
fixed laws. The nature of despotism is government of one person
alone without law or rules. The principle, on the other hand, is the
correspondence between the political form of the government and the
willingness of the people to accept it. In this idea of the totality of
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id.
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nature and the principle of government, Montesquieu establishes
what is the law's necessity. The law's necessity is the law's concor-
dance with historical reality, of which the law is the summary, expres-
sion and channel. Thus, we have arrived at one of the initial
propositions of this work.
Althusser stated:
Before Montesquieu this idea was entertained only for the
construction of an ideal state. With Montesquieu, the totality that
was an idea becomes a scientific hypothesis designed to give an
account of the facts. It becomes the fundamental category that
permits thinking no longer about an ideal state but about concrete
diversity, and, until that moment, unintelligible institutions of
human history. 28
Here Montesquieu is an innovator and revolutionary by putting his-
tory upon a foundation of the concrete whole, understood as a dy-
namic category.
3.8 Conclusions
The following can be concluded from our essay:
a) Separation of powers, by itself, neither favors nor impedes any
reproduction of the socioeconomic structure of the country and its
development, any more than any other form of state organization.
That reproduction depends upon the precise and efficient conformity
of the institutional system or the legal order td reality;
b) The theory of separation of powers, excluding the areas exclu-
sive to each power, ought to be understood as a horizontal interrela-
tion and coordination among the powers of the state;
c) The theory of separation of powers ought to be understood as
the state's expression in its pinnacle of power. This power is born and
develops through the organization and participation of the people in
the various instances of national life. The people are the depository of
sovereignty which they exercise constitutionally through the powers
of the state.
The ideological value assigned to the theory of separation of
powers ought not be determined with a mechanical attitude. Com-
plex and critical analysis demonstrates that in spite of Montesquieu's
position favoring feudal nobility, his theory contains profoundly revo-
28. L. ALTHUSSER, supra note 16.
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lutionary elements with respect to the object, method, and program of
political science and concept of law.
The concept of law is a device that is produced in society to
which the positive norm and formal law must conform. The concept
of law is particularly useful in a moment of legal and judicial transfor-
mation because what is sought, is that law be coherent with reality; to
express and to reproduce it. The law here loses that formal abstract
sense to become what it must be: reality made into positive norm.
Seen this way, we can deduce that, as Villemain said in his Eulogy for
Montesquieu, "the healthy necessity of laws ... are a truce between
states and a peace treaty between citizens."
'29
4. Law and Justice 
30
I again have the privilege of addressing a graduation of lawyers
from this law school under whose eaves my student life and an impor-
tant part of my intellectual and academic life took place. This time, I
address this message to the fourth graduating class of lawyers in these
nearly nine years of revolution. I begin with the warmest congratula-
tions and the most fraternal greeting.
On the previous occasions in which, as President of the Supreme
Court of Justice, I have occupied this rostrum, I discussed two topics.
First, I discussed the concept of the judicial branch proposed by the
Court for Nicaragua during the preparation of the new Political Con-
stitution. I also discussed the Supreme Court's marked role in the
process of judicial reform which began to conform ordinary legisla-
tion to the grand principles fixed in the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has had a special role in that process.
Today, I would like to present, in a personal way, some themes
on law, justice, and the legal profession.
4.1 Reciprocal Influence of International and Domestic Law
On the international level, the interaction between law and soci-
ety occurs today in a complex atmosphere. The complexity does not
come so much from the nature of the conflicts that afflict the contem-
porary world, because there have always been economic, ideological,
and religious wars. Instead, it comes from the spread of the knowl-
edge of conflicts and the possibility of the spread of destruction be-
29. Quoted in C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 23.
30. National Autonomous University of Nicaragua, Leon, December 11, 1987.
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cause of nuclear arms. The conflict is a product of the media, which
has created a sort of universal ideology of war and has produced a
tragic sense about the limits of life on earth.
Moreover, the complexity of the law-society relation increases
against the background of the following paradox: while individual
nations grow with the geography of their historical, social, and polit-
ical reality, the universal dimension of the world contracts because
the media puts all countries and people on the same plane and in the
same compact nucleus, shrinking time and space, and longitude and
latitude of the universe. This only seems to be a paradox because, in
reality, what we have is a dialectical relation between the universal
and the particular. The universal is particularized when it becomes
part of the internal life of nations, and the particular is universalized
when it crosses borders and travels around the world by means of the
media.
In such a world, the possibility of conflict increases not only be-
cause of economic, ideological, and religious causes, but because of
the universalization of crisis that this two-fold process of expansion
and contraction produces. Such a situation objectively polarizes and
accentuates the hegemonic tendencies of the powers in the world.
These tendencies have made it necessary to gradually rebuild the
nucleus of international law in an attempt to guarantee a basic law for
all nations. That is why international agreements and organizations
like the United Nations are equivalent to a sort of new social contract.
The United Nations defines new civil and political rights in the inter-
national sphere. International law is a type of universal consensus on
the rules of the game among states which defines and regulates the
sphere in which freedom of states may be exercised. It also limits
their rights on the basis of a series of basic principles. These princi-
ples are: sovereignty, self-determination, non-interference in the in-
ternal affairs of other states, non-use of force to settle conflicts, and
respect for individual human rights. They must be universally ob-
served, independent of the power of the state in question, the size of
its territory, the number of its inhabitants, the strength of its military
arsenal, or its economic capacity.
International law, caught between the competing interests of
hegemonic centers, power blocs, zones of influence, and geopolitical
strategies, is called upon to strike a balance. This balance must be
made with respect for all international treaties, norms, and customs,
which are, or ought to be, the foundation of the community of na-
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tions. The failure to observe this balance distorts the system and ac-
centuates disequilibrium. Above all, this failure renders ineffective
the mechanism charged with maintaining the consensus.
Domestic law is not foreign to international law. The latter pro-
gressively contributes form and content to the former. International
treaties and agreements become domestic law upon ratification. The
that have ratified them, or at least their content is incorporated in
provisions of national law, whether constitutional or ordinary legisla-
tion. The internal changes of society as well as external changes in
the international community are important to consider. Both interna-
tional and domestic law are changing and a reciprocal influence exists
between the two that carry the contemporary world to new common
norms of universal value. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
proper details of each society and individual legal order. One must
therefore be alert to these transformations in social, political, and
legal reality in order to face with intellectual clarity the threats and
challenges they pose.
4.2 Is Justice Immutable?
Justice is almost universally accepted as a value of law. Because
legal philosophers have studied the theme in depth, I shall not ex-
amine it exhaustively on this occasion. I will instead focus this brief
reflection on the question whether justice is immutable, which is to
say perennial or historical, and will make references to some principal
philosophical currents and to a few of the most important philoso-
phers who have dealt with the issue.
Plato is perhaps the leading figure within classical idealism. For
Plato, justice as a value is eternal and exists in an ideal world, the
topos uranus, different from the sensory world, and can be captured
only through intellectual intuition.
The theory of Edmond Husserl is perhaps closer to our day. His
intuition captures objects because they exist in the conscience. This
includes the emotional intuition theory of Nicolai Hartmann and Max
Scheller; that the value of justice is generated and lives in the
conscience.
For Roman law, justice is rerun natura, a value that is found in
the very order of nature. For Grotius, the most important natural law
theorist, justice is apetitus societatis, that is, the natural tendency to
live in society and order. For Kant, within a rationalist formulation,
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every action is just that in itself or in its maxim is such that the free-
dom of the will of each can coexist with the freedom of any other,
according to a universal law. With Marx, law expresses the interests
of the dominant class. Long before Marx, Thrasymachus said that
justice is the interest of the strongest. However, I agree with Guis-
seppe Lumia who said that Thrasymachus probably and Marx cer-
tainly intended to describe what in fact occurs rather than to evaluate
what ought to occur in a world governed by justice.
Legal positivism excludes all values, including justice as such,
from the law, although one of its expressions, ethical formalism, iden-
tifies just law with existing law. Meanwhile, in logical positivism,
whose principal figure is Wittgenstein, factual declarations are the
only ones that have meaning.
In this brief consideration of different philosophical schools,
there exists a diversity of criteria for the value of justice. The same
diversity exists in other schools, whether we are dealing with distribu-
tive justice, which concerns public law, or with corrective justice
which concerns private law. If we continue this reflection, we will see
that justice is the most important value of law and it is toward justice
that law is directed. It is, in fact, values that give meaning and justifi-
cation to the existence of law. A system of norms that did not have as
its objective justice, order, and protection of citizens, would be useless
and inexplicable.
When a community aims toward an objective in a given time and
place, the objective is a historical value whose content and meaning
are subject to change. For Ulpian, justice consisted of giving each one
his due, living honestly, and not injuring others. The content and
meaning of these three conditions of justice, however, have differed in
time and space. For the Greeks and Romans, slavery was an institu-
tion through which the law of property, of one person over another
was exercised. Therefore, in that case, justice consisted of giving each
one the slave that was his and not injuring anyone who had this right
in other persons, and by respecting these rules, fulfilling the three con-
ditions of justice. Surely, in this example as in others, the value of
justice as well as laws designed to implement and guarantee it, repre-
sented the dominant ideological values of a given social structure.
In contrast, in the last century, Abraham Lincoln paid his life for
the abolition of slavery. This occurred because he changed the privi-
leges and rules of social life in the United States, establishing a con-
cept of justice based upon equal dignity of human beings.
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For Manchesterian capitalism and the social values that it gener-
ated, unrestricted freedom of production and contract defined justice.
That base established the concept of legal equality, a concept that has
a dual nature: one positive, one negative. The positive overturns the
privileges and inequalities legally established in Greek, Roman, and
medieval law. The negative masks, behind the announcement of a
I'.Jrml GI uLJLaLL %A.JUal1L3V, all a%.4Ual, I1L4l...L u I LL4IY. ill LIJLJL Alfra-
tive aspect lies one of Manchesterian capitalism's principal contradic-
tions. It legally proclaims a universal principle of equality while the
totality of its legal order guarantees a practice of inequality and helps
reproduce and prolong the system that carries out an injustice.
The violation of a freedom is an injustice. However, at times
declarations of freedom cover up fundamental injustices. For exam-
ple, freedom of contract, upon which a good part of the concept of
justice of Manchesterian capitalism was based, accepted the existence
of great masses of impoverished unemployed on the one hand, and
owners of industry on the other. In that case, freedom of contract
was the freedom of the fox in the chicken coop, producing in practice
one of the major injustices in the history of mankind.
Freedom and justice are legitimate values as long as the integrity
and dignity of the human being is protected universally. This protec-
tion exists when everyone has a right to goods, health, education, cul-
ture, and respect for his or her integrity and dignity. In other words,
we believe that true justice is always a social, moral, and whole jus-
tice. It is not the privilege of sectors or of groups, but of the entire
society. We believe that freedom is not just a declaration to cover
privileges of minorities, but a real choice for all. Above all, freedom
for those who have always been marginal, discriminated against, or
exploited, is to have the pleasures and advantages of the material, cul-
tural, and spiritual goods of society. The law should guarantee those
values and the respective bodies of the state should guarantee the ful-
fillment of law.
4.3 Careers for Law Graduates
You now leave the University and depart upon professional lives
in a society which has experienced profound changes; changes with
respect to which the lawyer cannot remain at the margin, even if that
were his or her wish. New societal needs will open additional fields of
practice to the law graduates. This will be particularly true with re-
spect to the practice of civil and criminal law. The Nicaraguan state
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will need the services of advisers to give legal form to its administra-
tive acts, as well as indicate and explain the national and international
framework of rules in which public entities must act.
The judicial system will continue to need professionals to assume
the difficult responsibility of the administration of justice. For these
individuals, we have the hope of one day creating a judicial school to
perfect and strengthen the development of state personnel. The
school will prepare graduates for a judicial vocation which requires
dedication to this high and difficult service.
Each day, the judicial function in administrative, constitutional,
criminal, agricultural, and labor law grows in direct proportion to the
needs of our society. In criminal law, reform in substantive and pro-
cedural fields is increasingly important. In the field of procedure, the
Supreme Court of Justice is completing the reform with the assistance
of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior. In criminal
law, we have to eliminate the penal philosophy of repression and pun-
ishment as well as the Manichean concept of crime as the bad against
the good. In their place, we must substitute a concept of social con-
sideration which seeks to address the causes of crime and not just its
effects. This concept begins with the principles of crime prevention
and reeducation in order for the delinquent to be returned to our soci-
ety. It would use measures of solidarity, not of vengeance, and would
reform the values and criteria currently in our legislation.
The revolution offers a historic challenge to law graduates: the
opportunity to participate actively in our new society at the height of
the dreams and sacrifices of the Nicaraguan people.
5. State, Law, and Indigenous Peoples3'
5.1 Individual and Collective Human Rights
In the name of the government of Nicaragua, I welcome the par-
ticipants to this seminar and wish at the outset for the greatest of
successes for the future of indigenous peoples in various parts of the
world. The theme of this meeting-peace, autonomy, and human
rights-is full of hope. It is a theme which poses not only a watch-
word, but a message, a reflection, a possibility, and a faith.
Nicaragua is convulsed by a war of aggression. It is a peace that
is surely vulnerable to war but that represents much more than the
absence of it. War nullifies peace. Yet the nullification of war does
31. Managua, February 7, 1988.
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not fully restore the reality of peace. That reality is the fundamental
condition for a full, dignified, and hopeful peace to be brought about
in our land and history. Peace is respect for the right of all peoples to
self-determination and their right to dignity. It is the consideration of
rights and liberties specific to indigenous peoples; the possibility of a
fraternal nation in which different cultural expressions converge to
sow Seeds GI Flew hope, fLaith, and the possibility of living togee InI a
multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic society. Autonomy, which is not at
all distant from the concept of peace, is part of the global and struc-
tural concept of peace and brings its own content to it.
Respect for human rights is another condition for peace. Human
rights are understood not only as individual guarantees, but also as
social and economic rights that permit individuals access to the mate-
rial and cultural goods of society in order to reach the levels of dignity
that humanity demands. The historical subjects of human rights are
the community, ethnic groups, and indigenous peoples who demand
their essential rights, their identity, and their place in history with
nobility and courage. Without that necessary complement of commu-
nity rights to individual rights, the fullness of human rights is divided.
Once divided, it would be possible to attribute the complete concept
to only one expression of human rights, to the detriment of the other.
It is not possible, for example, to respect collective human rights with-
out respecting the human person, just as it is not possible to protect
and develop individual rights amidst an exploited and alienated
community.
5.2 Perspectivism and the Indigenous Problem
The theme of this seminar permits reflection on peace, auton-
omy, and human rights. Additionally, it presents the perspective of a
concrete and global analysis. This is true because historical events do
not occur in a metaphysical sky, but in a reality with problems and
contradictions. For that reason, the perspective of this meeting is a
specific one. It is not just any point of view, nor all points of view.
Rather, it is the perspective of the specific situation of the indigenous
peoples. It is from this perspective, which is always a perspective of
reality, that the history you are going to analyze acquires its perspec-
tive. Each person has his or her own perspective which is his or her
own truth. This truth becomes integrated and unified when the vari-
ous partial perspectives of reality become integrated and unified.
Thus, history and reality are moved by contradictions as well as by
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concrete situations. There is also the concrete perspective of the in-
digenous problem from which we begin to see history; our history and
that of others. From this specific vision, we integrate a universal vi-
sion articulating situations and linking problems together.
This brings me to a first affirmation: problems in history have
neither a sole perspective, nor a unilateral solution. This does not
mean that specific problems ought to be diluted into some abstract
and ambiguous totality. Rather, problems only acquire their true
specificity to the extent that they are not isolated or dissected from
that totality, nor placed outside of that unity. Something is specific
only when the characteristics of a reality are linked to a totality.
Likewise, unity is only obtained by making differences compatible.
Unity does not mean homogeneity in a vacuum, but rather the con-
vergence of multiple decisions and diverse expressions, each of which
preserves its own identity, in a unitary vision of historical situations
and objective realities.
With this in mind, I would like to raise some considerations
about the indigenous peoples. These considerations are presented
modestly, as one can only do when speaking of problems to the pro-
tagonists of their history. I do not intend to give lessons. Giving les-
sons is not my motive in addressing those whose words of practice,
action, suffering, and daily experience make and remake the fabric of
their life and history.
5.3 The Historical Context
The problem of the indigenous peoples is two-fold. First, there is
the structural problem which is related to the problems posed by the
concept of domination-dependence. Second, there is also an ethno-
cultural problem that, while specific, is part of the structural problem.
The two problems are inter-related. The structural problem is one
that the neo-colonial and imperial efforts along with the western con-
cepts of nation-state have caused and deepened. The nation-state has
not resolved the indigenous problem. Rather, it has helped entrench
it. In Latin America, the identity of indigenous peoples has been hid-
den behind an ethno-centric practice of the dominant nation with its
general legal pronouncements.
The concept of the nation-state, as well as the archetypes of the
dominant nations, have been mechanisms, in most cases, for the as-
similation, integration, dissolution, and erosion of the identity, law,
and reality of the indigenous peoples. We cannot forget the historical
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analysis of the nation-state which the ethnic communities must con-
front. The ethno-centric nation-state arose in post-Renaissance Eu-
rope as an expression of sole power, reunifying territory, population,
and power that had been spread apart in the medieval wars between
the three sectors of power (state, church, and feudalism). It was pre-
cisely in this fight between sacerdotium e imperium that the ideas were
sown for a power that reunilies through a concept of sovereignty. In
the epoch of the birth of the modem state, the state meant nothing
more than the reunification of power in order to exercise it fully over
a territory and a specific population. During that period, sovereignty
signified the possibility of defense in the face of the other internal sec-
tors which held power with the crown.
That is a different concept of sovereignty from today's legal and
political value. Today, in international law and relations, sovereignty
is the protecting shield of territorial integrity and internal rights. Sov-
ereignty is organized in the face of aggression from other states that
attempt to weaken these fundamental principles of national and inter-
national life.
Sovereignty, at its origin, was not what is justly claimed by na-
tional states today, especially the small states which confront the phe-
nomenon of imperialist expansion. That model of nation-state was
transferred to our latitudes, and was embodied in our history, begin-
ning in the nineteenth century. The model suffers from congenital
and acquired vices; from congenital vices in that the new nation-state
that is established in our lands really is not the result of a specific
internal historic situation as it was in Europe. What has occurred has
been a mechanical and historical transfer of the European model,
whose objective was to homogenize through the establishment of ab-
solute monarchies in France, Spain, Portugal, and England. The Eu-
ropean model represents colonialism, the original accumulation of
capital, and later expansion of capital through imperial mechanisms.
This generates a new international relationship of domination,
namely, the relationship of imperialism, dependence, and
underdevelopment.
In the case of Nicaragua, the structure, nature, and functions of
this legal-political apparatus develop like vectors, like a transmission
belt for imperial interests without even having formulated a national
bourgeois project that would support and run the organization of the
nation-state. The only active attempt to develop a national project for
the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was that of Zelaya from 1893 to 1909,
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which was overthrown by the government of the United States
through the famous Knox Note of December 1, 1909.
In the case of Nicaragua, the United States did not permit Nica-
ragua what it had already permitted and supported in other Latin
American countries, namely, that the national states sustain them-
selves upon a real possibility of a project of the bourgeoisie. What
was valid for various Latin American countries was heresy in Nicara-
gua. It was a dangerous challenge because Nicaragua was always
seen as a strategic geopolitical enclave in which the supervening inter-
ests of the empire were not only economic, but strategic-as was the
case with the canal project visualized in 1848 by Vanderbilt and the
Transit Company.
The Nicaraguan nation-state, until the triumph of the Revolu-
tion, played the role of vector, a simple transmission belt of imperial
interests, with no possibility of developing its own national
bourgeoisie.
With regard to our indigenous peoples, the basic problem at this
moment and in this analysis is that of the Atlantic Coast. In 1633, the
English occupied the Misquito area. In 1687, the coronation of the
Mosco King, Jeremias I, took place. There is a series of colonial and
material contradictions within this specific problem of identity.
Spain, the United States, and England fought for control of the Carib-
bean Sea. The United States and England had an interest in a possible
canal. The indigenous peoples, the Misquitos, became contractually
allied with the English, and fought with the English against the
Spaniards for control of the Caribbean, as well as for economic and
commercial interests in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
In 1849, the Moravian missionaries arrived in Bluefields. In
1850, the Clayton-Pulwer Treaty was signed between the United
States and England. In 1860, the Treaty of Managua was signed be-
tween Nicaragua and England. There, the English recognized for the
first time the formal sovereignty of Nicaragua over the Atlantic
Coast. This treaty reaffirmed the hegemony of the United States, as
seen through the lens of the relations of the superpowers with our
ethno-cultural problems and indigenous peoples, and signified the
transfer of colonial power from one empire to another.
Between 1880 and 1890, there was an economic boom brought
about by the export of bananas to New Orleans. As a result, the he-
gemony of North American capital displaced that of the English. As
of 1894, North American capital investment amounted to four million
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dollars, controlling ninety percent of business. That same year, the
government of Nicaragua put an end to the Misquito reservation, oc-
cupying it militarily and incorporating it into the nation as a depart-
ment. A decree was also issued which incorporated the Misquitos
and the Criollos, who controlled the government of the coast, into the
government as a whole. Their power was replaced by the Nicaraguan
bourgeoisie under the liberal government. in historic and structural
terms, this reincorporation represented a transfer from English to
United States colonialism.
The Liberal Constitution of 1894 created the Municipal Council
which excluded the Criollos and set up a new dependency between the
superpowers and communities through legal instruments that pur-
ported to legitimatize the situation. In 1905, the Harrison-Al-
tamirano treaty which confirmed the incorporation of the Misquito
territory into Nicaragua, was signed between Nicaragua and England.
These facts and events serve to explain part of the problem we
posed at the outset. Certainly there is a structural problem as well as
an important ethno-cultural problem. There is an identity problem
that is surely affected by the controversies between England and the
United States.
The national states that followed were, as I already indicated,
servants of the empire. When circumstances demanded, legal meas-
ures were adopted to recognize some rights of indigenous peoples, but
the measures were always part of the overall strategy favoring the
hegemonic power. The predominant standards were those of integra-
tion, incorporation, and assimilation.
These concessions established certain rights like the exemption
from military service, from taxes and rates, and the right to occupy
certain lands. However, the possibility was left open that, at some
point in the future, the incorporation and assimilation would be total.
The state, the nation, and law were intertwined in these imperial
contradictions. The laws, treaties, and decrees legitimated a process
that was nothing more than the displacement of domination by one
power for another. A series of agreements were entered into whose
purposes were not to seek recognition and strengthen the dignity of
the indigenous peoples or recognize their legitimate rights. Rather,
they favored transactions between the private and dominant interests
of the empires.
That is, in my view, a rapid historical sketch which justifies the
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initial hypothesis from which we began these reflections. The indige-
nous problem, however, is not our problem alone.
5.4 The Inadequacy of International Law
We cannot avoid the problem of international law which has yet
to adequately focus on the essence of the matter. Specifically, we need
parameters of integration, incorporation, assimilation, and the global-
ization and generalization of the problem by recognizing common
rights which should be extended to workers. The treaties address the
problems of the capital-labor relationship, generating some agree-
ments that permit recognition of people as sectors or factors of pro-
duction, but fail to recognize indigenous peoples or groups with their
own specific rights. International agreements and laws try to inte-
grate these people into the more equitable treatment given to workers
in other parts of the world.
The following are the five principal international instruments:
(1) The International Convention on elimination of all forms of
racial discrimination of December 21, 1965. Article 2 condemns all
forms of discrimination. Article 3 condemns racial segregation and
apartheid;
(2) The charter of the Organization of American States, article
29, subsection (a), proclaims that all human beings without distinc-
tion of race, nationality, sex, creed, or social condition, have the right
to achieve material well-being and spiritual development in conditions
of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security.
Article 74, subsection (c) embodies in law the right to education of all
population groups, and subsection (b) permits the creation and devel-
opment of special programs;
(3) The American Convention on Human Rights, known as the
Pact of San Jos6 of November 22, 1969, in article 1, protects rights
and liberties without any discrimination based on race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin,
economic position, birth or any other social condition. Article 4, sub-
section (a), declares the need to stimulate consciousness of human
rights in the American people;
(4) The United Nations Charter of 1945, in article 55, establishes
the free determination of peoples, universal respect for human rights,
and fundamental liberties of all without regard to race, sex, language,
or religion. Article 13 of the Charter of San Francisco of July 25,
1945 is perhaps the most important aspect of the Charter. It is a dec-
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laration to make effective the human rights and fundamental liberties
of all people;
(5) Convention 107 of the World Labor Organization, dated
July 5, 1957, relates to the protection of indigenous and other tribal or
semi-tribal peoples in matters of contracts, conditions of employment,
social security, health, education, and means of information. Under
convention i07, the protection of identity is subsidiary and exists only
to the extent that it is compatible with national values.
5.5 The New Constitution and Autonomy
Our Political Constitution and Statute of Autonomy goes beyond
international treaties and pre-revolutionary legislation on the subject.
The concepts of assimilation, integration, or incorporation, which the
internal sub-imperialisms of pre-revolutionary nation-states offered as
an alternative, have disappeared. In our Constitution and the Law of
Autonomy, the treatment of the problem is through the conviction
that it is impossible to create a qualitatively new nation-state and de-
velop a profound, revolutionary process, except from a nation built on
the convergence of indigenous peoples with other social and cultural
expressions of Nicaragua.
We do not propose to integrate them into a dominant platform,
or assimilate them into a hegemonic culture. Rather, it is a matter of
forging this multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic nation, whose main ob-
jective is to favor the people as the basic unit of the nation, into a new
nation-state, which fairly reproduces the values of the many entities in
our history. This is essential because it marks a qualitative break with
the past. It defines the possibility of a new nation-state and estab-
lishes revolutionary change as a condition. Here the values of inde-
pendence and national sovereignty, a prerequsite within this new
concept of nation-state, are integrated with the value of autonomy of
ethnic groups.
The Nicaraguan state does not intend, therefore, to absorb differ-
ent ethnic groups, but rather to build the nation on the units of differ-
ences; to respect them and bring them to a point of historical
convergence. This is because the nation should not look backwards,
but should project toward the future. The nation is constantly becom-
ing more than what it has been. Nicaragua now has a future, rather
than a past of denied values, injured peoples, and confiscated
dignities.
In this respect, the Statute of Autonomy and the political Consti-
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tution take an important collective leap in the definition of the new
nation-state. They recognize political rights and incorporate them at
the constitutional level by strengthening the concept of national unity
and territorial integrity. They also represent an extraordinary experi-
ence: a new step which is both fundamental and significant in the
process of building new Nicaraguan law. This step involves question-
ing criteria which are absolute, universal, and abstract in the law of
domination. It means that the Law of Autonomy is the consequence
of a historical reality. This is because, although the law does not cre-
ate indigenous communities, it gives expression to them. Though it is
not the cause of society, it is nevertheless, its causeway.
In this Law of Autonomy, we have direct, transparent examples
of what has been affirmed so often. The law is a social fact and the
consequence of a historical process. The Law of Autonomy is the
consequence of a series of historical facts, which evolved from discus-
sions with indigenous communities of the Atlantic, to elevation as a
principle of law.
There is a legal principle whose value is undeniable when it
emerges at the dawn of liberalism and has, at its back, the inequalities
instituted by medieval law. It is the principle of legal equality. The
development of this principle in capitalist society has been used as a
pretext to cover economic and social inequalities. Beneath a general,
abstract declaration of equality before the law, capitalist societies have
tried to hide a concrete inequality in the opportunity for participation
in the economy, politics, and society. The possibility of access to ma-
terial, cultural, and spiritual goods has been blocked.
Of course, we all share equality before the law with regard to due
process. But it is necessary to note that treating unequals as equals
has amounted to a cover up. For that reason, the new law should try
to be more than egalitarian and homogenizing. It should be an une-
qual, leveling force, that accounts for concrete economic and social
inequalities.
Contact with the indigenous communities has given our concept
of democracy a concrete content. We see democracy not as formal
democracy, since a democracy defined solely in such terms is incom-
plete. Rather, democracy is formal in the sense of the electoral
processes and suffrage, but also institutional to the extent that the
laws and institutions incorporate the dynamic reality. This is the case
with the Law of Autonomy and the constitutional articles which have
gathered that experience. We also conceive of democracy in an eco-
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nomic and social sense that permits participation by those who have
traditionally been marginalized from history. Nation-state, law and
democracy, are not empty elements, or mere declarations. They are
the working hypotheses of a revolutionary process with a specific
content.
The indigenous peoples are indispensable factors for peace in
%..IeIIfl~ AU-neL1L41. I i1eiterat whII h ave already stated. 1XaC ion
only the absence of war, but also the participation of all in the mate-
rial, social, and spiritual community of the nation.
5.6 Homage to the Indigenous Nicaraguans
I want to end with a dedication to the indigenous person of our
land. This is a dedication to the indigenous person who for centuries
traveled the old roads of the country as a friend of the ancient trees
and eternal volcanos, seas, lakes, forests, and plains. The indigenous
person is a part of the countryside where he cradelled his dreams
under the stars of a warm tropical night and where he forged his life
and his history in this land of light, fire, and love. The indigenous
person is our past; the past that we understand not as nostalgia for a
murmur of wings that hover in flight above melancholy, but as seeds
of the present and future.
6. The Judicial Transformation in Nicaragua 32
6.1 Break with the Past
The changes produced by the Sandinista Popular Revolution
provoked a break between political, economic, and social reality on
the one hand, and legal and institutional order on the other. This
break, inevitable in every revolutionary process, left behind the legal-
institutional system in general and the judicial machinery in particu-
lar. At the same time, it produced the bases for the new institutional
system and generated a process for adjusting institutions and law to
the changing reality in Nicaragua. This transforming process, which
will continue until reality and legal order reach a point of equilibrium,
has passed through three stages.
The first stage included such events as the passing of the Funda-
mental Statute, the Statute of Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans,
the Law of Political Parties, the Law Creating the Council of State,
and the Electoral Law. In addition, the National Assembly was cre-
32. Managua, March 6, 1988.
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ated, the General Statute was approved, the Implementation of the
Assembly was passed, and finally, the presidential and constitutional-
legislative elections of November 1984 were held.
The second stage consisted of the process of discussion and ap-
proval, culminating in the promulgation of the political Constitution
between 1985 and January 9, 1987. The third stage is characterized
by the initiation of legislative work by the National Assembly, having
finished its constitutional period. In this stage, the Assembly initiated
the process of legal adjustment to implement the Constitution and to
conform ordinary legislation to the constitutional text. The most im-
portant steps in this stage consisted of the approval of the Law of
Autonomy, which implemented constitutional provisions on the
rights of indigenous peoples; the forthcoming parliamentary works
that should conclude with the approval of the Procedural Law on
Dissolution of Marriage, which implemented article 72 of the Consti-
tution; the Law of Municipal Elections; the Law of Amparo; the Law
of Emergency; and the Law of Criminal Procedure Reform.
The Esquipulas Accords are important as a Central American
legal and political framework and have affected the institutional pro-
cess in Nicaragua. They neither created nor initiated the legal and
institutional formation of the country, but they do support its devel-
opment. From the judicial point of view, the most important conse-
quence of the Accords was the dissolution of the Popular Anti-
Somoza Tribunals and the concommitant transfer of their jurisdiction
to the judicial branch, as established by article 159 of the
Constitution.
6.2 The New Judiciary
With the triumph of the Revolution, various specialized jurisdic-
tions were separated from the judicial machinery and distributed
among the Popular Anti-Somoza Tribunals, the Agrarian Tribunal,
and Regional Committees of Housing and Protection and Care of Mi-
nors. The latter Committees are within a department of the Nicara-
guan Institute of Social Security and Welfare (INSSBI).
In addition, the Ministry of Justice and police courts were cre-
ated, the monopoly on criminal prosecutions was established in the
Attorney General's Office, and a series of decrees were promulgated
to deal with specific judicial questions. The existing code law was left
in force for the remaining fields of law.
The judiciary was traditionally organized to consist of local
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judges, district judges, Appeals Courts (which later were transformed
into Regional Appeals Tribunals), and the Supreme Court of Justice.
Appeals to the Regional Tribunals and extraordinary appeals to the
Supreme Court remained in place for civil and criminal matters as
they had existed before the revolutionary triumph. In the labor area,
the Superior Court of Labor was abolished and Labor Judgments now
end with appeal to the Regional Tribunals. The Fundamental Statute
maintained habeus corpus and amparo.
This judicial system was established with great difficulty due to
the congenital contradictions which existed within the system.
Among these contradictions, the following should be mentioned: the
old code law and the new law by decrees; the old, slow and rigid law
and the dynamic social reality; the concepts of the Ministry of Justice
and the Supreme Court of Justice; the monopoly on criminal prosecu-
tion and the actual capacity of the Attorney General's Office to prose-
cute due to explicable limitations; and the monopoly on criminal
prosecution and actual functioning of the criminal process drawn in
old models of rigid written law. Many of these contradictions are due
to the fact that our current Code of Criminal Instruction dates from
1879 and was inspired by the New Spanish Compilation of 1805.
Inside the Judicial Branch there was also an absence of clear
objectives about the role of the judiciary in the revolutionary process.
This led to the adoption of constrasting points of view. Under the
traditional and formalist point of view, a judge must limit himself ex-
clusively to apply the law without previous or subsequent considera-
tions concerning reality. This emphasizes the mechanical activity of a
judge and discards the integrating function so necessary in a historical
moment such as ours. Behind this traditional attitude, there is a se-
ries of underlying and implicit values which are founded upon a
scheme that considers law as a univeral, absolute, and abstract value.
This scheme ignores the social moment and the law's value as a his-
torical and cultural product.
Opposed to this traditional focus is a point of view oriented to-
ward a "paradigm shift," based upon certain judicial models thought
to be more advanced and modern. Without depreciating the value of
certain legal and judicial models, it is unavoidable that every legal and
judicial system must necessarily be part of the social reality to which
it belongs. Between the judicial system and its reality, there should be
coherence and integration, not imposition and contradiction. A com-
plex process does exist for the establishment of a more coherent and
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better coordinated relationship among the various institutions within
the judicial system. But there are serious problems derived from the
war of aggression which have translated into budgetary, human, and
material limitations in the judicial machinery. However, problems of
inter-institutional coordination are being overcome to the extent that
their objectives have been defined with a view toward greater coher-
ence and harmony of the judicial system as a whole.
Furthermore, the increase in the number of trials, the scarcity of
tribunals and prosecutors, the antiquity and rigidity of the criminal
laws and procedures, and the concentration of more than forty per-
cent of the trials in the capital city, have resulted in a severe delay of
justice. These problems have existed since the first years of the
Revolution. The delay is worsening due to the cumulative effects of
the mere passage of time. To remedy this delay, we devoted special
attention to this problem in our Report to the First Assembly of the
Judicial Branch issued on October 16, 1987.
In addition to the delay in the administration of justice, one must
focus on the excessive incapacity of the judges to impose sanctions for
common crimes. According to statistics of the Ministry of the Inte-
rior, less than two percent of the common criminals brought before
judicial authorities receive penal sanction. Of course, it would be im-
portant to determine the percentages of those persons released due to
the responsibility of the judges, and those released due to other struc-
tural or procedural limitations.
There are also extra-judicial problems, which though diminished,
still persist. Among these are inattention to release orders, careless-
ness of examining judges and, in some cases, failure to carry out judg-
ments. There is also a need for the Appeals Tribunals to effectively
supervise the examining judges, who are the representatives of those
Tribunals in proceedings of personal exhibition or habeus corpus.
On a different topic, the Supreme Court of Justice, during the
drafting of the political Constitution, urged unity of jurisdiction and
judicial review as fundamental to the consolidation and deepening of
the Rule of Law. The Supreme Court made the above proposals in its
draft of the Chapter on the Judicial Branch and in the bill presented
by the Supreme Court to the National Assembly in 1986.
6.3 Constitutional Changes and New Policies
Long and short term objectives of the Judicial Branch, and their
implementing policies, are defined within the revolutionary process.
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Among the objectives are the readjustment of the judiciary to social
reality, the consolidation of the Rule of Law, the elimination of delay
of justice, and the harmonization of the judiciary with the other
branches of the government. Among the implementing policies being
developed to reach the judiciary's objectives are the following: giving
the Supreme Court of Justice the constitutional and legal instruments
to organize and direct the judicial machinery, establishing the unity of
jurisdiction and judicial review with implementing laws where neces-
sary, broadening the judicial machinery, establishing mechanisms for
internal and external coordination with the other bodies of the judical
system, and above all, reforming criminal procedure.
Article 164, subsection (1) of the Constitution authorizes the
Court to organize and direct the administration of justice. Decrees
299 and 303 provide the Court with the authority to create, eliminate,
and transfer courts, broaden and organize the Appellate Tribunals,
and determine the jurisdiction of judges by subject matter and
amount. These powers, together with the constitutional power to
name all the judicial administrators of the country, give the Court the
real possibility of managing judicial adjustment and transformation.
This power strengthens the constitutionally guaranteed independence
of the Judicial Branch.
Judicial review for unconstitutionality, considered by the Court
as necessary for the consolidation of the Rule of Law, was incorpo-
rated into the Constitution. At the same time, implementation was
left to a new constitutional Law of Amparo which shall contain a
chapter on "Appeal for Unconstitutionality." The Supreme Court of
Justice prepared the draft of the new Law of Amparo, which later
incorporated the comments presented by the Ministry of Justice. The
last point upon which the Court and the Ministry disagreed was the
effect of a law that is declared unconstitutional. The Ministry of Jus-
tice considered the declaration limited to the concrete case, while the
Court found it inconsistent to leave valid any law that had been de-
clared unconstitutional. However, both institutions reached an agree-
ment when the focus was placed on the fate of the law considered
unconstitutional.
On the basis of the new perspective and in accord with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, it was established that (a) the nature of
the judgment was not a decision with erga-omnes effects, but rather
was limited to the concrete case, and (b) the law declared inapplicable
by the Court to the concrete case had no validity at all in light of
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article 182 of the Constitution. From this point of view, the judgment
of the Court does not overturn the law, but it identifies the contradic-
tion between the law and the Constitution. The law then becomes
inapplicable to all other cases and, in accordance with what the Con-
stitution itself provides, it is up to the Assembly to proceed with dero-
gation of the law. The draft of the new Law of Amparo establishes
that the appeal for unconstitutionality may be interposed against any
law whose effective date is later than the enactment of the Law of
Amparo.
This fertile interchange of legal opinions between both institu-
tions completes a new stage within the discussion of the appeal for
unconstitutionality. The first of these stages began in the Supreme
Court in the final months of 1985. Primarily, the discussion revolved
around whether the Court should suggest that the Assembly create
this appeal and, what body would undertake review for unconstitu-
tionality-the Court, a specific Constitutional Tribunal, or a commis-
sion of the Assembly itself.
The Assembly established in the Constitution the appeal for un-
constitutionality and conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court,
thus adopting the draft that the Supreme Court had approved by a
majority in December 1985. As is appropriate, the Assembly will
have the last word on the bill for the new Law of Amparo, which
incorporates the unanimous views of the Supreme Court and the Min-
istry of Justice.
In order to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the delay of justice,
we hope to expand the judiciary and reform criminal procedures. Ex-
pansion of the Judicial Branch is dictated by two circumstances.
First, there is the progressive increase in the number of common law
trials, particularly in criminal matters. Criminal trials overload the
courts in Managua since approximately forty-five percent of all trials
for crimes committed in the country are held there. Secondly, expan-
sion is required by the dissolution of the Popular Anti-Somoza Tribu-
nals and the consequent transfer of their jurisdiction to the Judicial
Branch. In Managua alone, the Judicial Branch has received about
4,000 files. The creation of new courts will not solve the problems
discussed above, however, we know that a solution is not possible
without those courts.
The Supreme Court, on the general authority of article 164, sub-
section (1) of the Constitution, in accord with the provisions of de-
crees 299 and 303, has recently agreed to create fifteen new criminal
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courts. Ten of these will be in the city of Managua to reinforce the
current eight. An additional court will be situated in each of the
following cities: Matagalpa, Juigalpa, Siuna, Bonanza, and Nueva
Guinea. The Supreme Court has also decided to increase the number
of justices on the Appellate Tribunals as follows: two in Region II,
one in Region III, and two in Region IV.
All of these steps were taken in coordination with the dissolution
of the Ministry of Justice. The steps included the transfer of new
parts of the Ministry to various agencies of the state and the reduction
of cases at the Attorney General's Office as a consequence of the loss
of the monopoly of criminal prosecution. This permitted a number of
Ministry personnel to be integrated into the reorganization of the ju-
dicial branch. Within that process, twenty-three new officers came
into the Judicial Branch as judges and justices, three as consultants,
and about one hundred as administrative or para-judicial support
personnel.
Linked to this process, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme
Court, and the Ministry of the Interior have developed a bill for the
Law of Criminal Procedure Reform. This bill overturns decree 1130
and seeks to make the Criminal Prosecutors' Offices function more
practically as well as make the judicial function in criminal matters
more flexible.
The monopoly on criminal prosecution no longer exists. The
state does have the exclusive power to prosecute those crimes in
which it has a special interest because of social repercussions. These
would include graft, heinous murder, and crimes against the national
security. However, crimes have been redefined according to whether
they carry only correctional penalties or more than correctional pen-
alties. Now, local judges have jurisdiction over the former. Although
the mandatory conference and trial by jury have been eliminated,
sound discretion, sana critfca, and participation of victims have been
established. Minor conflicts have been left to the local judges. This
will divert approximately forty to fifty percent of the current work-
load away from the district judges.
These reforms, of course, will require a special, urgent program
to train local judges in methods and procedures of criminal law. This
can be accomplished by working with the authorities of higher educa-
tion and the law schools in order to establish social service for the
graduates. Such a measure would permit the creation of a source of
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judges and will permit them, while the social service lasts, to act as
appointed defense counsel where there are no lawyers available.
The proposed reforms will be considered soon by the National
Assembly and after their approval, the Supreme Court, the Ministry
of the Interior, and the Attorney General's Office will come together
again to continue the reform of criminal procedure. This reform will
be conducted in light of the restructuring and growth of the Judicial
Branch, the abolition of the Ministry of Justice, and the creation of
the Attorney General's Office.
6.4 The Future
With the description of these various accomplishments, I do not
pretend to present an idealized vision of reality. Nor do I pretend
that everything is resolved. The truth is that very serious problems
survive. They include the delay of justice, the training of judicial per-
sonnel, the creation of funds for salaries of officers and employees,
transportation, lack of offices, and others.
My purpose has been to present an objective balance of accom-
plishments and limitations, not just a quantitative inventory of what
has been done and what remains to be done. My purpose has been to
present the logic of these transformations and their conceptual sup-
port, illustrating them with concrete cases. It is very important to
make clear not only what has been done but why it has been done,
and to explain the full vision of the judiciary, with its objectives, poli-
cies, needs, limits, and actions. Facts must be evaluated as part of a
unity, a logic and a development.
So far, it has been possible to formulate a conceptual and legal
framework to carry out the legal and organizational reforms already
mentioned. This is not enough. The results produced remain to be
seen. Only time will tell us if we have substantially reduced the delay
of justice. Reducing the delay demands permanent training programs
until a judicial school can be created. There are preliminary plans for
a judicial school, but the necessary resources are lacking.
The past work has been difficult, as will be the work of the fu-
ture. The results of the objectives and policies already adopted must
be examined again in light of new needs and situations. This requires
the unity of all the members of the Judicial Branch, constant self-
sacrifice, permanent communication among judicial officers, the Asso-
ciation of Jurists, lawyers, professors, and students of law. In order to
institutionalize our revolution, it is also important to improve interna-
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tional relations so that our plans and programs are explained and un-
derstood abroad.
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APPENDIX - THE NICARAGUAN CONSTITUTION OF 1987
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
hereby makes known to the people of Nicaragua that the Constituent
National Assembly after consulting with the people, has discussed
and approved the following Political Constitution:
PREAMBLE
WE,
The Representatives of the People of Nicaragua, united in the Con-
stituent National Assembly,
INVOKE
The struggles of our Indian ancestors;
The spirit of Central American unity and the heroic tradition of our
people who, inspired by the exemplary actions of General JOSE
DOLORES ESTRADA, ANDRES CASTRO and ENMANUEL
MONGALO, destroyed the dominion of the filibusters and the
United States intervention in the National War;
BENJAMIN ZELEDON'S anti-interventionist deeds;
AUGUSTO C. SANDINO, General of Free People and Father of the
Popular and Anti-imperialist Revolution;
The heroic action of RIGOBERTO LOPEZ PEREZ, who initiated
the beginning of the end of the dictatorship;
The example of CARLOS FONSECA, the greatest perpetrator of
Sandino's legacy, founder of the Sandinista National Liberation Front
and Leader of the Revolution;
The generations of Heroes and Martyrs who forged and carried for-
ward the liberation struggle for national independence.
IN THE NAME OF
The Nicaraguan people; the democratic, patriotic and revolutionary
political parties and organizations of Nicaragua; the men and women;
the workers and peasants; the glorious youth; the heroic mothers;
those Christians who moved by their faith in GOD committed and
dedicated themselves to the struggle for the liberation of the op-
pressed; the patriotic intellectuals; and all others who through their
productive labor contribute to the defense of the Nation;
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Those who guarantee the happiness of future generations by offering
their lives in the struggle against imperialist aggression.
FOR
The establishment of the legal framework to protect and preserve the
achievements of the Revolution and the building of a new society
dedicated to the elimination of all forms of exploitation and to the
achievement of economic, political and social equality for all Ni-
caraguans and absolute respect for human rights.
FOR THE HOMELAND, FOR THE REVOLUTION,
FOR THE UNITY OF THE NATION AND FOR PEACE.
WE HEREBY PROCLAIM THE FOLLOWING
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF NICARAGUA
TITLE I
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Chapter I
Article 1
Independence, sovereignty and self-determination are inalien-
able rights of the Nicaraguan people and the foundation of the Nic-
araguan nation. Any foreign interference in the internal affairs of
Nicaragua or any attempt to undermine these rights is an attack
upon the life of the people.
It is the right of the people and the duty of all citizens to pre-
serve and defend, with arms if necessary, the independence of the
Nation, its sovereignty and national self-determination.
Article 2
National sovereignty rests with the people, the source of all
power and forgers of their own destiny. The people exercise de-
mocracy by freely deciding upon and participating in the construc-
tion of the economic, political and social system which best serves
their interests. The people exercise power both directly and
through their representatives elected by universal suffrage; equal,
free, and direct elections and secret ballot.
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Article 3
The struggle for peace and the establishment of a just world
order are unrenounceable national commitments of the Nicara-
guan nation. We therefore oppose all forms of colonialist and im-
perialist domination and exploitation. The Nicaraguan people are
in solidarity with all those who struggle against oppression and
discrimination.
Article 4
The Nicaraguan people have created a new state to promote
their interests and guarantee their social and political achieve-
ments. The state is the principal instrument through which the
people eliminate all forms of exploitation and oppression, promote
material and spiritual progress of the nation, and ensure that the
interests and rights of the majority prevail.
Article 5
The state guarantees the existence of political pluralism, a
mixed economy and non-alignment.
Political pluralism assures the existence and participation of
all political organizations in the economic, political and social af-
fairs of the nation, without ideological restrictions, except for those
who seek a return to the past or advocate the establishment of a
political system similar to it.
A mixed economy assures the existence of different forms of
property: public, private, associative, cooperative and communal;
these forms of property must serve the best interests of the nation
and contribute to the creation of wealth to satisfy the needs of the
country and its inhabitants.
Nicaragua's international relations are based on the principle
of non-alignment, the search for peace, and respect for the sover-
eignty of all nations; therefore, Nicaragua opposes all forms of dis-
crimination and is anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, and anti-racist.
Nicaragua rejects the subordination of any state by another.
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TITLE II
THE STATE
Chapter I
Article 6
Nicaragua is an independent, free, sovereign, unitary and indi-
visible state.
Article 7
Nicaragua is a participatory and representative democratic re-
public. It has four branches of government: Legislative, Execu-
tive, Judicial and Electoral.
Article 8
The people of Nicaragua are multi-ethnic and are an integral
part of the Central American nation.
Article 9
Nicaragua is a firm defender of Central American unity. It
supports and promotes all efforts to achieve political and economic
integration and cooperation in Central America. It also supports
the efforts to establish and preserve peace in the region.
Nicaragua, inspired by the ideals of Bolivar and Sandino,
strives for the unity of the people of Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Consequently, Nicaragua will participate with other Central
and Latin American countries in the creation and election of the
bodies necessary to achieve such goals. This principle shall be reg-
ulated by appropriate legislation and treaties.
Article 10
The national territory is located between the Atlantic and Pa-
cific Oceans and the republics of Honduras and Costa Rica. It in-
cludes the adjacent islands and keys, soil and subsoil, territorial
waters, continental platform, continental rise, airspace and
stratosphere.
The precise boundaries of the national territory are defined by
laws and treaties.
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Article 11
Spanish is the official language of the state. The languages of
the Communities of the Atlantic Coast shall also have official use
in the cases established by law.
Article 12
The city of Managua is the Capital of the Republic and the
seat of government. In exceptional circumstances these can be es-
tablished elsewhere in the nation.
Article 13
The symbols of the nation are the National Anthem, the Flag
and the Official Seal, as established by the law that defines their
characteristics and use.
Article 14
The state has no official religion.
TITLE III
NICARAGUAN NATIONALITY
Chapter I
Article 15
Nicaraguans are either nationals or nationalized.
Article 16
Nationals are:
1. Those born in Nicaraguan territory, excepting children of
foreigners in diplomatic service, children of foreign officials
serving international organizations or those sent by their
government to work in Nicaragua, unless they choose to
solicit Nicaraguan nationality.
2. Children of a Nicaraguan father or mother.
3. Children born abroad to fathers or mothers who originally
were Nicaraguan, if and when they apply for citizenship
after reaching legal age or independence.
4. Infants of unknown parents found in Nicaragua, subject to
1990] 473
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
correction in accordance with the law should their filial
identity become known.
5. Children born to foreign parents on board a Nicaraguan
aircraft or vessel, if and when they solicit Nicaraguan
nationality.
Article 17
Native born Central Americans who reside in Nicaragua have
the right to apply for Nicaraguan nationality from the competent
authorities without renouncing their previous nationality.
Article 18
The National Assembly may grant nationality to foreigners
deserving this merit by virtue of extraordinary service rendered to
Nicaragua.
Article 19
Foreigners who have renounced their nationality may be na-
tionalized by applying to the competent authorities when they have
fulfilled the requirements and conditions established by law.
Article 20
No national may be deprived of nationality except upon vol-
untary acquisition of another; nor shall a national be deprived of
Nicaraguan nationality because of having acquired that of another
Central American country or any country with which Nicaragua
has an agreement of dual nationality.
Article 21
The granting, loss and recuperation of nationality shall be reg-
ulated by law.
Article 22
Cases of dual nationality shall be treated in conformity with
treaties and the principles of reciprocity.
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TITLE IV
RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND GUARANTEES OF THE NICARAGUAN
PEOPLE
Chapter I
Article 23
The right to life is inviolable and inherent to all persons.
There is no death penalty in Nicaragua.
Article 24
All persons have duties to their families, the community, the
Homeland and humanity. The rights of each person are limited by
the rights of others, the collective security and the just require-
ments of the common good.
Article 25
All persons have the right to:
1. personal freedom;
2. security;
3. seek legal redress.
Article 26
All persons have the right to:
1. privacy and the privacy of their family;
2. the inviolability of their home, correspondence and
communications;
3. respect for their honor and reputation.
A private home may be searched only with a warrant from a
competent judge or expressly authorized official to prevent a crime
from being committed or to avoid damage to persons or goods, in
accordance with the procedures established by law.
The law shall determine the cases and the procedures for an
examination of private documents, fiscal records and related docu-
ments, when such is indispensable for the investigation of matters
before the Courts or for fiscal reasons.
Illegally seized letters, documents and other private papers
shall be null and void in legal proceedings or, elsewhere.
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Article 27
All persons are equal before the law and have the right to
equal protection under the law. There shall be no discrimination
for reasons of birth, nationality, political belief, race, gender, lan-
guage, religion, opinion, national origin, economic position or so-
cial .condition.
Foreigners have the same rights and duties as Nicaraguans,
with the exception of political rights and other rights established
by law; foreigners may not intervene in the political affairs of the
country.
Article 28
Nicaraguans who are temporarily out of the country have the
right to enjoy amparo I and protection by the state through its dip-
lomatic representatives.
Article 29
All persons have the right to freedom of conscience and
thought and to profess or not to profess a religion. No one shall be
the object of coercive measures which diminish these rights, or be
obligated to declare his or her creed, ideology or beliefs.
Article 30
Nicaraguans have the right to freely express their beliefs in
public or private, individually or collectively, in oral, written or
any other form.
Article 31
Nicaraguans have the right to travel and to establish their res-
idence in any part of the nation and to freely enter and exit the
country.
Article 32
No one is obligated to do what is not required by law, or
barred from doing what is not prohibited by law.
1. In Nicaragua, amparo is a legal procedure used to seek review of administrative acts,
similar to writs of prohibition, mandamus, and habeas corpus in the United States judicial
system. It is originally a Mexican constitutional concept.
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Article 33
No one may be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, or be de-
prived of liberty except in cases established by law and in accord-
ance with legal procedures. Therefore:
1. An individual may be detained only by a warrant issued
from a competent Judge or an official expressly authorized
by law, except when apprehended in the act of committing
a crime.
2. All detained persons have the right to be:
2.1. Informed in detail without delay of the reasons for
their detention and the charges against them, in a lan-
guage they understand; to have their family informed;
and to be treated with respect in accordance with the
dignity inherent in human beings.
2.2. Brought before a competent legal authority within
seventy-two hours.
3. No one shall be detained after a release order has been
granted by the appropriate authority or once the sentence
imposed has been completed.
4. The responsible authority shall be liable for any illegal
detention.
5. The appropriate authorities shall attempt to maintain those
awaiting trial apart from those who have been sentenced.
*Article 34
All those awaiting trial have equal rights to the following min-
imum guarantees:
1. To be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to
the law.
2. To be tried without undue delay by a competent court
established by law.
3. Not to be removed from the jurisdiction of a competent
judge except in cases provided for in this Constitution or
by law.
4. To be guaranteed the right to a defense, to participate per-
sonally from the start of the proceedings and to adequate
time and means to prepare their defense.
5. To be represented by a public defender when legal counsel
has not been selected by the time of the first hearing, or in
the event that no prior call was decreed. The accused
shall have the right to communicate freely and in private
with his or her legal counsel.
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6. To have the assistance of an interpreter free of charge if
they do not understand or speak the language used by the
court.
7. Not to be obligated to testify against themselves or against
a spouse or a partner in a stable de facto union, or a fam-
ily member within the fourth level of consanguinity or the
second of marital relations, or to admit their own gilt
8. To be found guilty or not guilty within the legal time pe-
riod, by each of the relevant courts.
9. To have the right to appeal to a superior court upon con-
viction of any crime and not to be retried for any crime
for which a final judgment of conviction or acquittal has
been issued.
10. Not to be brought to trial or sentenced for acts or omis-
sions which at the times committed had not been unequiv-
ocally established by law as a punishable crime, and not
to be given a sentence which has not been previously es-
tablished by law.
Criminal proceedings are open to the public, but in some cases
the press and the general public may be excluded for moral consid-
erations or for matters of the public order or national security.
Article 35
Minors shall not be subjected to nor the object of judgment
nor shall they be submitted to any legal proceeding. Minors who
violate the law cannot be taken to penal rehabilitation centers.
They shall be attended in centers under the responsibility of a spe-
cialized institution, as provided by law.
Article 36
All persons shall have the right to respect for their physical,
psychological and moral integrity. No one shall be subjected to
torture, nor inhumane, cruel or degrading treatment. Violation of
this right constitutes a crime and shall be punishable by law.
Article 37
The penalty shall not extend beyond the accused. No sen-
tence may independently or consecutively total more than thirty
years.
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Article 38
The law is not retroactive except in penal matters that favor
the accused.
Article 39
In Nicaragua, the penitentiary system is humane, its funda-
mental objective is to transform the detainee into a person capable
of reintegration into the society. In the progressive stages, the pen-
itentiary system shall promote family unity, health care, educa-
tional and cultural advancement and productive occupation with
financial compensation. Detention has a reeducational character.
Women and men serving prison sentences shall be held in sep-
arate penal centers. Women shall be provided guards of the same
sex.
Article 40
No one shall be subjected to involuntary servitude. Slavery
and slave trade in any form are prohibited.
Article 41
No one shall be detained for indebtedness. This principle does
not limit the powers of competent legal authorities to issue war-
rants for the non-fulfillment of support or alimony orders. All na-
tional and foreign citizens have the duty to pay their debts.
Article 42
Nicaragua guarantees asylum to those 'persecuted for their
struggle for democracy, peace, justice and human rights. The
granting of political asylum shall be determined by law in accord-
ance with international agreements ratified by Nicaragua. If a
political refugee or exile is expelled from Nicaragua, that person
may not be sent back to the country in which he or she was
persecuted.
Article 43
Extradition from Nicaragua will not be permitted for political
crimes or common crimes committed in conjunction with them, at
Nicaragua's own discretion. Extradition for other common crimes
is regulated by law and international treaties.
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Nicaraguans shall not be extradited from Nicaragua.
Article 44
Nicaraguans have the right to the personal property and nec-
essary goods that is essential for the integral development of each
.esonl.
Article 45
Persons whose constitutional rights have been violated or are
in danger of violation have the right to present writs of habeas
corpus or amparo, according to the circumstances and the Law of
Amparo.
2
Article 46
All persons in Nicaragua shall enjoy protection and recogni-
tion by the state of the rights inherent to human beings, as well as
unrestricted respect, promotion and protection of human rights,
and the full benefit of the rights set forth in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights; the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man; the International Pact of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the International Pact of Civil and Political
Rights of the United Nations; and the American Convention of
Human Rights of the Organization of American States.
Chapter II
Political Rights
Article 47
All Nicaraguans who have reached sixteen years of age are
full citizens.
All citizens enjoy the political rights set forth in the Constitu-
tion and in other laws, without limitations other than those estab-
lished for reasons of age.
A citizen's rights may be suspended when serious corporal or
specific related punishments are applied and when a final judgment
of civil injunction is decreed.
2. See supra note 1.
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Article 48
Unconditional equality among Nicaraguans in the enjoyment
of political rights is established. In the exercise of these rights and
in the fulfillment of these responsibilities and obligations, there ex-
ists absolute equality between men and women. It is the obligation
of the state to remove obstacles that impede effective participation
of Nicaraguans in the political, economic and social life of the
country.
Article 49
In Nicaragua workers in the cities and countryside, women,
youth, agricultural producers, artisans, professionals, technicians,
intellectuals, artists, religious persons, the Communities of the At-
lantic Coast and the population in general have the right to form
organizations in order to realize their aspirations according to their
own interests, without discrimination, and to participate in the
construction of a new society.
Such organizations may be formed by the voluntary participa-
tion and free will of their members. They shall have social func-
tion and may have a partisan character, according to their nature
and objectives.
Article 50
Citizens have the right to participate under equal condition in
public affairs and in state management.
Effective participation by the people at local and national
levels shall be guaranteed by law.
Article 51
Citizens have the right to elect and be elected in periodic elec-
tions, and to vie for public office.
Article 52
Citizens have the right, individually or collectively, to peti-
tion, denounce irregularities and make constructive criticisms to
the branches of government or to any authority, and obtain a quick
resolution or response and to have the result made known within
the time period established by law.
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Article 53
The right to peaceful assembly is recognized; the exercise of
this right does not require prior permission.
Article 54
The right to public assembly, demonstration and mobilization
in conformity with the law is recognized.
Article 55
Nicaraguan citizens have the right to organize or affiliate with
political parties with the objective of participating in, exercising or
vying for power.
Chapter III
Social Rights
Article 56
The state shall grant special attention in all of its programs to
those who defend the dignity, honor and sovereignty of the nation,
and to their families, as well as to the families of those fallen in
defense of the nation, in accordance with the laws.
Article 57
Nicaraguans have the right to work in keeping with human
nature.
Article 58
Nicaraguans have the right to education and culture.
Article 59
Every Nicaraguan has an equal right to health care. The state
shall establish the basic conditions for the promotion, protection,
recuperation and rehabilitation of the health of the people.
The organization and direction of health care programs, serv-
ices and activities is the responsibility of the state, which shall also
promote popular participation in support of health care.
Citizens are obliged to respect stipulated sanitary measures.
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Article 60
Nicaraguans have the right to live in a healthy environment
and it is the obligation of the state to preserve, conserve and re-
claim the environment and the natural resources of the country.
Article 61
The state guarantees Nicaraguans the right to social security
for protection against the social contingencies of life and work, in
the manner and conditions determined by law.
Article 62
The state shall strive to establish programs for the physical,
psycho-social and professional rehabilitation of disabled people,
and for their job placement.
Article 63
It is the right of all Nicaraguans to be protected against hun-
ger. The state shall promote programs which assure adequate
availability and equitable distribution of food.
Article 64
Nicaraguans have the right to decent, comfortable and safe
housing that guarantees familial privacy. The state shall promote
the fulfillment of this right.
Article 65
Nicaraguans have the right to sports, physical education, re-
laxation and recreation. As part of their integral development, the
state shall promote sports and physical education, through the or-
ganized and mass participation of the people and specific programs
and projects.
Article 66
Nicaraguans have the right to accurate information. This
right includes the freedom to seek, receive and disseminate infor-
mation and ideas, be they spoken or written, in graphic or any
other form.
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Article 67
The right to provide information is a social responsibility and
shall be exercised with strict respect for the principles established
in the Constitution. This right cannot be subject to censorship, but
may be subject to retroactive liability established by law.
Article 68
The mass media is at the service of national interests.
The state shall promote the access of the public and its organi-
zations to the means of communication, and shall prevent the me-
dia from responding to foreign interests or to any economic power
monopoly.
The existence and functioning of public, corporate or private
means of communication shall not be the object of prior censor-
ship. It shall be subject to the law.
Article 69
All persons, either individually or collectively, have the right
to practice their religion in public or private, through worship,
practice and teaching.
No one may disobey the law or prevent others from exercising
their rights and fulfilling their duties by invoking religious beliefs
or inclination.
Chapter IV
Family Rights
Article 70
The family is the fundamental nucleus of society and has the
right to protection by society and the state.
Article 71
It is the right of Nicaraguans to form a family. The law shall
regulate and protect this right.
Article 72
Marriage and stable defacto unions are protected by the state;
they rest on the voluntary agreement between a man and a woman,
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and may be dissolved by mutual consent or by the will of one of the
parties, as provided by law.
Article 73
Family relations rest on respect, solidarity and absolute equal-
ity of rights and responsibilities between the man and woman.
Parents must work together to maintain the home and provide
for the integral development of their children, with equal rights
and responsibilities. Furthermore, children are obligated to re-
spect and assist their parents. These duties and rights shall be ful-
filled in accordance with the pertinent legislation.
Article 74
The state grants special protection to the process of human
reproduction.
Women shall have special protection during pregnancy and
shall be granted maternity leave with pay and appropriate social
security benefits.
No one may deny employment to women for reasons of preg-
nancy nor dismiss them during pregnancy or the post-natal period,
in conformity with the law.
Article 75
All children have equal rights. There shall be no discrimina-
tion for reasons of filial relations. In ordinary legislation, disposi-
tions or classifications that reduce or deny equality among children
shall be null and void.
Article 76
The state shall promote programs and develop special centers
for the care of minors; minors have the right to protection and
education from their family, the society and the state, according to
their needs.
Article 77
The elderly have the right to protective measures from their
family, society and the state.
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Article 78
The state shall protect responsible paternity and maternity
and establish the right to investigate paternity and maternity.
Article 79
The right of adoption based on the best interests of the child is
established, as regulated by law.
Chapter V
Labor Rights
Article 80
Work is a right and a social responsibility. The labor of Ni-
caraguans is the fundamental means to satisfy the needs of society
and of the individual, and is the source of the wealth and prosper-
ity of the nation. The state shall strive for full and productive em-
ployment under conditions that guarantee the fundamental rights
of the individual.
Article 81
Workers have the right to participate in the management of
their enterprises, through their organizations and in conformity
with the law.
Article 82
Workers have the right to working conditions that guarantee:
1. Equal pay for equal work under identical conditions, suita-
ble to their social responsibility, without discrimination for
political, religious, social, gender or other reasons, which
assures a standard of living compatible with human
dignity;
2. Payment of legal tender in their work place;
3. Minimum wage and social security payment shall not be
legally attached except for support of the family and only
by the terms established by law;
4. Work conditions that guarantee physical safety, health and
hygiene and minimize work hazards to guarantee the
worker's occupational health and safety;
5. An eight-hour work day, weekly rest, vacations, remunera-
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tion for national holidays and a thirteenth month bonus, in
conformity with the law;
6. Work stability in conformity with the law and equal oppor-
tunity to be promoted, subject to length of service, capac-
ity, efficiency and responsibility;
7. Social security for protection and subsistence in case of dis-
ability, old age, occupational hazards, illness or maternity;
and for family members in case of death, according to the
conditions established by law.
Article 83
The right to strike is recognized.
Article 84
Child labor that can affect normal childhood development or
interfere with the obligatory school year is prohibited. Children
and adolescents shall be protected against any form of economic
and social exploitation.
Article 85
Workers have the right to cultural, scientific and technical de-
velopment; the state shall facilitate this through special programs.
Article 86
All Nicaraguans have the right to choose and exercise freely
their profession or trade and to choose their place of work with no
requirements other than requisite schooling and that the work
serve a social purpose.
Article 87
Full labor union freedom exists in Nicaragua. Workers may
organize voluntarily in unions, which shall be constituted in con-
formity with the law. No workers are obligated to belong to a par-
ticular union, nor to resign from the one to which they belong.
Full union autonomy is recognized and the legal rights of organ-
ized labor are respected.
Article 88
In defense of their individual or organizational interests,
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workers are guaranteed the inalienable right to negotiate with their
employers, in conformity with the law:
1. Individual contracts;
2. Collective bargaining agreements.
Chapter VI
Rights of the Communities of the Atlantic Coast
Article 89
The Communities of the Atlantic Coast are indivisible parts of
the Nicaraguan people, enjoy the same rights and have the same
obligations as all Nicaraguans.
The Communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to pre-
serve and develop their cultural identities within the framework of
national unity, to be granted their own forms of social organiza-
tion, and to administer their local affairs according to their
traditions.
The state recognizes the communal forms of land ownership
of the Communities of the Atlantic Coast and their enjoyment, use
and benefit of the waters and forests of these communal lands.
Article 90
The Communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to the
free expression and preservation of their languages, art and culture.
The development of their culture and values enriches the national
culture. The state shall create special programs to enhance the ex-
ercise of these rights.
Article 91
The state is obligated to enact laws promoting and assuring
that no Nicaraguan shall be the object of discrimination for rea-
sons of language, culture or origin.
TITLE V
NATIONAL DEFENSE
Chapter I
Article 92
It is the duty and right of Nicaraguans to struggle for the de-
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fense of life, homeland, justice and peace for the full development
of the nation.
Article 93
The Nicaraguan people have the right to arm themselves in
defense of their sovereignty, independence and revolutionary gains.
It is the duty of the state to direct, organize and arm the people to
guarantee this right.
Article 94
The defense of the homeland and the Revolution rests on the
mobilization and organized participation of all the people in the
struggle against their aggressors. The state shall promote mass in-
corporation of the people into the various structures and tasks of
the country's defense.
Article 95
The Sandinista Popular Army has a national character and
must protect, respect and obey this political Constitution.
The Sandinista Popular Army is the military arm of the peo-
ple and direct descendant of the Army in Defense of National Sov-
ereignty. The state prepares, organizes and directs popular
participation in the armed defense of the homeland through the
Sandinista Popular Army.
No armed groups may exist in the national territory other
than those established by the law, which shall regulate military or-
ganizational structure.
Article 96
Nicaraguans have the duty to bear arms to defend the home-
land and the gains of the people against the threats and aggressions
of a foreign country, or of forces directed or supported by any
country. Patriotic military service is established in accordance
with the terms of the law.
Article 97
The struggle against externally promoted actions to under-
mine the revolutionary order established by the Nicaraguan people
and the confrontation with criminal and anti-social actions are in-
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tegral to the defense of the Revolution. The state creates the inter-
nal security forces, whose functions are determined by law.
TITLE VI
NATIONAL ECONOMY, AGRARIAN REFORM AND
PUBLIC FINANCES
Chapter I
National Economy
Article 98
The principal economic function of the state is to promote the
country's material development, overcome the inherited backward-
ness and dependence of the economy, improve the country's stan-
dard of living and create a more just distribution of wealth.
Article 99
The state directs and plans the national economy to guarantee
the protection of the interests of the majority and the promotion of
socio-economic progress.
The Central Bank, the National Financial System, insurance
and foreign commerce, instruments of the economic system, are
irrevocable responsibilities of the state.
Article 100
The state shall promulgate a Foreign Investment Law that
contributes to the socio-economic development of the country,
without damaging national sovereignty.
Article 101
Workers and other productive sectors have the right to par-
ticipate in the creation, execution and control of economic plans.
Article 102
Natural resources are national patrimony. Preservation of the
environment, and conservation, development and rational exploita-
tion of natural resources are responsibilities of the state; the state
may formalize contracts for the rational exploitation of these re-
sources when required by the national interest.
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Article 103
The state guarantees the democratic coexistence of public, pri-
vate, cooperative, associative and communal property; all these
form parts of the mixed economy, are subject to the overriding in-
terest of the nation and fulfill a social function.
Article 104
Enterprises organized under any of the forms of ownership
established in this Constitution enjoy equality before the law and
the economic policies of the state. The economic plans of enter-
prises must be prepared with the participation of the workers.
Free economic initiative exists.
Article 105
The state is obligated to fairly and rationally regulate the sup-
ply and distribution of basic consumer goods, both in the country-
side and in the cities. Speculation and hoarding are incompatible
with the socio-economic system and constitute serious crimes
against the people.
Chapter I
Agrarian Reform
Article 106
Agrarian reform is the fundamental instrument for achieving
a just distribution of land and an effective means for revolutionary
transformation, national development and the social progress of
Nicaragua. The state guarantees the development of the agrarian
reform program in order to fulfill the historic demands of the
peasants.
Article 107
Agrarian reform shall abolish landed estates, rentism, ineffi-
cient production and the exploitation of peasants. It shall promote
forms of ownership compatible with the economic and social objec-
tives of the nation, as established in this Constitution.
Article 108
Land ownership is guaranteed to all those who productively
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and efficiently work their land. The law shall establish specific reg-
ulations and exceptions in conformity with the goals and objectives
of agrarian reform.
Article 109
The state shall promote the voluntary association of peasants
in agricultural cooperatives, without sexual discrimination. Sub-
ject to resources, it shall provide the material means necessary to
raise their technical and productive capacity in order to improve
the standard of living of the peasants.
Article 110
The state shall promote the voluntary incorporation of small
and medium scale agricultural producers, both individually and in
associations, into the economic ind social development plans of the
country.
Article 111
The peasants and other productive sectors have the right to
participate, through their own organizations, in establishing the
policies of agrarian transformation.
Chapter III
Public Finances
Article 112
The annual General Budget of the Republic shall regulate
public income and expenditure. The Budget must show the dis-
tinct sources and recipients of income and expenditure, which
must balance, and shall determine the spending limits of the state
institutions. Extraordinary spending may only be authorized by
law and financed through the simultaneous creation and assign-
ment of resources.
Article 113
The Budget shall be prepared by the President of the Republic
and approved by the National Assembly in the Annual Budget
Law, in conformity with this Constitution and the law.
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Article 114
The taxation system must take into consideration the distribu-
tion of wealth and income, as well as the needs of the state.
Article 115
Taxes must be created by laws that establish their frequency
and type and the rights of taxpayers. The state shall not require
payment of taxes that have not been previously established by law.
TITLE VII
EDUCATION AND CULTURE
Chapter I
Article 116
Education seeks the full and integral development of Ni-
caraguans; to stimulate them with a critical, scientific and human-
ist way of thinking; to develop their personality and sense of
dignity and to prepare them to assume the tasks of common inter-
est necessary for the progress of the nation. Therefore, education
is fundamental to the transformation and development of the indi-
vidual and society.
Article 117
Education is a single, democratic, creative and participatory
process, which promotes scientific research and links theory with
practice and manual with intellectual labor. It is based on our na-
tional values; on the knowledge of our history and reality and of
national and universal culture; and on scientific and technological
advances; it cultivates the values of the new Nicaraguan in accord
with the principles established in this Constitution, the study of
which must be promoted.
Article 118
The state promotes the participation of the family, community
and individuals in education and guarantees the support of the
public means of communication for this purpose.
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Article 119
Education is an unrenounceable responsibility of the state, in-
cluding planning, direction and organization. The national educa-
tional system functions in an integrated fashion and in accordance
with national plans. Its organization and functioning are deter-
mined by law.
It is the duty of the state to develop and train the technical
and professional personnel at all levels and disciplines necessary
for the development and transformation of the country.
Article 120
The creative application of educational plans and policies is a
fundamental role of the national teaching profession. Teachers
have the right to living and working conditions in accord with
their dignity and with the important social function that they per-
form; they shall be promoted and given incentives in accord with
the law.
Article 121
All Nicaraguans have free and equal access to education. Ba-
sic education is free of charge and obligatory. The Communities of
the Atlantic Coast have access in their region to education in their
native language up to the levels set by national plans and
programs.
Article 122
Adults shall be offered educational opportunities and training
programs. The state shall continue its programs to eradicate
illiteracy.
Article 123
Private education centers may function at all levels, subject to
the terms established in this Constitution.
Article 124
Education in Nicaragua is secular. The state recognizes the
right of private educational centers with a religious orientation to
teach religion as an extracurricular subject.
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Article 125
Higher education enjoys financial, organic and administrative
autonomy in accordance with the law. Academic freedom is rec-
ognized. The state promotes free creation, research and dissemina-
tion of the sciences, arts and letters.
Article 126
It is the duty of the state to promote the recovery, develop-
ment and strengthening of national culture, sustained by creative
popular participation.
The state shall support national culture in all its diversity,
whether collective or individual.
Article 127
Artistic and cultural creation is completely unrestricted. Cul-
tural workers have full freedom to choose their forms and styles of
expression. The state shall strive to provide them with the means
necessary to create and present their works, and to protect their
rights of authorship.
Article 128
The state protects the archeological, historical, linguistic, cul-
tural and artistic patrimony of the nation.
TITLE VIII
ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE
Chapter I
General Principles
Article 129
The Legislative, Executive, Judicial and Electoral branches of
government are independent of one another and coordinate harmo-
niously, subject only to the overriding national interest and to the
provisions established in this Constitution.
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Article 130
No office holder may exercise functions other than those con-
ferred upon the office by the Constitution and the laws.
All state officials must declare their financial status before as-
suming and upon leaving public office, as regulated by law.
Article 131
Elected and appointed officials of the four branches of govern-
ment are publicly accountable for the proper fulfillment of their
duties and must inform the public of their work and official activi-
ties. They must be receptive to problems presented by the people
and strive to resolve them. Official duties must be exercised in the
public interest. All officials must efficiently and honestly carry out
their duties; they shall be responsible for their acts and omissions.
Civil service shall be regulated by law.
Chapter II
Legislative Branch
Article 132
The National Assembly exercises legislative power through
representative popular mandate. The National Assembly is com-
posed of ninety Representatives with their respective Alternates,
elected by universal suffrage; equal, free and direct elections, and
secret ballot in regional districts by means of a proportional repre-
sentation system, as regulated by the Electoral Law. The number
of Representatives may be increased in accord with the general
census of the population in conformity with the law.
Article 133
Unelected Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who
participated in the election also form part of the National Assem-
bly as Representatives and Alternates respectively if they have re-
ceived a number of votes equal or superior to the average number
of votes necessary to win the election in each regional electoral
district.
Article 134
A Representative in the National Assembly must be:
1. A Nicaraguan national;
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2. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
3. Over twenty-one years of age.
Article 135
No Representative to the National Assembly may obtain any
concessions from the state or be the proxy or agent of public, pri-
vate or foreign enterprises which have contracts with the state. Vi-
olation of this provision annuls the concessions or advantages
obtained and terminates the person's representative status.
Article 136
Representatives to the National Assembly shall be elected for
a period of six years, starting from the date of inauguration, which
shall be the ninth of January of the year following the election.
Article 137
Representatives and Alternates elected to the National As-
sembly shall be sworn in by the President of the Supreme Electoral
Council.
The National Assembly shall be inaugurated by the Supreme
Electoral Council.
Article 138
The functions of the National Assembly are to:
1. Draft and approve laws and decrees, as well as amend or
repeal existing ones.
2. Officially interpret the law.
3. Decree amnesty and pardons, as well as commute or re-
duce sentences.
4. Solicit reports through the President of the Republic from
the Ministers or Vice Ministers of the state and Presidents
or Directors of autonomous and governmental institu-
tions. Request by the same means their personal appear-
ance and explanation or consultation.
5. Grant and cancel legal status to entities of a civil or reli-
gious nature.
6. Consider, discuss and approve the General Budget of the
Republic in conformity with the procedures established in
the Constitution and by law.
7. Elect Judges to the Supreme Court of Justice and Mem-
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bers and their Alternates to the Supreme Electoral Coun-
cil, from slates of three candidates proposed by the
President of the Republic.
8. Elect the Controller General of the Republic from a slate
of three candidates proposed by the President of the
Republic.
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permanent absences of Representatives to the National
Assembly.
10. Consider and acknowledge the resignations or dismissals
of Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice, of Members of
the Supreme Electoral Council or the Controller General
of the Republic.
11. Ratify or reject international treaties.
12. Regulate all matters related to symbols of the nation.
13. Create honorary orders and distinctions of national
character.
14. Create and grant its own orders of national character.
15. Receive the President or the Vice President of the Repub-
lic in formal session to hear the annual report.
16, Delegate the legislative faculties to the President of the
Republic when the National Assembly is in recess in ac-
cord with the Annual Decree of Delegating Legislative
Functions. Matters relating to the codes of the Republic
are excepted.
17. Elect the National Assembly's Executive Board.
18. Create permanent, special and investigative committees.
19. Propose grace pensions and grant honors for distin-
guished service to the homeland and to humanity.
20. Determine the political and administrative division of the
country.
21. Consider the economic and social development plans and
policies of the country.
22. Fill permanent vacancies of the Presidency or Vice Presi-
dency of the Republic.
23. Authorize foreign visits of the President of the Republic
which last longer than one month.
24. Review and resolve complaints presented against officials
who enjoy immunity.
25. Decree the General Statute and Internal Rules of the Na-
tional Assembly.
26. Fulfill other functions conferred by the Constitution and
the laws.
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Article 139
Representatives shall bear no legal responsibility for their
opinions and votes cast in the National Assembly and enjoy immu-
nity in conformity with the law.
Article 140
Representatives to the National Assembly and the President
of the Republic may initiate bills, as may the Supreme Court of
Justice and the Supreme Electoral Council in matters pertaining to
their respective jurisdictions. This right of initiative shall be regu-
lated by the General Statute and Internal Rules of the National
Assembly.
Article 141
Quorum for sessions of the National Assembly is half the
number of its members plus one. To be approved, bills shall re-
quire a favorable vote by a simple majority of the Representatives
present.
Once a bill is approved, it shall be sent to the President of the
Republic for authorization, promulgation and publication.
Article 142
The President of the Republic may partially or totally veto a
bill within 15 days after receiving it. If the President does not veto
the bill and fails to authorize, promulgate and publish it, the Presi-
dent of the National Assembly shall order the law to be published.
Article 143
A bill partially or totally vetoed by the President of the Re-
public must be returned to the National Assembly with the reasons
for the veto specified. The National Assembly can reject the veto
with a vote of half plus one of its Representatives, in which case
the President of the National Assembly shall order the law to be
published.
1990] 499
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Chapter III
Executive Branch
Article 144
The President of the Republic, who is the Head of State, Head
of Government and Commander in Chief of the Defense and Se-
curity Forces of the Nation, exercises executive power.
Article 145
The Vice President of the Republic carries out the functions
delegated by the President and shall substitute in that position dur-
ing the President's temporary or permanent absence.
Article 146
The election of the President and Vice President of the Repub-
lic is by universal suffrage, equal, free and direct elections, and se-
cret ballot. The Candidates who receive the largest number of
votes will be elected.
Article 147
The President and Vice President of the Republic must be:
1. Nicaraguan nationals;
2. In full enjoyment of civil and political rights;
3. Over twenty-five years of age.
Article 148
The President and Vice President shall exercise their functions
for a period of six years, starting from their inauguration on Janu-
ary 10 of the year following the election; they shall enjoy immunity
during their term of office.
Article 149
In case of the temporary absence of the President of the Re-
public, the Vice President shall assume the Presidential functions.
When the absence is permanent, the Vice President shall assume
the position of the President of the Republic for the remainder of
the term and the National Assembly must elect a new Vice
President.
In case of the temporary and simultaneous absence of the
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President and Vice President, the President of the National Assem-
bly, or whoever is serving in that position in accord with the law,
shall assume the functions of the President.
In case of the permanent absence of the Vice President of the
Republic, the National Assembly shall appoint a substitute.
If the President and Vice President of the Republic are perma-
nently absent, the President of the National Assembly or whoever
is next in order of succession under law shall assume the functions
of the President. The National Assembly must appoint substitutes
for the President and Vice President within seventy-two hours after
their positions have become vacant. Those appointed shall exercise
their functions for the remainder of the term.
Article 150
The functions of the President of the Republic are to:
1. Comply with and enforce the political Constitution and
the laws.
2. Represent the nation.
3. Initiate legislation and exercise the right to veto, in ac-
cordance with this Constitution.
4. Enact executive decrees with the force of law in fiscal and
administrative matters.
5. Prepare the General Budget of the Republic and promul-
gate it upon approval or review by the National Assem-
bly, depending on the case.
6. Appoint and remove Ministers and Vice Ministers of
State, Delegate Ministers of the Presidency, Presidents or
Directors of autonomous and governmental institutions
and other officials whose appointment or removal is not
otherwise determined in the Constitutions and the laws.
7. Assume the legislative faculties delegated by the National
Assembly during its recess period.
8. Conduct the international relations of the Republic, for-
malize international treaties, agreements or accords and
appoint the heads of diplomatic missions.
9. Decree and put into effect the State of Emergency in cir-
cumstances defined by this political Constitution and for-
ward the decree to the National Assembly for ratification
within a period of no more than forty-five days.
10. Adopt regulations to give effect to the laws.
11. Grant honorary orders and decorations of a national
character.
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12. Organize and conduct the government and preside over
Cabinet meetings.
13. Administer the economy of the country and determine
socio-economic policies and programs.
14. Propose slates of three candidates to the National Assem-
bly for the election of Judges to the Supreme Court of
Tistiee Members to the Supreme E.lhetnrqrl Cninnil and
the Controller General of the Republic.
15. Present the annual and other reports and special messages
to the National Assembly personally or via the Vice
President.
16. Fulfill the other functions conferred by this Constitution
and the laws.
Article 151
The President of the Republic determines the number, organi-
zation and jurisdiction of the government ministries and autono-
mous and state institutions. The ministers, vice ministers and
presidents or directors of autonomous and governmental institu-
tions enjoy immunity.
Article 152
Ministers, vice ministers or presidents of autonomous or gov-
ernmental institutions must be:
1. A Nicaraguan national;
2. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
3. Over twenty-five years of age.
Article 153
Ministers, vice ministers and presidents or directors of auton-
omous and governmental institutions are responsible for their acts
in conformity with this Constitution and the laws.
Chapter IV
Office of the Controller General of the Republic
Article 154
The Office of the Controller General of the Republic is the
governing body which controls public administration and the
"Area of People's Property" (public property).
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Article 155
The Controller General of the Republic has the following
responsibilities:
1. The establishment of a system which controls the proper
use and prevents abuses of funds.
2. Ongoing supervision of the management of the General
Budget of the Republic.
3. Control, examination and evaluation of the administrative
and financial management of public institutions, those sub-
sidized by the state and the public or private enterprises
which receive investments of public capital.
Article 156
The Office of the Controller General of the Republic shall en-
joy functional and administrative autonomy and shall be directed
by the Controller General of the Republic, who shall give annual
reports to the National Assembly and enjoy immunity.
Article 157
The law shall determine the organization and functioning of
the Office of the Controller General of the Republic.
Chapter V
Judicial Branch
Article 158
Justice emanates from the people and shall be carried out in
their name as their proxy by the Judicial Branch, composed of the
Courts of Justice established by law.
Article 159
The Courts of Justice form a single system, headed by the
Supreme Court of Justice. The exercise of judicial powers falls
under the authority of the Judicial Branch. Military jurisdiction is
established, and its exercise is regulated by law.
Article 160
The administration of justice guarantees the principle of legal-
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ity and protects and promotes human rights through the applica-
tion of law in the matters within its jurisdiction.
Article 161
A Judge of the Supreme Court of Justice must be:
1. A Nicaraguan national;
2. A lawyer;
3. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
4. Over twenty-five years of age.
Article 162
Judges shall serve for a term of six years and may be dismissed
from their position only for reasons determined by law.
Judges enjoy immunity.
Article 163
The Supreme Court of Justice shall be composed of at least
seven Judges, selected by the National Assembly, from slates of
three candidates proposed by the President of the Republic.
The Judges shall take office after being sworn in before the
National Assembly.
The President of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be ap-
pointed by the President of the Republic from among the Judges
selected by the National Assembly.
Article 164
The functions of the Supreme Court of Justice are to:
1. Organize and direct the administration of justice;
2. Review and decide ordinary and extraordinary appeals
presented against the judgments of the Courts of Justice of
the Republic, in accord with the proceedings established by
law.
3. Review and decide on writs of amparo3 claiming violations
of rights established in the Constitution, according to the
Law of Amparo.
4. Review and decide on writs challenging the constitutional-
ity of a law, filed in conformity with the Constitution and
the Law of Amparo.
3. See supra note 1.
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5. Appoint the Judges of the Appeals Courts and the Courts
of the Republic, in accord with procedures established by
law.
6. Draft its internal rules and appoint its personnel.
7. Fulfill other functions conferred on it by the Constitution
and the laws.
Article 165
In their judicial activity Supreme Court Judges and other
judges are independent and are subject only to the Constitution
and the law; they shall be governed by, among others, the princi-
ples of equality, public proceedings and the right to a defense. In
Nicaragua justice is free of charge.
Article 166
The administration of justice shall be organized and shall
function with popular participation as determined by the law. The
members of the Courts of Justice, be they lawyers or not, have
equal authority in the exercise of their legal functions.
Article 167
State authorities, organizations and legal institutions and indi-
viduals must comply with the verdicts and resolutions of the
Courts and Judges.
Chapter VI
Electoral Branch
Article 168
The organization, management and oversight of elections,
plebiscites and referendums are the exclusive responsibility of the
Electoral Branch.
Article 169
The Electoral Branch is composed of the Supreme Electoral
Council and other, subordinate electoral bodies.
Article 170
The Supreme Electoral Council is composed of five Members
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with their respective Alternates, elected by the National Assembly
from slates of three candidates for each position proposed by the
President of the Republic. The National Assembly shall select the
President of the Supreme Electoral Council from the elected
Members.
Article 1" 71
The Members of the Supreme Electoral Council must be:
1. Nicaraguan nationals;
2. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
3. Over twenty-five years of age.
Article 172
The President and other Members of the Supreme Electoral
Council shall exercise their functions for a term of six years start-
ing from the date on which they take office; during this period they
enjoy immunity.
Article 173
The functions of the Supreme Electoral Council are to:
1. Organize and conduct the elections, plebiscites or referen-
dums convoked in accordance with the Constitution and
the law.
2. Appoint the members of the other electoral bodies, in ac-
cordance with the Electoral Law.
3. Establish the calendar for elections.
4. Apply the constitutional and legal provisions that refer to
the electoral process.
5. Serve as the final arbiter of resolutions enacted by
subordinate electoral bodies and of the claims and dis-
putes presented by political parties.
6. Issue relevant measures in accordance with the law to en-
sure that the electoral process develops under conditions
of full legal guarantees.
7. Ensure that the appropriate bodies provide security for
the political parties participating in the elections.
8. Make the final check of the votes cast in the elections,
plebiscites and referendums, and present the final declara-
tion of the results.
9. Draft its own regulations.
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10. Fulfill other functions conferred on it by the Constitution
and the laws.
Article 174
The Members and alternates of the Supreme Electoral Coun-
cil shall take office after being sworn in by the President of the
National Assembly.
TITLE IX
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
Chapter I
Municipalities
Article 175
The national territory shall be divided for administrative pur-
poses into Regions, Departments and Municipalities. The laws re-
garding this matter shall determine the size, number, organization,
structure and operation of the various districts.
Article 176
The Municipality is the basic unit of political administration
in the country. The law shall determine their number and size.
Article 177
The government and administration of Municipalities is the
responsibility of the municipal authorities, who enjoy autonomy
without abrogating the authority of the central government.
Municipal governments shall be elected by the people, by uni-
versal suffrage; equal, free and direct election and secret ballot, in
conformity with the law.
Article 178
Municipal authorities shall serve six-year terms, beginning
from the day they are sworn in before the Supreme Electoral
Council.
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Article 179
The state shall promote the integral and harmonious develop-
ment of the diverse parts of the nation.
Chapter II
Communities of the Atlantic Coast
Article 180
The Communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to live
and develop under the forms of social organization that correspond
to their historic and cultural traditions. The state guarantees these
communities the benefits of their natural resources, the legitimacy
of their forms of communal [sic]. Furthermore, it guarantees the
preservation of their cultures and languages, religion and customs.
Article 181
The state shall implement a law which establishes autono-
mous governments in the regions inhabited by the Communities of
the Atlantic Coast to guarantee the exercise of their rights.
TITLE X
SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION, ITS REFORM, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS
Chapter I
Political Constitution
Article 182
The political Constitution is the fundamental charter of the
Republic; all other laws are subordinate to it. Any laws, treaties,
orders or provisions that oppose it or alter its provisions shall be
null and void.
Article 183
No branch of government, governmental body or official shall
have any authority, faculty or jurisdiction other than those con-
ferred by the political Constitution and the laws of the Republic.
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Article 184
Once written, the Electoral Law, Emergency Law and Law of
Amparo will have constitutional status under the political Consti-
tution of Nicaragua.
Article 185
The President of the Republic may suspend the rights and
guarantees consecrated in this Constitution within part or all of the
nation in case of war or when demanded by national security, eco-
nomic conditions or a national catastrophe.
The President's decree shall put the State of Emergency into
effect for a specified renewable time period. The law of Emergency
shall regulate its forms. During a State of Emergency, the Presi-
dent of the Republic is authorized to approve the General Budget
of the Republic and forward it to the National Assembly for its
review.
Article 186
The President of the Republic can not suspend the rights and
guarantees established in articles 23; 24; 25, no.3; 26, no.3; 27; 29;
33, nos. 2.1 (final part), 3 and 5; 34, except nos. 2 and 8; 35; 36; 37;
38; 39; 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; 46; 47; 48; 50; 51; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 61;
62; 63; 64; 65; 67, first paragraph; 68, first paragraph; 69; 70; 71;
72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 82; 84; 85; 87; 89; 90 and 91.
Chapter II
Constitutional Control
Article 187
Any citizen has the right to seek judicial review of the consti-
tutionality of any law, decree or regulation that is inconsistent with
the political Constitution.
Article 188
The Writ of Amparo may be used to challenge any provision
act or resolution and any action or omission of any official or au-
thority or his or her agent violating or attempting to violate the
right and guarantees affirmed in the political Constitution.
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Article 189
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be used by anyone whose
freedom, physical integrity or security is violated or is in danger of
being violated.
Article i90
The Law of Amparo shall regulate the remedies established in
this chapter.
Chapter III
Constitutional Amendment
Article 191
The National Assembly is empowered to partially amend this
political Constitution and to review and approve its total revision.
The President of the Republic or one-third of the Representa-
tives to the National Assembly can initiate a partial reform.
Half plus one of the total number of Representatives to the
National Assembly are necessary to initiate a total reform.
Article 192
A proposal for partial reform must specify the article or arti-
cles to be reformed with a statement of the reasons for the modifi-
cation. The proposal must be sent to a special commission which
shall render an opinion within no more than sixty days; the initia-
tive shall then follow the same process as for the creation of a law.
A proposal for partial reform must be discussed in two ses-
sions of the National Assembly.
Article 193
A proposal for total reform shall follow the same process as in
the previous article, except that upon its approval, the National
Assembly shall establish a time period for holding elections for a
Constituent National Assembly. The National Assembly shall re-
tain jurisdiction until the installation of the new Constituent Na-
tional Assembly. Until a new Constitution has been approved by
the Constituent National Assembly, this Constitution shall remain
in effect.
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Article 194
Approval of a partial reform shall require a favorable vote by
sixty percent of the Representatives. Two-thirds of the total
number of Representatives are required to approve a total revision.
The President of the Republic must promulgate the partial amend-
ment which is not subject to veto.
Article 195
The reform of constitutional laws shall follow the procedure
established for partial reform of the Constitution, with the excep-
tion of the requirement of discussion in two legislative sessions.
TITLE XI
FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 196
This Constitution shall govern from the time of its publication
in La Gaceta, the official daily legal publication, and shall annul
the Fundamental Statute of the Republic, the Statute of Rights and
Guarantees of Nicaraguans and all other legal provisions inconsis-
tent with it.
Article 197
This Constitution shall be widely disseminated in the official
language of the country. It shall also be disseminated in the lan-
guages of the Communities of the Atlantic Coast.
Article 198
All aspects of the existing legal order that do not contradict
this Constitution shall remain in effect, until such time as they may
be modified.
Article 199
The special Courts shall continue to function until such time
as they come under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch. The
appointment of their members and their procedures shall be deter-
mined by the established laws.
Furthermore, the Common Courts shall continue to function
in their present form, until a system with popular representation is
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established. This principle shall be implemented gradually in ac-
cord with the circumstances.
Article 200
The current political administrative division shall be pre-
served until the law governing it iq promnlsgted.
Article 201
The President and Vice President of the Republic and the
Representatives to the National Assembly, elected November 4,
1984, shall exercise their functions during the term that ends Janu-
ary 10 and 9, 1991, respectively.
The members of the Supreme Court of Justice and the
Supreme Electoral Council and other authorities and officials of
the diverse branches of government shall continue to exercise their
functions until such time as their successors take office in accord-
ance with the Constitution.
Article 202
Four official copies of this Constitution shall be signed by the
President and Representatives to the National Assembly and by
the President of the Republic. These copies shall be kept in the
offices of the Presidency of the National Assembly, the Presidency
of the Republic, and the Presidency of the Supreme Electoral
Council. Each one shall have the force of the authentic text of the
Political Constitution of Nicaragua. The President of the Republic
shall cause it to be published in La Gaceta, the official daily
publication.
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THEREFORE, LET BE IT PUBLISHED
MANAGUA, JANUARY 9, 1987.
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